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ABSTRACT 
DIFFUSION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES 
Khatera Alizada 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. David C. Earnest 
This study examines the global diffusion of renewable energy policies: feed-in tariffs 
(FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). Existing studies of policy diffusion have failed to 
differentiate between four possible mechanisms of policy diffusion: emulation, suasion, learning 
and competition. To test these competing explanations, the study uses a mixed-method research 
design that combines statistical analysis of time-series cross-sectional data with an agent-based 
model of diffusion processes. The findings of the statistical analysis show strong support for the 
suasion (European Union Membership, Clean Development Mechanisms) and emulation 
mechanisms (cultural similarity or common language) in the diffusion of FIT. In the diffusion of 
RPS there is strong support for suasion mechanism (European Union Membership and Clean 
Development Mechanisms), and emulation (common colonial history and language similarity). 
There is no support and weak support for competition and learning respectively.  The study 
identifies future areas for research on the emulation, suasion, learning and competition 
mechanisms.
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright, 2017, by Khatera Alizada, All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
For my family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am grateful for the support and guidance of many people who have contributed to the 
successful completion of this dissertation. I extend many thanks and gratitude to my committee 
members Dr. David C. Earnest, Dr. Steve Yetiv, and Dr. David D. Selover for their patience and 
hours of guidance on my work and editing of this manuscript. I would like to acknowledge the 
special effort of my committee chair David Earnest without whom the project could not be 
completed.  His specific suggestions and recommendation helped me organize my thought 
process from the beginning of the project until the end. Every time he reviewed my work, he 
offered detailed suggestions that helped improve the project. When I felt overwhelmed, he 
encouraged me with his understanding and sympathy. When there were moments when I felt 
stuck, his advice and guidance helped me progress. Steve Yetiv offered practical comments, 
support and assistance in finding data sources. David Selover provided suggestions that added 
great value to the project.   
While I received valuable support from my committee, I would like to thank the rest of 
Graduate Program in International Studies (GPIS) at Old Dominion University. Regina Karp 
offered me advice and continuous encouragement. Jessi Richman deserves special mention with 
offering his support whenever I needed it. I am grateful to Kurt Taylor Gaubatz for teaching 
valuable programming skills that were very useful in managing my data and statistical tests. I 
would like to thank the all the GPIS team, faculty, staff and fellow students for inspiring me.  
While I benefited immensely from GPIS, I would like to thank the rest of at Old 
Dominion University.  I would like to mention Interdisciplinary Studies Teacher Preparation 
program and especially Elizabeth Esinhart for supporting me whenever I needed. Dr. Jennifer 
vi 
 
Fish was always there for me offering her encouragement and advice. John Sokolowski and 
Catherine Banks were influential in my work.  
I want to thank my family and friends who kept me motivated, believed in me and were 
eagerly waiting for the completion of the project. They always encouraged me to stick to it and 
were curious about my progress. Without their encouragement, this project would have not been 
successful. I would like to thank Eva Szalkai Csaky, Director of the Hunter and Stephanie Hunt 
Institute of Engineering and Humanity at Southern Methodist University, for providing me with 
support and office space to write my project. Finally, I would like to thank everyone at Old 
Dominion University.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xi 
 
Chapter 
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 
RPS AND FIT: THE MOST EFFICIENT RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES .................4 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: DIFFUSION MECHANISMS ............................................................11 
SUASION ..............................................................................................................................12 
COMPETITION ....................................................................................................................17 
LEARNING ...........................................................................................................................21 
EMULATION ........................................................................................................................24 
OTHER EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................................................28 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................................................40 
DIFFUSION MECHANISMS’ HYPOTHESES ...................................................................40 
RESEARCH METHODS ......................................................................................................49 
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION ..............................................................................52 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................64 
 
AGENT-BASED MODEL ............................................................................................................65 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND AGENTS ...............................................................................66 
AGENTS’ INITIALIZATION ...............................................................................................72 
MODEL EXECUTION: TO ACTIVATE A DYAD .............................................................73 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE RATE AT WHICH DIFFUSION OCCURS ..................74 
INTERACTION .....................................................................................................................80 
PLOTS ...................................................................................................................................83 
TYPICAL RUN FOR EACH MECHANISM .......................................................................87 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED DATA .......................................................97 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................111 
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS ..........................................................................................................117 
RANDOM EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS ............................................118 
EVENT HISTORY MODELS .............................................................................................123 
HYPOTHESIS EXAMINATION UNDER FOUR SPECIFICATIONS OF FIT  
MODELS .............................................................................................................................127 
  
viii 
 
Chapter Page 
 
HYPOTHESIS EXAMINATION UNDER FOUR SPECIFICATIONS OF RPS  
MODELS .............................................................................................................................135 
COMPARISON: RESULTS OF FIT AND RPS MODELS ................................................138 
PROBABILITY PROFILES OF FIT AND RPS MODELS ...............................................141 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................145 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL FINDINGS ................................................................147 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .................................................................................153 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................155 
 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................164 
A. DATA SOURCES ...........................................................................................................164 
B. DIFFUSION VARIABLES .............................................................................................167 
C. DIFFUSION MECHANISMS ........................................................................................170 
D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ........................................................................................172 
E. CORRELATIONS ...........................................................................................................174 
F. OPERATIONALIZATION .............................................................................................176 
G. ABM CODE ....................................................................................................................178 
 
VITA ............................................................................................................................................195 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Countries FIT/RPS Year of Adoption....................................................................................... 6 
2. FIT/RPS Adoption by Geographic Region ............................................................................... 7 
3. Countries with National RPS/FIT by Income Level ................................................................. 8 
4. Barriers to Renewable Energy ................................................................................................ 31 
5. Data Operationalization .......................................................................................................... 53 
6. Controls not Included Because of Missing Data ..................................................................... 55 
7. Frequency Table ...................................................................................................................... 57 
8. Frequency Distribution of Variables ....................................................................................... 58 
9. RPS/non-RPS Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 59 
10. Interaction Rules ..................................................................................................................... 82 
11. Time to Full Diffusion .......................................................................................................... 104 
12. Maximum Power Difference ................................................................................................. 105 
13. Maximum Regional Difference ............................................................................................ 106 
14. Maximum Compliance Difference ....................................................................................... 107 
15. Last Step Maximum Region ................................................................................................. 108 
16. Last Step Maximum Power Difference ................................................................................. 109 
17. Last Step Maximum Compliance Difference ....................................................................... 110 
18. Diffusion of Kyoto Protocol by Region ................................................................................ 113 
19. FIT Diffusion Regional Variation ......................................................................................... 115 
  
x 
 
Table Page 
20. FIT Models, Random-Effects Logit ...................................................................................... 121 
21. RPS Models Random-Effects Logit...................................................................................... 122 
22. FIT Models: Event History (Estimates as Betas) .................................................................. 125 
23. RPS Models: Event History (Estimates as Betas) ................................................................. 126 
24. FIT Suasion Models .............................................................................................................. 128 
25. FIT Emulation Models .......................................................................................................... 129 
26. FIT Competition Models....................................................................................................... 130 
27. FIT Learning Models ............................................................................................................ 131 
28. FIT Models............................................................................................................................ 133 
29. RPS Suasion Models ............................................................................................................. 134 
30. RPS Emulation Models ......................................................................................................... 135 
31. RPS Competition Models ..................................................................................................... 136 
32. FIT Learning Models ............................................................................................................ 137 
33. RPS Models .......................................................................................................................... 140 
34. Comparison FIT and RPS Models ........................................................................................ 142 
35. Pooled Logit Probability Profiles Full RPS Model .............................................................. 143 
36. Pooled Logit Probability Profiles Full FIT Model ................................................................ 144 
37. Full FIT Model: Event History Probability Profile ............................................................... 145 
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                               Page 
1. Total number of countries with FIT and RPS Policies 1990-2013 ......................................... 56 
2. Average Rates of Growth & Dispersion under FIT/ Non-FIT 1990-2011 ............................. 58 
3. Average Rates of Growth & Dispersion under RPS/non-RPS 1998-2011 ............................. 59 
4. Percent of Countries with FIT Based on Orientation/ System of Government ...................... 60 
5. Percent of Countries with RPS Based on System/Government Orientation ........................... 61 
6. Percent of Countries with FIT/RPS in Each Region ............................................................... 62 
7. Percent of Countries Adopted FIT/RPS by Income Level ...................................................... 63 
8. Agent Types ............................................................................................................................ 68 
9. Competitors ............................................................................................................................. 71 
10. Initialization ............................................................................................................................ 73 
11. Sender Is Nation-state (Sky Blue), IGO (green) & Actor (Yellow) ....................................... 74 
12. Non-Convergence the Receiver Nation-state (Red Patch) Not Turning White ...................... 84 
13. Convergence: The Receiver Nation-state (Red Patch) Turned White .................................... 84 
14. Left to Right Emulation, Learning & Competition ................................................................. 85 
15. Coercion: Poisson, Uniform, Normal ..................................................................................... 85 
16. Competition Normal, Uniform, Poisson ................................................................................. 85 
17. Emulation, Normal, Uniform, Poisson ................................................................................... 85 
18. Learning Normal, Uniform, Poisson ....................................................................................... 86 
19. Learning Poisson Regional Difference ................................................................................... 86 
  
xii 
 
Figure                                                                                                                               Page 
20. Learning Poisson Power Difference ....................................................................................... 86 
21. Learning Poisson Compliance Difference .............................................................................. 86 
22. Competition Mechanism. Top to Bottom Run Time 428, 561, 792 ....................................... 89 
23. Emulation Mechanism. Top to Bottom Run Time 260, 792, 2594 ......................................... 91 
24. Coercion Mechanism Top to Bottom Run Time 313, 587, 1445 ............................................ 93 
25. Learning Mechanism Top to Bottom Run Time 198, 394, 1086 ............................................ 95 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to what rational self-interested actors would do based on costs, benefits and 
utility maximization, some of the top oil exporters in the world have adopted renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS) or feed-in tariffs (FIT) in less than a decade. These countries include Iran and 
the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East; Kazakhstan in Asia; Nigeria and Algeria in Africa; 
Norway and the United Kingdom in Europe; and Brazil in the Americas (Network 2014, U.S. 
Department of Energy and Administration 2012). Not only is Norway a top non-renewable 
energy producer, the share of renewable energy in the country’s final energy consumption was 
65 percent in 2012 (Eurostat 2014). Despite being the top oil exporters in the world, however, 
these countries have adopted renewable energy policies. One possible explanation for this puzzle 
is policy diffusion, the spread of new policies in the international system. Does adoption of 
renewable energy policies in one country affect the probability of adoption in others? If so which 
mechanisms explain the diffusion of renewable energy policies? 
This study looks at the adoption of renewable energy polices at the national government 
level as a consequence of diffusion and of actors involved in the processes of diffusion. What is 
diffusion? “Diffusion occurs when one government’s decision about whether to adopt a policy 
innovation is influenced by the choices made by other governments”(Graham, Shipan, and 
Volden 2013, 675) Diffusion is associated with external determinants. However, there is no 
consensus among scholars whether internal or external determinants are more important in policy 
adoption. 
There is limited literature on renewable energy policy adoption and diffusion 
mechanisms. The literature mainly focuses on internal characteristics of states. There are 
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separate studies about US states (Matisoff 2008, Jenner, Ovaere, and Schindele 2013), Europe 
(Jenner et al. 2012) and developing and emerging economies (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). A 
comprehensive study is needed to encompass broader geographic regions. There is a gap in the 
literature about the systematic studies of diffusion mechanisms, their links with different actors 
and with renewable energy policy adoption. This study will contribute by examining the role of 
actors in these different processes. 
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) argue that governments’ policy decisions are 
interdependent to decision of other countries. They identify four discrete diffusion mechanisms: 
coercion, competition, learning, and emulation through which policies diffuse (Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) argue that diffusion studies 
often have failed to control for alternative diffusion mechanisms. For example, those that test for 
the competition mechanisms seldom control for alternative mechanisms. The same happens with 
other camps. This study will fill this gap by controlling for alternative diffusion mechanisms, 
which will also address the problem of over determination. Some studies do not make clear 
distinctions between the mechanisms while testing for the effects of these mechanisms. They do 
not test for which diffusion mechanism has taken place, but rather test only whether diffusion has 
occurred (Stadelmann and Castro 2014) This study will draw the distinction through operational 
measures of the independent variables that are associated with each of these mechanisms 
applying the suggestions of (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007) . 
Theories of diffusion make assumptions about the primary actors, their motivation to 
behave in certain ways, the information on which they base their decisions, and their objectives. 
There is a gap in the literature about a systemic analysis of the interaction among the primary 
actors (internal, external and go-betweens). “The existence and nature of the linkages among 
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internal, external, and go between actors may influence which diffusion mechanisms are used” 
(Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 675). Therefore, to understand the notion of 
interdependence of countries in making policy decision, it is important to understand the 
diffusion mechanisms and how they relate to primary actors in policy adoption and the link 
between the primary actors. According to Braun and Gilardi (2006) diffusion mechanisms affect 
effectiveness and payoffs, which drive policy change.  
Policies are chosen by people who have different preferences, goals and capabilities, but 
studies only look at how they cluster geographically without paying attention to the actors who 
are involved in policy making (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 684). There are three sets of 
actors who are crucial in policy adoption: the internal actors in policy adopting government, the 
external actors from which policies are adopted, and the go-betweens who are involved across 
multiple governments (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013).  
The internal actors within a country who influence potential policy adoption are 
politicians, electorates, policy advocates, interest groups and appointed officials. To understand 
policy adoption, one needs to understand the actors, their goals, preferences, capabilities and the 
environment within which they act. Federal governments play the role of facilitator in diffusing 
policies across states and international organizations across countries (Graham, Shipan, and 
Volden 2013).  
In terms of external actors who may affect potential policy adopters, it is important to 
understand what causes external actors to innovate. For example, governments with expertise 
may be the leaders of diffusion processes and might be more likely to provide the information for 
potential adopters. Likewise, some states will be more likely to imitate wealthy governments 
who may be bigger in size and more likely to succeed in norm creation. So it is important to 
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know the features of the external governments that make policy diffusion more or less likely. 
The earlier adopters will respond strategically as competition arises through business-friendly tax 
schemes and effective regulatory norms.  
The go-betweens are the third parties that neither belong to the governments of potential 
adopters nor to the governments from which policy diffuse. They may be think tanks, 
academicians, research institutes, mass media, migrants and intergovernmental organizations. 
“Studying each of these three types of actors and the interactions between them is crucial to a 
better understanding of politics of policy diffusion” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). 
“Precisely when external and go-between actors (as well as the internal actors themselves) utilize 
each of the mechanisms, and to what ends, has not been studied systematically, but is ripe for 
future exploration” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 693). Filling this gap in the literature, 
this study will look at the link between the crucial actors and diffusion mechanisms. 
First the study provides a review of the most efficient renewable energy policies. The 
literature identifies feed-in tariffs (FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as the most 
efficient renewable energy policies. Then it looks at the mechanism through which policies 
diffuse and the involvement of crucial actors in these processes. Then it discusses the alternative 
explanations to policy adoption. It follows with presenting the research design, results and the 
conclusion. 
 
RPS AND FIT: THE MOST EFFICIENT RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES 
Saidur et al. (2010) find that “FIT, RPS, incentives, pricing law & quota system” are the 
most efficient wind energy policies adopted by countries across the globe. An RPS policy 
requires electricity retailers to have a certain share of their electricity come from renewable 
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sources of energy (Jenner, Ovaere, and Schindele 2013). “In contrast, the FIT is a mode of price 
regulation that stimulates investment by giving fixed price incentives to producers” (Jenner et al. 
2012, 3). Saidur et al. (2010, 1745) define energy policy as the following: “Energy policy is the 
manner and the country’s strategy in which a given entity (often governmental) decides to 
address issues of energy development along with the development of the energy industry to 
sustain its growth including energy production, distribution and consumption.” However, they 
only look at wind energy policies. In another study Solangi et al. (2011) find that the most 
successful solar energy policies are FIT, RPS and incentives. “These policies provide significant 
motivation and interest for the development and use of renewable energy technologies” (Solangi 
et al. 2011, 2149).  All the countries that consume solar energy have some sort of policy related 
to solar energy.  
While these policies may have limitations, they are the ones widely used and considered 
appropriate to the context of the countries that adopted them.  Table 1 depicts countries that 
adopted FIT and RPS. A total of 69 countries enacted FIT and fifteen countries adopted RPS by 
2013 (Network 2014). 
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Table 1 Countries FIT/RPS Year of Adoption 
Year Cumulati
ve 
Countries added that year (FIT) 
 
 
Cumula
tive 
Countries added that 
year (RPS/Quota 
Policies) 
1978 1 United States*   
1983     
1990 2 Germany   
1991 3 Switzerland   
1992 4 Italy   
1993 6 Denmark, India   
1994 9 Luxembourg, Spain, Greece   
1996     
1997 10 Sri Lanka   
1998 11 Sweden   
1999 14 Portugal, Norway, Slovenia 1 Italy 
2000 14    
2001 17 Armenia, France, Latvia 2 Australia 
2002 23 Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, 
Indonesia, Lithuania 
3 UK 
2003 28 Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, South Korea, 
Slovak Republic 
5 Japan, Sweden 
2004 30 Israel, Nicaragua 6 Poland 
2005 34  China, Turkey, Ecuador, Ireland   
2006 37  Argentina, Pakistan, Thailand   
2007 45  Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican 
Republic, Finland, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Mongolia 
7 China 
2008 50 Iran, Kenya, Philippines, Tanzania, Ukraine 11 Chile, India, 
Philippines, Romania 
2009 54 Japan, Serbia, South Africa, Taiwan   
2010 59 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Malta, UK 
12 South Korea 
2011 64  Ghana, Montenegro, Netherlands, Syria, 
Vietnam 
14 Albania, Israel 
2012 68 Jordan, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda 15 Norway 
2013 69 Kazakhstan 15  
Source: (Network 2014) 
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Table 2 FIT/RPS Adoption by Geographic Region 
# The Americas European 
Union 
Europe Africa Asia Middle East Oceania 
1 USA Germany Switzerl
and 
Algeria India# Israel# *Australi
a 
2 Dominican 
Republic 
Italy # Norway# Kenya Sri lanka # Iran #Palau 
3 Brazil Denmark Turkey Tanzania Armenia Syria  
4 Ecuador Luxembour
g 
Albania# South 
Africa# 
Indonesia# Jordan  
5 Argentina Spain Croatia Mauritius South 
Korea# 
United Arab 
Emirates # 
 
6 Nicaragua Greece Macedon
ia 
Ghana# China#   
7 Chile* Sweden# Moldova Nigeria Pakistan   
8 Honduras Portugal# Ukraine Rwanda Thailand   
9 Peru Slovenia Serbia Uganda Mongolia   
10 Panama France Bosnia Senegal# Philippines
# 
  
11 Uruguay Latvia Montene
gro 
 Japan#   
12  Austria   Taiwan   
13  Czech 
Republic 
  Malaysia#   
14  Lithuania#   Vietnam   
15  Cyprus   Kazakhstan   
16  Estonia   Maldive   
17  Hungary   Tajikistan   
18  Slovakia      
19  Ireland      
20  Bulgaria      
21  Finland      
22  Malta      
23  UK#      
24  Netherlands     
25  Poland*      
26  Romania*      
Source: (Network 2014): regular font countries with FIT; *countries with RPS, # countries 
that have both RPS and FIT. In this table countries with that unknown year of adoption and 
countries that have discontinued from the policies are included.  
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Table 3 Countries with National RPS/FIT by Income Level  
Numbe
r 
FIT (high 
income) 
Upper Middle 
Income 
Lower Middle 
Income 
Low 
Income 
 Austria Albania# Armenia Kenya 
 Croatia Algeria Ghana# Rwanda 
 Cyprus Argentina Honduras Tajikistan 
 Denmark Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
India# Tanzania 
 Estonia Bulgaria Indonesia# Uganda 
 Finland China# Moldova Kyrgyzstan
# 
 France Dominican Republic Mongolia  
 Germany Hungary Nicaragua  
 Greece Iran Nigeria  
 Ireland Jordan Pakistan  
 Israel# Macedonia Philippines#  
 Italy# Malysia# Sri Lanka#  
 Japan# Maldives Syria  
 Latvia Panama Ukraine  
 Lithuania# Peru Vietnam  
 Luxembourg Serbia Senegal#  
 Malta Thailand   
 Netherlands Turkey   
 Portugal# Palau#   
 Slovakia Romania*   
 Slovenia South Arica#   
 Switzerland    
 UK#    
 Chile*    
 Norway#    
 Poland*    
 South Korea#    
 Australia*    
 Sweden#    
 
Source: (Network 2014)  regular countries with FIT, #countries with RPS and FIT, * 
countries with RPS only 
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The United States (US) adopted PURPA policy (1978), which was an early version of the 
FIT. Seven countries including (Brazil, Czech Republic, Mauritius, Spain, South Africa, South 
Korea, and the United States) have discontinued the policy. Seven countries (Honduras, 
Maldives, Peru, Panama, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Uruguay) have adopted FIT but their years of 
adoption are unknown. Countries including Ghana, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Palau, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and United Arab Emirates adopted RPS/Quota 
policies, but their years of adoption are unknown (Network 2014). Any countries with known 
year of adoption that initially adopted the policies are included. However, those with unknown 
year of adoption are not included in this study. There are countries that have adopted the policies 
at the local level. However, this study does not include the countries that have adopted the 
policies at the local level, it only includes the countries that have adopted the policies at the 
national level. And it does not make any analysis about the implementation of these policies. The 
literature on diffusion mechanisms reviewed in this study implies rationalist and 
normative/constructivist thinking. The aim here is to explore and better understand how and to 
what extent these approaches influence the processes of diffusion of renewable energy policies.  
Conventional constructivist approaches focus on “how ideational factors influence policy 
outcomes” (Saurugger 2013, 889) and analyze “how ideational factors (worldviews, ideas, 
collective understanding, norms, values, cognitive schemes, etc.)” influence political behavior 
(Saurugger 2013, 888). Rejecting the rationalist assumptions that material factors are the main 
driving force, constructivists argue that ideational factors are the main independent variables 
(Mueller 2003). Emulation and learning mechanisms follow the logic of appropriateness. States 
do things for reasons other than instrumental rationality. They may desire to seek legitimacy and 
or credibility. Learning may occur through demonstration effects or through socialization.  On 
10 
 
the other hand, competition and suasion mechanisms follow the rationalist model where states 
respond to sanctions and incentives. States do things to advance their interest with a rational 
approach of cost and benefit analysis. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: DIFFUSION MECHANISMS 
Before defining diffusion mechanisms it is important to define policy innovation and the 
conditions under which diffusion occurs. Walker (1969, 881) defines innovation as “a program 
or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how 
many other states may have adopted it.” Similar words that are used to convey the term diffusion 
are “convergence” and “race to the bottom”. Braun and Gilardi (2006, 299) define diffusion as “a 
process where choices are interdependent, i.e. where the choice of a government influences the 
choices made by others and conversely, the choice of a government is influenced by the choices 
made by others.” According to Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013, 675) “Diffusion occurs when 
one government’s decision about whether to adopt a policy innovation is influenced by the 
choices made by other governments.”  
According to Leichter (1983) seven circumstances lead to policy diffusion.  
These were the need or desire to 1) remodel a nation’s political institutions; 2) deal with a 
new or unique situation; 3) respond to a situation requiring relatively quick policy action; 
4) change an existing but unsuccessful policy; 5) gather information during the initial 
stages of the policy making process; 6) emulate a specific policy known to adopting 
nation; and 7) avoid the policy mistakes of other nations (Leichter 1983, 233).  
 
In addition, when the decision makers see that their states are deprived of some needs that 
others have already responded, they are more likely to adopt new programs (Walker 1969). 
According to Berry and Berry (Sabatier, 2007) the primary difference between various 
diffusion models are the channels of communication and influence. Berry and Berry (2007) 
argue that states emulate each other for three reasons: learning, competition and coercion. 
 A diffusion mechanism is thus a “systematic set of statements that provide a plausible 
account of how two variables are linked.”(Braun and Gilardi 2006, 299). In an effort to answer 
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how and why policies diffuse Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013, 684) divide policy diffusion 
mechanisms and processes into four categories: learning, competition, coercion and 
socialization.  
Braun and Gilardi (2006) focus on learning, competition and cooperative 
interdependence, coercion, common norms, taken-for-grantedness, and symbolic imitation. 
Aside from proximity, competition, imitation (similar attributes), emulation (successful policy) 
influences states to adopt policies (Karch 2007).  
According to Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) policy diffusion occurs when 
countries’ decisions to adopt policies are influenced by similar decisions in other countries. 
Sometimes this process occurs through the behavior of international organizations, private actors 
or organizations. Theories of diffusion highlights diverse tools such as “Bayesian learning to 
rational competition through hegemonic domination to unthinking emulation of leaders” 
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).  
In addition, diffusion mechanisms may be interrelated. For example, governments may 
learn how to compete better with one another (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). Financial 
incentives can enhance learning and norm diffusion. The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) contributes to greening India’s energy policy in two ways: through transfer of technology 
or leapfrogging, and norm diffusion under the conditions that is embedding economic activities 
into local context and path dependencies are given due consideration (Benecke 2009). 
 
SUASION  
In the suasion form of diffusion, strong countries impose their policy preferences on 
weaker states where weaker states would not adopt those policies otherwise (Daley and Garand 
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2005; Gilardi 2005). This mechanism relates to the hegemonic stability theory, which claims that 
the dominant state enforces a stable global economic order and provides public goods 
(Kindleberger 1986). In the case of renewable energy policies, a hegemon arguably provides an 
environmental public good—clean air. The mechanism applies to situations where powerful 
countries themselves adopt certain policies and impose it on weaker countries. However, in the 
case of renewable energy policy, not all strong countries themselves adopt these policies. Berry 
and Berry (2007) argue that states adopt a policy adopted elsewhere because of coercion or 
pressure on states in a federal system to confirm to regional or national standards. Federal 
governments play the role of facilitator in diffusing similar policies across states and 
international organizations across countries (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). 
Hegemonic countries can influence or coerce other countries. To examine this effect 
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) use former colonizers’ policy adoption effect on the developing 
countries as they continue to have strong economic and political ties. Another example of 
diffusion through financial incentive is the spread of environmental ministries in transitional 
democracies. Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) examine the spread of national environmental 
ministries. They find that during democratic transition period, international factors influence 
democratizing countries to adopt environmental ministries. However, the study does not directly 
examine policy adoption or diffusion. “[S]tudies linking policy diffusion to soft coercion should 
show that the policy ideas actively promoted by strong countries are more likely to be put into 
practice in weaker countries structurally or situationally dependent on them”(Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2006).  
International organizations can also coerce countries to adopt identical policies. Powerful 
countries and international organizations can use financial incentives to affect policy change. 
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International organizations like the IMF and the World Bank influence countries to liberalize 
their economies through financial incentives and loans. Kelemen and Sibbitt (2004) show that 
economic liberalization and political fragmentation affect the spread of American style legal 
system around the world.  
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) argue that the international climate regime and the 
emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto Protocol are not strict enough to force 
countries into action. But there are specific international climate policy components such as the 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) that target developing countries and provide them with 
financial incentives. In a study, Benecke (2009) asks how and to what extent the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) contributes to greening India’s energy policy and argues that 
in two ways CDM contributes: through transfer of technology or leapfrogging and norm 
diffusion under the conditions that embed economic activities to the local context, and path 
dependencies are given due consideration (Benecke 2009).  
The European Union can use its coercive power to impose policies (e.g. renewable 
energy targets) on its members. While EU imposes renewable energy targets, it does not impose 
the adoption of RPS/FIT. Countries around the world and specially EU countries have set targets 
to decrease their energy dependence through domestic generation of renewable energy (Eurostat 
2014). Countries with the highest change target from 2012 to 2020 are the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Malta and Luxembourg while Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, 
Ireland, and Italy are on the top of the list in terms of energy dependence. It is interesting to see 
Norway, which is the highest oil producer in Europe, but also has the highest (64.5%) renewable 
energy consumption. It is followed by Sweden, Latvia, Finland, and Austria. On the other hand, 
Malta, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Cyprus and Belgium had the lowest share of 
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renewable energy consumption in 2012. They have set the highest targets to increase their 
renewable energy consumption by 2020. 
Jenner et al. (2012) examine the effect of EU membership, representing EU Directive 
2001/77/EC on generation of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) on policy 
adoption (RPS, FIT). It has been the first binding directive that obliges state legislators to 
support RES-E. Therefore, it can be treated as a coercion mechanism.  
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. Their 
dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured by 
the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (kWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010. The 
external independent variables include adoption of Kyoto Protocol and official development 
assistance (ODA), which are instruments of coercion from an international organization. They 
find a negative effect from openness and aid, and a weak influence of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013).There is not enough pressure from international climate change 
regime to achieve climate goals. Since Kyoto Protocols are not binding therefore, it will not be 
used as a measure of coercion. Saikawa (2013, 13) uses international aid as a proxy for 
international pressure or coercion by using "Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other 
official aid values as a share of GDP (in percentage)" on the adoption of emission standards.  
“[T]he preferences of the U.S. government, the European Union, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank may shape policies in countries reliant on those 
entities for trade, foreign direct investment, aid, grants, loans, or security” (Dobbin, Simmons, 
and Garrett 2007). The IMF or the EU set conditions for loans, aid or other incentives. Powerful 
countries may set conditions themselves or through international institutions. Powerful countries 
may act unilaterally and change the status quo, which influences the weaker country to alter their 
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policy as well. Gruber (2000) gives the example of the effect of US and Canada’s decision to 
liberalize on Mexico’s liberalization even before it was ready to do so.  
Unilateral policy leadership may solve coordination problems when there exist multiple 
equilibria that require nation-states to coordinate their policies. Nation-states may follow the 
leader as focal points (TC. 1960). The models that leaders provide may be well examined. 
Garrett and Weingast (1993) argue that Germany’s model of central bank and political structure 
was adopted by the EU without Germany seeking to influence Europe.  Dobbin, Simmons, and 
Garrett (2007) suggest some ways to test for coercion. One way to illustrate that coercion 
mechanism is at work is testing for adoption of a policy while countries are negotiating trade, 
accession to the EU or the World Trade Organization (WTO), or loan disbursement from the 
IMF. In addition, studies should illustrate that countries subject to aid, loans or security 
dependence are adopting policies promoted by powerful actors. When carrot or stick is involved 
from the go-between actors or external actors in the process of diffusion, it falls under suasion 
mechanism.  
According to Braun and Gilardi (2006), the payoff of policy diffusion is a function of 
voting rewards and policy rewards. Coercion and symbolic imitation impact payoffs and affect 
the policy component while electoral payoffs is a more domestic determinant rather than external 
one. In vertical coercion, actors who are neither part of the adopting government nor government 
from which policy diffuse impose their policy preferences through carrots and sticks. In 
horizontal coercion one external government can impose pressure on a country to adopt a policy. 
Asymmetric power is important in coercion. Powerful states or international organizations can 
apply sanctions and issue linkages, “making behavior in one policy area contingent on behavior 
in another” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 693). One needs to review the nature of these 
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agreements for any stick or carrots attached to them to categorize the diffusion as coercion where 
a change will be associated to the payoffs rather than the effectiveness. To further examine the 
nature of these relationships or the links between the crucial actors interaction terms are used. 
In the suasion/coercive mechanism of policy diffusion, the most important relationship 
among actors are vertical. When internal actors are structurally or situationally dependent on 
strong external actors, the suasion mechanism is at use in the diffusion process (Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). When external actors or go-betweens have the capability and have 
interest in changing policy of others, they use coercive strategies to change policies. Unilateral 
policy leadership of external actor may change the status quo for the internal actors (TC. 1960). 
As go between actors, national policy makers or international organizations in federal system and 
international organization may use coercive strategies through grants and aid requirements, pre-
emptive laws, sanctions or military force to influence internal actors (Graham, Shipan, and 
Volden 2013). 
 
COMPETITION  
Competition theorists have these assumptions:  
First, they assume that the policy under examination has the potential to affect the flow of 
international production and capital or the attractiveness of a nation’s exports…Second, 
they assume that the policies that diffuse have consequential effects in the short to 
medium term… Third, competitive models assume an information-rich (in fact, close to 
perfect) environment…Finally … competition theorists assume that the most important 
relationships are horizontal” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). 
Competition is more decentralized than the coercion mechanism of policy diffusion. This 
mechanism focuses on the attractiveness of economic policies in the international market for the 
buyers and investors. “Simplifying regulatory requirements, ameliorating investment risks, and 
reducing tax burdens are often viewed as policy choices that can, quite quickly, make a local 
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investment more attractive, exports more competitive, and an economy more vital” (Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 792). Mooney illustrates that competition matters in the early phase of 
the adoption process. Countries with similar economic structures can use competition diffusion 
mechanisms. Membership to similar economic and regional blocs can be used as a proxy for 
competition (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). 
The geographic proximity of states influence neighboring states in policy adoption 
(Karch 2007). The jurisdiction proximity influences some policies adoption but not others. For 
example, “In policy areas where outcomes, externalities, and citizen or business mobility across 
jurisdictional boundaries are plausible, we should expect to see competitive processes working in 
the diffusion of policy innovations” (Tucker, Stoutenborough, and Beverlin 2012). When a 
policy outcome is contained within the jurisdiction it is less likely that the policy adoption will 
occur in the neighboring state. By adopting policies states want to avoid being competitively 
disadvantaged (Berry and Berry 2007).  
Berry and Baybeck (2005) use close geographic proximity as a proxy for competition. A 
regional diffusion model focuses on regions and proposes that states are influenced by the states 
in geographic proximity. They assume that neighboring states influence the potential adopter and 
the probability of a state adopting a policy is related to the number of its neighbors that have 
already adopted it. Fixed region models divide nation-states into specific regions and argue that 
states adopt policies if other states within the same region adopted it (Berry and Berry 2007, 
229). According to Berry and Berry (2007) one realistic assumption is that states are influenced 
by nearby states depending on the distance between states vary their influence. Matisoff (2008) 
finds that the percentage of neighboring states that adopted RPS has statistically significant and 
positive effect on renewable energy programs and policies adoption.  
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Berry and Berry (2007) argue that states adopt policies being adopted elsewhere to 
compete with other states to have an advantage over other states or to avoid being disadvantaged. 
Competition and efficiency cause states to liberalize their economies. For example, Kelemen and 
Sibbitt (2004) show that economic liberalization and political fragmentation affect the spread of 
American-style legal systems around the world.  
According to Baccini, Lenzi, and Thurner (2013) oil producing countries join energy 
related international governmental organizations (IGOs) if their competitors, main trade partners 
in the energy sector, other oil and gas producers and consumers joined the organizations. In 
addition, countries that share oil and gas pipelines also join energy IGOs. States use energy IGOs 
to make them better off in the energy market.  
Prakash and Potoski (2006) argue that countries adopt ISO 14001, a voluntary 
environmental regulation, if their main export markets have done so. Vogel Cooper (1995) 
argues stringent emission standards in California prompted car companies to adopt the standards 
so that they can sell their products in California. After, acquiring the technology, these 
companies pressured their domestic governments to adopt higher standards so that the companies 
profit in the domestic markets. Saikawa (2013) argues that countries adopted emission standards 
regulations to be competitive in international automobile market: “Adoption by importers creates 
pressure (direct export pressure, that is, a 'California effect') and in other adoption by economic 
competitors create pressure (indirect export pressure) to adopt such standards…” (Saikawa 2013, 
2). Saikawa (2013) states that adoption of automobile emission standards creates competitive 
advantage for exporting country if the importing country adopted the standards. The competitive 
advantage declines as the number of countries adopting the standards increases. He creates four 
independent variables to test the effect: exporting countries emission standard, importing 
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countries adoption status, the interaction term of the two previous variables and the log of 
number of standards.   
In the competition mechanism, the most important relationships among actors are 
horizontal (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). External and internal actors who compete are 
more likely to have similar economic structures (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). In national 
policy governments or international organizations in federal system and international 
organization “may help restructure competitive environments, such as with the European Union 
facilitating the reduction of trade barriers or the US Constitution limiting inter-state regulation of 
commerce by the states” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 693). 
Internal actors use competition mechanism when they do not want to be competitively 
disadvantaged (Berry and Berry 2007). Policies diffuse from external actors to internal actors 
when they are competitors or trading partners (Berry and Berry 2007). In other cases external 
and internal actors compete in third-country markets or they might be competing for a third 
country’s investment in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Dobbin, Simmons, and 
Garrett 2007). 
Internal actors use competition mechanisms when externalities, citizen and business 
mobility across jurisdictional boundaries are plausible. According to Tucker, Stoutenborough, 
and Beverlin (2012) geographic proximity influences policy diffusion because of competition. 
“In policy areas where outcomes, externalities, and citizen or business mobility across 
jurisdictional boundaries are plausible, we should expect to see competitive process working in 
the diffusion of policy innovation” (Tucker, Stoutenborough, and Beverlin 2012). When a policy 
is contained within a jurisdiction it is less likely that the policy diffusion occurs in the 
neighboring states because of competition.  
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LEARNING 
According to Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006, 792) the learning mechanism 
suggests that success or failure of a policy mostly affect the policy adoption elsewhere especially 
among those countries with similar experiences. Spread of successful policy is labeled as 
learning (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 644). Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet (2009) propose 
that learning increases in the later stages as knowledge accumulates.  In addition, there are 
specific projects such as renewable energy-related capacity-building under development and 
environmental finance initiatives of international climate policy that target developing countries 
that can be a depiction of learning (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). Similarly, one of the reasons 
that democracy spread in post-communist countries is the success of earlier efforts. (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2006). 
Berry and Berry (2007) argue that states emulate each other because they learn from each 
other when they adopt policies perceived successful elsewhere. Chandler (2009) argues that RPS 
spread among US states through interstate learning. He finds positive association of neighboring 
effects. In the learning mechanism, evidence of success increases the probability of adoption. 
This connection fades when moving towards emulation.  
Some studies examine the effect of renewable energy policies on the adoption of 
renewable energy resources (Carley 2009; Pfeiffer, Mulder 2013). There are mixed results. 
However, studies do find that energy diversification decreases foreign energy dependence which 
increases energy security (Aslani, Helo, and Naaranoja 2014). Carley (2009) examines the 
association between renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and the percentage of renewable 
energy in electricity generation across US states. The result shows that RPS is not a predictor of 
renewable energy mix as part of electricity. The study finds that for each additional year the 
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renewable energy increases with an RPS policy. Salim and Rafiq (2012)  find that Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2) emissions is a significant factor in renewable energy sources consumption. 
Research focusing on the learning mechanism should show that the efficacy of a policy 
increases the likelihood of its adoption elsewhere (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007). 
However, many studies are lacking evidence of efficacy in policy diffusion. They rather assume 
the spread of a policy as the learning effect.   
States learn about the economic benefits of renewable energy sources and adopt the 
policies. Schreurs (2012) argues that economic benefits to small and medium size businesses 
motivates Germany’s renewable energy adoption. Gallagher (2013) argues that economic motive 
is a key factor in renewable sources adoption. Economic benefits from major wind energy 
manufacturing companies motivate countries to promote renewable sources technologies 
(Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf 2012). Apergis and Payne (2010) examine the relationship 
between renewable energy consumption and economic growth organization for economic 
cooperation and development (OECD) member countries. They find that there is a bidirectional 
relationship between economic growth and renewable energy consumption. The variables that 
were statistically significant included real gross domestic product (GDP), renewable energy 
consumption, real gross fixed capital formation, and the labor force (Apergis and Payne 2010). 
 Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. 
The dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured 
by the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (KWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010. 
The independent variables include adoption of Kyoto Protocol, trade intensity, net foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflow, renewable energy technology (RET) policies, growth in electricity 
consumption, official development assistance (ODA), secondary enrollment, hydro share, coal 
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production, gas production and per capita income. The study controls for Kyoto Protocol, ODA, 
trade intensity and FDI, which are measures of diffusion. Economic and regulatory instruments, 
per capita income and schooling level, and stable democratic regimes have positive and 
statistically significant effect on NHRE. There is a negative effect from openness and aid, 
institutional and strategic policy support programs, growth of electricity consumption and fossil 
fuel production. Diverse energy mix increases the probability of NHRE adoption. There is a 
weak influence from Kyoto Protocol and no significant effect from financial sector development 
(Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013). Aslani, Helo, and Naaranoja (2014) find that increasing renewable 
energy capacity by implementing the action plan saves $4 billion in expenditure on natural gas 
imports. Energy diversification reduces energy dependency and increases energy security in 
Finland. 
The findings of a study by Al-mulali, Fereidouni, and Lee (2014) reveal that renewable 
energy consumption; non-renewable energy consumption in electricity generation; gross fixed 
capital formation; total labor force; and total trade have a positive effect on economic growth in 
Latin American countries. Renewable energy consumption is more significant than non-
renewable energy consumption in electricity on economic growth. The reason is that renewable 
energy consumption in electricity constitutes more than half of electricity generation (Al-mulali, 
Fereidouni, and Lee 2014). Yildirim, Saraç, and Aslan (2012) examine the role of renewable 
energy on economic growth in USA. The result shows that renewable energy consumption from 
biomass waste has a positive and significant relation on real GDP. The other variables including 
total renewable energy consumption, geothermal energy consumption, hydro-electric energy 
consumption, biomass energy consumption and biomass-wood-derived energy consumption, 
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employment and investment were not statistically significant (Yildirim, Saraç, and Aslan 2012). 
Countries learn about the effectiveness of a policy as other countries adopt it.  
In the learning mechanism, external actors increase the knowledge about a policy’s 
effectiveness. Their policy adoption does not have externality on the internal actors or potential 
adopters. External actors are not actively seeking to change policies of potential adopters using 
carrots and sticks. Internal actors are more active and are seeking effective public policies. They 
learn from others about the success and political viability of policies adopted elsewhere 
(Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). As go-betweens, national governments or international 
organizations in federal system and international organization can facilitate learning (Graham, 
Shipan, and Volden 2013). For example, the EU can have a learning effect on European 
countries in transition or through capacity building projects under “development and 
environmental finance initiatives of international climate policy” for developing countries 
(Stadelmann and Castro 2014).  
 
EMULATION 
The emulation mechanism focuses on the role of shared cultural beliefs, norms, common 
language, history, and religion as having significant effect on policy diffusion, which cannot be 
explained by learning and competition (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 792). Socially 
accepted norms and policies may diffuse even when countries are not developmentally ready to 
implement them. For example, many developing and developed countries sign international 
conventions on human rights as a sign of commitment to global norms. International non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), NGOs, policy professionals, and academics can influence 
governments to adopt new policies.  
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On the other hand, Stadelmann and Castro (2014) combine learning and emulation. They 
use common language, colonial experience or membership to similar economic and regional 
block to examine learning and emulation effects.  
Such learning-imitation due to socially constructed policy norms (Simmons et al., 2006) 
is more likely to take place in case of neighboring countries, or countries within the same 
region (MacGarvie, 2005), because such peers are more likely to meet in common forum 
and exchange information with each other (Berry and Berry, 2007). In addition, countries 
with cultural, historic or economic commonalities are also more likely to learn from each 
other (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) or even to compete for markets, e.g. for RE 
technology. Adoption of policies from culturally or historically similar countries can be 
understood as learning or emulation of peers “with psychological proximity”, an idea 
based on constructivist theories… (Stadelmann and Castro 2014, 416). 
 
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) find that EU membership and common colonial history 
have statistically significant and positive effect on FIT adoption and financial incentives through 
tax reduction, grants, and concessional loans. Common colonial history and Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) funding have statistically significant and positive effects on 
framework policies (strategies, plans, generic law). Only EU membership has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on renewable energy target adoption.  
Isomorphism in organizational theory refers to “the mechanisms leading one unit in a 
population to resemble other units facing the same set of environmental conditions” (Radaelli 
2000, 40). Isomorphism may help explain why states emulate policies of similar states who have 
common ideology (conservative-liberal), political demographic and economic characteristics and 
“channels of cultural commonality and historic connection”. In vertical influence, the policy is 
diffused from national government to states (Berry and Berry 2007). MacGarvie (2005) finds 
that “technological knowledge diffuses faster across countries that share a [common official] 
language or that are geographically proximate.”  
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Walker (1969) emphasizes the role of interstate communication in the process of 
diffusion. In a national interaction model, when potential adopters interact with officials from 
adopting states, their probability of adoption increases. Their probability of adoption is 
proportional to the number of interactions they have with already adopted state officials (Gray 
1973a). The model assumes that during any time period, each potential adopter is equally likely 
to adopt the policy. The variable that influences the probability of adoption is the previous 
cumulative number of adopters, but not all potential adopters are similar. 
Common norms emerge with increased interaction and socialization within networks. 
Common norms are appropriate behaviors within certain context for actors (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, 891). Networks of professionals, regulators, and international organizations can be 
platforms for the development of common norms. Through socialization in these networks actors 
develop similar views about effectiveness of policies. Lee (2013) compares Northeast Asia and 
European energy cooperation. The history of European cooperation on energy initiatives 
suggests that economic integration, institutional development and policy coordination are 
prerequisites for energy cooperation.  It suggests domestic efforts and sub-regional institutional 
buildup for Northeast Asian cooperation. It highlights the regional multilateral institutions as a 
useful platform for renewable energy coordination and cooperation. How does the ratification 
and signing of multilateral environmental agreements affect renewable energy policy adoption?  
Advocacy groups, epistemic communities, common language, cultural heritage and 
religion can be used to test the effect of emulation (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). 
Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf (2012) state that pressure from environmental groups 
motivate countries to promote renewable sources technologies. Jenner et al. (2012) find that the 
presence of International Solar Energy Association has positive and significant effect on states to 
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adopt regulations (RPS, feed-in tariffs) that support electricity generation from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E). Lyon and Yin (2010) test for the effect of American Energy Association on the 
adoption of RPS.   
According to Finnemore’s constructivist IO theory, elite government officials socialize in 
IOs and adopt policies as appropriate state behavior. For example, government officials' 
socialization in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
has led to the diffusion of state science bureaucracies (Kim 2013). On the other hand, Kim 
(2013) argues constructivists IO theories ignore the role of international non-government 
organizations, which have mediated the diffusion of national human rights organizations.   
Saikawa (2013) argues that as the number of countries adopting emission standards 
increases, it changes the norms for other countries on environmental issues. It becomes more 
appropriate and encourages other countries to adopt the standards. The increased number of 
epistemic communities and transnational movements encourage the use of the emulation 
mechanism. When the carrot or stick is not involved through external and go-between actors, the 
process of diffusion will be categorized as emulation mechanism. 
In the emulation mechanism, as go-betweens national policy governments or 
international organizations in federal systems and international organization can facilitate 
socialization by establishing information facilities, organizing conferences and recommending 
best practices (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). NGOs, policy professionals, and academics 
can influence governments to adopt policies (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). 
Socialization or emulation mechanisms aim to change preferences of actors, without 
expecting immediate policy change, but rather would lead to long-term policy change (Graham, 
Shipan, and Volden 2013). Despite a policy outcome being contained within a jurisdiction 
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boundary, if it diffuses to neighboring states (internal actors) it is because of emulation, the 
common cultural and historical characteristics and increased interaction. 
 Increased interaction among actors can lead to norm diffusion (Walker 1969, Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998). In addition, norms can diffuse among external and internal actors who have 
similar cultural and historical connections (Berry and Berry 2007). External actors with soft 
power can appeal to others by becoming role models (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). 
While socialization through international organizations or more specifically the norm 
creation through multilateral environmental agreements do not involve financial incentives or 
sanctions in the process of diffusion, it falls under the emulation mechanism, which affects the 
effectiveness. It may not affect the payoffs of policy adoption (Braun and Gilardi 2006). 
 
OTHER EXPLANATIONS  
States might adopt renewable energy policies for reasons unrelated to the four 
mechanisms of diffusion. This study draws a clear distinction between policy adoption and 
diffusion. It sees diffusion as a component of policy adoption, but policy adoption may be 
influenced by other factors. All examples of policy diffusion are examples of policy adoption, 
but not all policy adoptions are examples of diffusion.  Internal characteristics of states are used 
as controls for policy adoption. A more detailed discussion of these characteristics follows.  
There is no consensus among scholars on whether external (diffusion) or internal 
determinants are more important in policy adoption. There are scholars who argue for internal 
determinants being more important and there are scholars who gave more importance to external 
determinants. Stadelmann and Castro (2014) find that internal determinants are more relevant in 
explaining policy adoption than international factors. Recent studies claim that domestic factors 
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are more important than diffusion factors in policy adoption (Lyon and Yin 2010); (Matisoff 
2008). According to Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013) internal characteristics of states play 
key role in  policy adoption (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). For example, Kelemen and 
Sibbitt (2004) show that economic liberalization and political fragmentation affect the spread of 
American-style legal systems around the world. 
According to the previous studies presented in the below table, the factors that have 
positive effects on renewable energy adoption can be categorized as political factors, 
environmental concerns, economic factors, renewable energy endowment and international 
factors.  
 
Political factors 
Policy adoption is a combination of factors including motivation for policy change, 
availability of resources and barriers that prevents policy change (Walker 1969). Public opinions 
and uncertainty about the effect of to be adopted policy is an obstacle to policy adoption (Berry 
and Berry 1990). 
Political ideology may affect RPS adoption (Lyon and Yin 2010). Biresselioglu and 
Zengin Karaibrahimoglu (2012) emphasize on the role of government orientation. According to 
them leftist and center oriented governments are more likely to adopt renewable energy than 
right oriented governments. They find that right oriented governments have negative significant 
effect on renewable energy consumption. Contrary to Biresselioglu and Zengin Karaibrahimoglu 
(2012), White (2009) finds that government orientation and  green party representation in 
legislature  do not have significant effect on renewable energy adoption. However, he finds that 
proportionality has positive and significant effect on renewable energy consumption. Stable 
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democratic regimes, support from both ruling and opposition parties in the case of Germany and 
political factors are highlighted as key in political category to have positive association with 
renewable sources adoption (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013); (Schreurs 2012); (Gallagher 2013). 
Matisoff (2008) finds positive and significant relationship between renewable energy policy 
adoption (RPS) and citizen liberalism. Carley (2009) finds that political institutions have 
significant effect on the percentage of renewable energy in electricity generation across US states 
(Carley 2009). 
Private interests affect RPS adoption (Lyon and Yin 2010). Jenner et al. (2012) ask what 
drives states to adopt regulations (RPS, feed-in tariffs) that support electricity generation from 
renewable energy sources (RES-E). The findings show that the presence of International Solar 
Energy Association is positively correlated with the regulation adoption. Jenner, Ovaere, and 
Schindele (2013) examine how financial contributions by conventional energy interest groups 
(CEI) and renewable energy interest group (REI) affect RPS adoption. Their findings show that 
REI contributes more to Democrats and CEI donates more to Republicans state-level policy 
makers between 1998-2010. They found that CEI donations have negative significant effect on 
RPS adoption in a state while REI donations have positive and significant effect on RPS 
adoption. Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf (2012) state that pressure from environmental 
groups motivate countries to promote renewable sources technologies. Marques and Fuinhas 
(2012) find that European Union’s established industries’ lobbies and renewable energy sources 
consumption are negatively associated. 
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Economic factors 
Electricity sector subsidization is highlighted in the literature to be a barrier to the 
generation of renewable energy sources in the market because of the absence of competitiveness 
in terms of price. According to Bayülgen (Winter 2013) subsidization of electricity as a state-
owned industry made it harder for the renewable energy to enter the electricity market. A study 
shows that the monopolistic structure of Turkish natural gas sector and the lobbying power of 
fossil fuel sector make the entry of renewables harder. Turkey is taking pride in being a transit 
country between the neighboring supplier and the European consumers and energy 
interdependence has become central to its foreign policy (Bayülgen Winter 2013).This study 
argues that the main obstacles to renewable energy reform is political not technical and financial 
in Turkey. Turkish government has not reduced the dominance of fossil fuel in its energy policy 
despite external pressure, political stability, civic activism and favorable public opinion. Energy 
policy in Turkey favors fossil fuel over renewables (Bayülgen Winter 2013). 
Zhang (2008) looks at Asia’s renewable energy policies. He suggests that Asia needs to 
get rid of its subsidies on fossil fuel energy so that they reflect the right prices in order to adopt 
clean energy (Zhang 2008). Burns (1982) argues that in order for solar energy to achieve a 
substantial market penetration, it needs to be competitive with the price of fossil fuel energy. 
Table 4 Barriers to Renewable Energy 
Monopolistic structure of utilities (state owned public utilities (subsidization of electricity, 
regulated vs open market) 
Lobbying effect of fossil fuel (contribution of fossil fuel as a percentage of GDP) 
Long term non-renewable energy agreements with suppliers 
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Carley (2009) finds that deregulation and electricity price have significant effect on the 
percentage of renewable energy in electricity generation across US states (Carley 2009). 
Electricity market concentration has a negative effect on policy adoption (Jenner et al. 
2012). States with regulated electricity markets or cost-based pricing are more likely to adopt 
RPS with in-state requirement than states with restructured electricity markets or competitive 
markets (Lyon and Yin 2010). 
Lyon and Yin (2010) conduct an empirical study on the adoption of renewable portfolio 
standards (RPSs) in the US states. They examine the political and economic factors that 
contribute to the adoption of RPSs in US states. They find that states with slower economic 
growth are slower in adopting RPS. Local environment conditions and preference effects are not 
significant. Whether there is an in state requirement or not depends on the current level of 
renewable energy development. States that have a higher developed renewable energy capacity, 
are less likely to adopt an RPS with in-state requirement. Carley (2009) finds that gross state 
product per capita, and electricity use per person have significant effect on the percentage of 
renewable energy in electricity generation across US states (Carley 2009). 
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. The 
dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured by 
the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (kWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010. 
They include renewable energy technology (RET) policies, growth in electricity consumption, 
secondary enrollment and per-capita income among their independent variables. Economic and 
regulatory instruments, per capita income and schooling level, and stable democratic regimes 
have positive and statistically significant effect on NHRE. There is a negative effect from 
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institutional and strategic policy support programs and growth of electricity consumption. There 
is no significant effect from financial sector development (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013). 
GDP is identified as a determinant of renewable energy consumption in various studies; 
therefore; it is included here. Countries’ prosperity allows for investment in renewable sources of 
energy (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Salim and Rafiq (2012) find that GDP is a significant 
factor in the consumption of renewable energy. As GDP increases one percent, the consumption 
of renewable energy increases 1.228 percent in the emerging economies (Salim and Rafiq 2012). 
Sadorsky (2009) finds that per capita income has positive and statistically significant effect on 
per capita renewable energy consumption in the emerging economies. “In the long term, a 1% 
increase in real income per capita increases the consumption of renewable energy per capita in 
the emerging economies by approximately 3.5%” (Sadorsky 2009). 
Erdogdu (2013) finds that there is a negative relationship between energy intensity of 
GDP and renewable energy R&D. Countries with higher energy intensity of GDP have lower 
budget for R&D in renewable energy. He measures energy intensity by dividing energy supply 
over GDP to show how much energy is used for producing one unit of GDP. Overall his results 
show that deregulation of electricity market leads to lower government spending on energy 
R&D. He explains this result by claiming that countries with high energy intensity of GDP invest 
in technologies that produce large amounts of energy to meet their high energy needs rather than 
focusing on renewable energy technology that produce lower amount of energy. Among the 
countries with highest energy intensity of GDP are USA, Canada, Finland, Czech Republic and 
Korea (Erdogdu 2013).  
Jenner et al. (2012) argue that unemployment affect policy adoption (RPS, feed-in-tariffs) 
positively. Per capita income and renewable energy consumption are positively associated 
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(Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013); (Sadorsky 2009). While Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) use per capita 
non hydro renewable energy, Sadorsky (2009) uses per capita renewable sources consumption as 
the dependent variable. Schreurs (2012) argues that economic benefits to small- and medium-
sized businesses motivates Germany’s renewable energy adoption. Gallagher (2013) argues that 
economic motive is a key factor in renewable sources adoption. Salim and Rafiq (2012) argue 
that income (GDP) is a major factor for renewable sources consumption. Economic benefits from 
major wind energy manufacturing companies motivate countries to promote renewable sources 
technologies (Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf 2012). 
It is important to control for the effect of oil prices, it might be that increased oil prices is 
the motivation for countries to adopt the policies simultaneously, which would not be because of 
diffusion, but rather a common response to rising prices. Failure to include this variable might 
lead to false conclusion about policy diffusion.  
 
Factor endowments 
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. The 
dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured by 
the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (kWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010. 
They include hydro share, coal production, and gas production among their independent 
variables. There is a negative effect from fossil fuel production. Carley (2009) finds that natural 
resource endowments have significant effect on the percentage of renewable energy in electricity 
generation across US states (Carley 2009). Diverse energy mix increases the probability of 
NHRE adoption (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013). 
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Jenner et al. (2012) ask what drives states to adopt regulations (RPS, feed-in-tariffs) that 
support electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). The findings show that 
solar potential measured as global radiation in kwh per square meter, and unemployment rate as 
a percent of total work force are positively correlated with regulation adoption. Matisoff (2008) 
finds positive and significant relationship between renewable energy policy adoption (RPS) solar 
density and the criteria pollutant index. Lyon and Yin (2010) conduct an empirical study on the 
adoption of renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) in US states, which examines the political and 
economic factors that contribute to the adoption of RPSs in US states. Local environment 
conditions and preferences effects are not significant. Whether there is an in state requirement or 
not depends on the current level of renewable energy development. States that have higher 
renewable energy capacity developed, are less likely to adopt an RPS with in-state requirement.  
 
Environmental concern 
In addition, environmental concern is another main factor highlighted in previous studies. 
Global warming and climate change concern policy makers on how to reduce Carbon Dioxide 
(CO2) emissions and other greenhouse gases that are produced by energy consumption. If the 
concentration of greenhouse gases keeps increasing, the temperature at the earth’s surface will 
continuously rise. With the industrial revolution, the amount of CO2 emission increased as 
burning coal to produce electricity and factories increased. In 2005 CO2 reached 379 parts per 
million, an increase of 35% from pre-industrial revolution period. Average global temperature 
increased by 0.76 degree Celsius since the end of the 1800s. Increased temperature could have 
adverse effects on the living habitat. Although most of CO2 is natural, humans generate a great 
portion of CO2 by burning fossil fuel. Growth in GDP and population growth increase human 
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generated carbon. Other major sources of emissions are deforestation and burning bio mass 
(Yergin 2011).  
Countries are under pressure by the environmental groups to mitigate their CO2 emission. 
One of the barriers to clean energy transition is the high cost of clean energy. Technological 
innovation can reduce the cost of transition to clean energy. Renewable energy research, 
development and demonstration (RD&D) is a route towards adopting clean energy, which can 
lead to mitigation of CO2 emission. There are previous studies on how pollutant emission 
increases renewable energy consumption, but there is not much focus on the role of pollutant 
emission on RD&D. Salim and Rafiq (2012) find that pollutant emission is a significant factor 
for renewable energy consumption. Their examination shows that one percent increase in 
pollutant emission increases renewable energy consumption by 0.033% in emerging economies 
(Salim and Rafiq 2012). Renewable energy sources endowment is also identified as a significant 
factor for adoption of renewable sources (Gallagher 2013). Jenner et al. (2012) find that solar 
radiation is a significant factor for policy adoption (RPS, feed-in tariffs). On the other hand, 
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) find that fossil fuel production is not a significant factor.  
Geopolitical concerns are barrier to renewable energy adoption. Podobnik (1999) argues 
that the interaction of three systemic dynamics--geopolitical rivalry, commercial competition, 
and social unrest--paved the way to shift from coal regime to petroleum in the twentieth century 
(Podobnik 1999).  While acknowledging the challenges that countries face in terms of energy 
such as not having secure energy supplies, environmental threats due to climate change, loss of 
biodiversity, water scarcity, growth in energy consumptions of individuals and industrial needs, 
economic and geopolitical concern influences countries’ decisions on their energy policies. 
ÜSTÜN (2012) examines Turkey’s energy and environmental policy and its geopolitical and 
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economic needs and the agreements with the oil producing countries. Many factors such as 
“droughts, water scarcity, the passage of energy tankers from Black Sea and the decline of 
biodiversity force Turkey to use clean energy; on the other hand, economic and geopolitical 
concerns influence Turkey’s decisions in having agreements with energy producing countries 
(ÜSTÜN 2012). 
Gallagher et al. (2011) find that the investment in research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D) in energy has been volatile with an increase in the late 1970s, shrank in 
the next two decades with a decline in 1997 followed by a gradual increase during the 2000s. 
The investment has been dominated on research in nuclear and fossil fuel. While Brazil, Russia, 
India, Mexico, China and South Africa (BRIMCS) have been significant in the energy sector, 
little data is available about public and private investment in those countries. Similar to 
International Energy Agency (IEA) their investments have been predominantly on nuclear 
technology and fossil fuel (Gallagher et al. 2011). 
Some of the top oil importers also have the highest budget for renewable sources RD&D. 
According to IEA data for 2011 these countries were the United States, Japan, Germany, Korea, 
France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. Only two of the IEA members in the top oil importers 
(Turkey & Belgium) in Figure 2 are not in the list countries who are leading in renewable energy 
sources RD&D. However, it does not report the budget for non-IEA members from Asia & 
Oceania. According to Renewable 2014 Global Status Report (Network 2014) Asia & Oceania 
region, which is the most dependent on foreign energy, has the highest investment on renewable 
power and fuels. The investment in the Americas has been volatile. Europe’s investment, which 
used to have the highest investment, has declined. Asia & Oceania where the main investors are 
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China and India surpassed Europe in 2012 and surpassed Americas in 2009. Africa & the Middle 
East has the lowest investment (Network 2014). 
Dependence on foreign sources of energy is a great concern for the highly dependent 
countries, which are also major or emerging economies of the world. The concern for energy 
security (affordability and supply), vulnerability of energy sources infrastructure to terrorist 
attacks and natural disaster, the dominance of nationalized oil companies, increasing demand for 
the energy with the growth of emerging economies, environmental consequences of fossil fuel 
consumption are some of the challenges the world faces today. Most importantly there is only 
limited reserves of conventional energy sources available in the world. These sources are not 
sustainable and will deplete sometime in the future. Diversification of energy mix and energy 
sources is seen as one of the main solutions for energy security (Bahgat 2006). As sustainable 
development is highly dependent on renewable energy sources and to achieve energy security, 
countries need to develop renewable sources of energy.  
Encouraging domestic production is valuable not only in decreasing the dependence, but 
also sustainable development. Development of technology will be vital for domestic production 
and decreasing dependence on foreign energy sources. This transition will ultimately become 
possible through investment in renewable sources research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) to make renewable sources of energy more competitive in the world market. 
World demand for energy is increasing. Energy dependency is measured by the 
difference between total primary energy consumption and energy production in different regions. 
According to the data from US Energy Information Administration (EIA) three regions (Asia & 
Oceania, Europe & North America) are highly dependent on foreign energy. There is an 
increasing trend in energy dependency of Asia and Oceania region. It has surpassed Europe’s 
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energy dependency. There has been a decreasing trend in North America’s energy dependence 
because of the energy boom in the United States. Central & South America, Africa, Middle East 
and Eurasia produce more energy than they consume.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
To examine the diffusion of renewable energy policies, this study applies mixed methods. 
A statistical model will allow testing multiple hypotheses with a large sample size. In addition, 
an agent-based model is used to complement the statistical analysis. Studies use empirical 
findings to develop agent-based models for better understanding of the dynamics behind an 
observation. Others use theoretically informed agent-based models to compare with empirical 
findings (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).  
The section will present the hypotheses for each of the mechanisms. Then it will discuss 
the specification and estimation techniques for the statistical model; the operational measures of 
all variables; and the data sources. The section ends with the discussion of developing an agent-
based model. 
 
DIFFUSION MECHANISMS’ HYPOTHESES 
This section discusses the hypothesis for each mechanism. First, it presents suasion 
mechanism’s hypotheses followed by competition, learning and emulation respectively. There 
are eighteen hypotheses in total.  
 
The Suasion Mechanism: Hypotheses 
“[S]tudies linking policy diffusion to soft coercion should show that the policy ideas 
actively promoted by strong countries are more likely to be put into practice in weaker countries 
structurally or situationally dependent on them” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). 
Membership in similar regional or multilateral organizations, preferential trade agreements 
41 
 
(PTAs), and military alliance can be used to examine their effect on policy outcome when the 
sticks or carrots of suasion are involved.  
The European Union can use its coercive power to impose policies (e.g. renewable 
energy targets) on its members. While the EU imposes renewable energy targets, it does not 
impose the adoption of RPS/FIT specifically. Jenner et al. (2012) examine the effect of EU 
membership, representing EU Directive 2001/77/EC on generation of electricity from renewable 
energy sources (RES-E) on policy adoption (RPS, FIT). Because it is the first binding directive 
that obliges nation-states' legislators to support RES-E, it can be treated as a coercion 
mechanism. 
International organizations and powerful countries can coerce countries through financial 
incentives to affect policy change. International climate policy components such as the Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM) target developing countries and provide them with financial 
incentives (Stadelmann and Castro 2014).  To examine the effect of coercion from international 
organizations, one can use CDM projects as a proxy measure.  
Hegemonic countries can influence or coerce other countries. To examine this effect 
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) use former colonizers’ policy adoption effect on the developing 
countries as they continue to have strong economic and political ties. 
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) suggest some ways to test for coercion. One way 
to illustrate that the coercion mechanism is at work is to test for adoption of a policy while 
countries are negotiating trade agreements; accession to the EU or the WTO; or loan 
disbursement from the IMF. In addition, studies should illustrate that countries subject to aid, 
loans or security dependence are adopting policies promoted by powerful actors. “[T]he 
preferences of the U.S. government, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF), and the World Bank may shape policy in countries reliant on those entities for trade, 
foreign direct investment, aid, grants, loans, or security” (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007). 
Together, these previous studies suggest four hypotheses about suasion: 
 
H1a Countries that are members of the European Union are more likely to adopt renewable 
energy policies than non-EU states.  
H2a Countries for which their former colonizers adopted RPS/FIT are more likely to adopt 
them.  
H3a Countries with CDM projects are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than countries without 
them. 
H4a Countries with high levels of FDI are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS than countries with 
lower levels of FDI.   
 
The above hypothesis will examine the effect of different crucial actors on policy 
diffusion.  The European Union and CDM are go-between actors. Former colonizers and FDI 
show the effects of external actors.  
 
The Competition Mechanism: Hypotheses  
To test the effects of competition on policy diffusion, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 
(2007) provide some operational measures. First, it is important to identify what policies are 
important for a country and its competitors. Exporting countries are affected by wage and 
welfare policies elsewhere. Investment seekers compete on policies that reduce security or 
political risks and contractual hazards. In case of competition in a local market, the competition 
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is with a trade partner. In other cases, countries compete in a third country’s market. For 
example, if country A and B are competing in C’s market, when A reduces trade barriers, B may 
follow A for gaining access to C’s market. For countries who are seeking foreign direct 
investment, one may consider countries with similar social capital, infrastructure or natural 
resources endowment. 
Trade openness can be used as a proxy for competition. Neumayer (2002) finds that trade 
openness promotes multilateral environmental cooperation. Exporting countries support those 
multilateral environmental agreements that do not hinder their economic interests. For example, 
fossil fuel exporters are less likely to sign the Kyoto Protocol because they see it as a threat to 
their economic interest. When the trade provisions in multilateral environmental agreements 
accommodate the interest of the exporters, they are more likely to cooperate.  A measure of  
trade openness is membership to the World Trade Organization. Other proxy measures include 
the natural log of the sum of exports and imports divided by gross domestic product (GDP); the 
natural log of imports as a percentage of GDP; the natural log of exports as a percentage of GDP; 
the index of openness from the Fraser Institute; and the index of trade openness from the 
Heritage Foundation. The natural log of the variables are used to avoid the potential problem of 
hetroscedasticity (Neumayer 2002). Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) use trade intensity and net FDI 
inflow, which are measures of competition, to find the drivers of renewable energy adoption. 
Policies diffuse from external actors to internal actors when they are competitors or 
trading partners (Berry and Berry 2007). In other cases, external and internal actors compete in 
third countries’ market or they might be competing for a third country’s investment in the case of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007).   
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In the competition mechanism, the most important relationships among actors are 
horizontal (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). External and internal actors who compete are 
more likely to have similar economic structures (Stadelmann and Castro 2014).  Stadelmann and 
Castro (2014) find significant effects of GDP per capita on FIT adoption in emerging and 
developing countries. Income level (low, medium, high) can be used to measure competition 
among countries.  
The literature provides various measures of competition. Stadelmann and Castro (2014) 
use membership to similar economic and regional blocks, trade openness and countries with 
similar economic structure as proxies for competition. Baccini, Lenzi, and Thurner (2013) define 
competitors as main trade partners. Prakash and Potoski (2006) use the main exporter’s market 
or partner(s) as a measure of competition. Saikawa (2013, 13) states that adoption by an 
importing country puts pressure on the exporting country to adopt the policy as well. Adoption of 
an exporting country gives it a competitive advantage. Geographic proximity is another proxy for 
measure of competition.  
These findings suggest three hypotheses about the competition mechanism of diffusion: 
 
H5a Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their main export partner(s) (competitor) 
adopted them.  
H6a Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their competitors with CDM have adopted 
the policies.   
H7a Countries are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT if their competitors with FDI adopted them. 
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Countries are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT if their prime competitors for trade and 
investment have done so. FDI will be used to measure competition between the receivers. 
However, it can be a measure of suasion if considered in terms of recipients and investors. The 
same can be true for CDM, the recipients compete for it, while from the perspective of relation 
between CDM providers and recipients, it is a measure of suasion. The hypotheses will examine 
the effects of external actors in the competition mechanism. 
 
The Learning Mechanism: Hypotheses  
Berry and Berry (2007) argue that states emulate each other because they learn from each 
other; they adopt policies that they perceive as successful elsewhere. The percentage of 
renewable energy in electricity generation, CO2 emission per capita and economic growth could 
be used to measure RPS/FIT success. The following hypotheses test the learning mechanism of 
diffusion: 
 
H8a In comparing countries, those in regions with a high share of renewable energy are more 
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with a low share of renewable energy.  
H9a In comparing countries of the world, the average share of renewable energy is higher in 
countries with FIT/RPS than countries without them. 
H10a In comparing countries, those in regions with lower average carbon emissions are more 
likely to adopt FIT/RPS that those in regions with high average carbon emissions. 
H11a In comparing countries of the world, the average carbon emissions are lower in countries 
with FIT/RPS than countries without them. 
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H12a In comparing countries, those in regions with higher average economic growth are more 
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with lower average economic growth. 
H13a In comparing countries of the world, the average economic growth is higher in countries 
with FIT/RPS than countries without them. 
 
In the above hypotheses, the effects of external actors in the learning mechanism are 
considered. Covadonga (2004) assumes that governments are rational learners choosing to 
privatize. Governments use their prior beliefs of the impact of privatization on growth a year 
before they choose to privatize. In each period, a year before they adopt the policies, the 
countries will observe the average rate of renewable energy consumption, CO2 emissions and 
economic growth for countries with the policies and without the policies. Governments will use 
this information to change their prior belief about the effectiveness of the policies.     
 
The Emulation Mechanism: Hypotheses 
In addition, by introducing a new independent variable and a broader reach, this study 
will contribute by examining whether and how socialization in international organizations affects 
the policy diffusion process. It investigates the question: how does membership in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) affect the diffusion of domestic renewable energy policies? 
The purpose is to examine the diffusion of renewable energy policies, whether socialization or 
membership in these networks or multilateral environmental agreements affect the adoption of 
RPS and FIT. 
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) argue that the international climate regime and the 
emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto Protocol are not strict enough to force 
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countries into action. Therefore, multilateral organizations will be used as a proxy to examine 
socialization, which is one of the emulation processes. The independent variables are 
membership in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as Kyoto Protocol from the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. Neumayer (2002) categorizes MEAs as continuous and suggest that Cox proportional 
Hazards model or survival model is the appropriate estimation method.  The model will also 
include independent variables to test the domestic determinants of renewable energy policy 
adoption. 
MacGarvie (2005) uses geographic proximity as a proxy for communication barriers 
between two countries and measures the distance between the capital of two countries of the 
citing and cited patents. 
Acting as go-betweens, national policy governments in federal system and international 
organizations can facilitate socialization by establishing information facilities, organizing 
conferences and recommending best practices (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). NGOs, 
policy professionals, academics can influence governments to adopt policies (Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2006). 
These previous studies suggest the following hypotheses concerning the emulation 
mechanism of policy diffusion: 
 
H14a States with a higher percentage of neighbors with the renewable energy policy are more 
likely to adopt renewable energy policy.  
H15a States with a higher percentages of countries with FIT/RPS that share a common 
colonizer historically are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT 
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H16a States with higher percentages of countries with FIT/RPS that share a common language 
are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT 
H17a Countries that are signatories to the Cartagena multilateral environmental agreement are 
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies. 
H18a Countries that are signatories to the Kyoto multilateral environmental agreement are 
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies. 
 
The above hypotheses will examine the effects of external actors (neighboring countries, 
countries with common cultural/historical features) and go-between actors (MEAs) on internal 
actors. When and where policy diffusion occurs--in other words, the process of diffusion rather 
than the end result--“the existence and nature of the linkages among internal, external, and go 
between actors may influence which diffusion mechanisms are used” (Graham, Shipan, and 
Volden 2013). Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013) suggest the examination of diffusion 
mechanisms and the interaction of crucial actors. Previous studies do not look at the interaction 
of neighboring states’ and the policy advocates’ influence. It is not known whether their 
interaction reinforces the learning processes or substitutes it. While the literature identifies the 
actors and the mechanisms, it does not examine the existence and linkages among the crucial 
actors and the diffusion mechanisms. Not only that, Braun and Gilardi (2006) suggest that policy 
change is driven by change in effectiveness and payoffs, which are affected by diffusion 
mechanisms through change in beliefs and preferences. For example, learning should be used in 
combination with some measures of payoff. They illustrate that learning by itself cannot affect 
the policy change but rather changes the beliefs about effectiveness of policy.  
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RESEARCH METHODS  
Since the dependent variable in this study is dichotomous, that is, whether RPS/FIT is 
enacted is coded as 1 or not coded as (0), pooled random-effects logistic regression (logit) and 
event history methods will be used. There are some disadvantages in regression models that 
examine time series (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Two of the problems with regression 
models are “right censoring” and “time varying covariates”. Ordinary least squares regression 
models assume that time-varying predictors are fixed. Independent variables explain the 
variation in duration of change from one state to the other. For example, any state that does not 
adopt a policy during a period of observation is right censored (that is, future policy adoption is 
not directly observed). In this case, regression models fail to distinguish a state that has not 
adopted a policy by the end of the observation period from states that adopted a policy at the end 
of the period of observation. By using logit or pobit models, one loses information on when an 
event occurs. They give inefficient estimates with larger variances relative to event history 
estimates. To address these issues, event history models are considered for a robustness check 
whether the variables behave consistently across specifications within pooled logit models and 
within event history models and across pooled logit models and event history models.  
An event history model’s dependent variable is not one or zero. It analyzes the 
probability of an event occurring in a given time. How long does it take until a given event takes 
place? It solves the problem of serial correlation. How long does it take until a state adopts 
FIT/RPS?  
Event history modeling focuses on duration, timing of events, and patterns and causes of 
change.  “One indicator of issue innovation and diffusion might be to record the duration of time 
before adoption occurs” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1415).  
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Why Use Agent-Based Models? 
Statistical models allow observing correlation of regularities. However, because they use 
aggregate and/or pooled data, they do not allow directly observing how states change their 
preferences and make decisions. Agent-based models can close this gap by making it possible to 
model how actors receive information and update their preferences. “Agent-based models can be 
used to develop models based on agents making decisions with simple strategies that can explain 
the observed behavior in experiments” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,178).  
Conventional theories of collective action claim that actors make decisions based on 
rational utility maximization. However, the empirical findings challenge these predictions. The 
empirical findings show different outcomes in how individuals manage collective action. “The 
findings suggest the importance of communication, trust, and reciprocity, normative 
considerations, interactions among multiple types of actors, and the cognitive challenges 
presented by complex ecological systems” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,194). Agent-
based models use agents with a heterogeneity of attributes and preferences to explain outcomes. 
This justifies the use of agent-based modeling to study collective action and how individuals or 
agents act collectively to manage the commons in a sustainable way.  
Agent-based simulation is used as a tool to analyze complex system. Social phenomena 
are complex in nature. Complexity refers to non-linearity, decentralization, and self-organization. 
A number of scholars including (Axelrod 1984, Jervis 1997, Rosenau 1990) used this concept. 
Geller and Moss (2008) describe complexity as a type of condition in which an agent’s behavior 
and social interaction combine to generate macro-level outcomes that could not be predicted 
from knowledge of the behavior and nature of interactions alone. 
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ABM is an appropriate approach to analyze the relationships among actors and outcomes. 
In ABM terms, these can be rules that explain why or how the behavior of A influences the 
behavior of B. This study will contribute by examining the interactions using ABM rules and 
developing a new model.  
According to Macy and Willer (2002, 155) a diffusion model would “start with some 
distribution of practices and a rule by which agents decide whether to abandon current practice in 
favor of one used by another agent.” An advantage of simulation is that it focuses on processes 
rather than equilibria (Johnson 1999, 1522). “They can thus supply insights on how different 
diffusion processes may lead to the same equilibrium (e.g. convergence) and more generally on 
the characteristics of diffusion processes, whereas formal analysis permits conclusions only on 
equilibria that are achieved, and thus gives much less information on the diffusion process itself” 
(Braun and Gilardi 2006, 316). According to Elkins and Simmons (2005) policy diffusion is an 
uncoordinated process, which cannot easily fall under the umbrella of rational decision making.  
Braun and Gilardi (2006) suggest that ABM can be used in contexts where changes can be 
applied to various parameters that may affect diffusion outcomes at aggregate level. They specify 
decision rules, which depend on payoffs and effectiveness that are affected by the decisions of 
other states through various decision mechanisms. Simulation could be used to model the 
aggregate pattern of diffusion that emerges from interdependent policy choices.  
In the model, there will be leading countries that have already adopted the policies at the 
setup prior to simulation based on leader laggard and threshold models. Walker (1969) finds that 
because of their size, wealth and cosmopolitan nature, some states are leaders in policy 
innovations. “Similarly, the go-betweens of policy entrepreneurs and epistemic communities 
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influence when and where policies spread” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 697). In Leader-
laggard models states emulate pioneers and leaders who are economically developed.  
Threshold models state that early adopters have low threshold values. They have strong 
preferences for policy change, which lead them to policy change even when no one else adopted 
the policy. Their payoffs and effectiveness change independent of others’ behavior. They face 
higher transaction costs than potential adopters. They face uncertainty about decision-making 
process.  
 
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION  
For the statistical model, the study uses time-series cross-sectional data covering FIT and 
RPS adoption between 1990 and 2011. The first enactment of FIT was in 1978 and the second 
enactment in 1990; however, because of lack of availability of data and occurrence of the first 
diffusion, the study begins from 1990. There are 1958 observations (See appendix 3). Some of 
the independent variables originally considered, will be dropped because of missing data (see 
Table 6). Data for RPS/FIT policies and some of the independent variables were compiled from 
Renewables 2014 Global Status Report (REN 21). The independent variables’ data sources are: 
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), Eurostat Database, International Energy Agency, 
World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Central European Free Trade Agreement, 
International Environmental Agreements, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Research and 
Expertise on the World Economy (CEPII), and U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
Table 5 presents the data sources and operationalization of each variable.  
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In 1990 only two countries had adopted a FIT policy. This number exceeded to 69 in 
2013 (69 countries with known years of adoption and this number grows to 76 including the 
countries with unknown years of adoption). There are fewer countries which have RPS, but the 
number is growing. In 1999 only one country had RPS policy and this numbered reached to 15 in 
2013 (This number exceed to 25 including the countries with unknown years of adoption).  
Table 5 Data Operationalization 
Variables operationalization Abbreviation Sources # Actor Ha 
Feed-in tariff 1 dummy fit Renewables 
2014 Global 
Status 
Report 
1,
2 
Interna
l 
DV 
+EU membership/non members 
(non=1,2) 
eumem EU 3 Go-
betw 
H1a 
+former colonizer with/without FIT 
(1,2),  
colonizer_fit CEPII, 
created 
5 extern
al 
H2a 
+CDM, dummy (non=1,cdm=2) cdm UNFCCC 6 Go-
betw 
H3a 
+Foreign direct investment (net inflows 
(% of GDP), new investment inflows 
less disinvestment) divided by GDP 
(positive fdi =2, negative fdi=1) 
fdi WDI 7 extern
al 
H4 
+ %Main export partners (competitor) 
with RPS/FIT 
comfit CIA 
Factbook 
8 extern
al 
H5a 
% of competitors with CDM compcdm create 10 extern
al 
H6a 
+% of competitor with  FDI compfdi  11 extern
al 
H7a 
+  Regional difference in mean 
renewable electricity share of FIT and 
nonFIT (Total Renewable Electricity 
Net Generation (Billion 
Kilowatthours)/Total Electricity Net 
Generation (Billion 
Kilowatthours)*100 
 
regelshare_fit
.nf 
EIA 12 Extern
al 
H8 
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Table 5 continued: Variables 
operationalization 
Abbreviatio
n 
Sources # Actor Ha 
+  World difference in mean renewable wfit_elshare_ EIA 1 Extern H9 
electricity share of FIT and nonFIT  
 
regelshare_fit
.nf 2 al 
+Regional difference in mean CO2 
emissions (metric tons per capita) of fit 
& nonfat countries  
regfit_co2.no
nfit 
Created-
WDI 
1
3 
Extern
al 
H10 
+world difference in mean CO2  wfit_co2_no
nfit 
Created-
WDI 
1
3 
Extern
al 
H11 
+  Regional difference in mean GDP 
growth (annual %) of FIT and nonFIT 
countries 
regfit_gdpg.n
onfit 
Created-
WDI 
1
4 
Extern
al 
H12 
+  World Difference in mean GDP 
growth  
 
wfit_gdpg_n
onfit 
Created-
WDI 
1
4 
Extern
al 
H13 
+% of neighboring states with FIT 
 
nei_fit CIA fact 
book created 
1
6 
Extern
al 
H14
a 
+% of countries with the same 
colonizer having FIT, countries 
without a colony coded 0 
Commoncolo 
ny_fit 
CEPII, 
created 
1
7 
Extern
al 
H15 
+ % countries with common language 
with FIT 
coml_FIT CEPII, 
created 
2
0 
Extern
al 
H16 
+Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
dummy 
cartagena IEAD 2
2 
Go-
betw 
H17 
+Kyoto Protocol from the United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, dummy 
kyoto IEAD 2
1 
Go-
Betw 
H18 
+CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) Co2em WDI 13 Extern
al 
C 
+Global oil price goilpr EIA 24 Go-
betw 
C 
+GDP per capita (Current US$) gdppc WDI 25 interna
l 
C 
+Population popul WDI 26 interna
l 
C 
Government Orientation, -right(2), center 
(3), +left(4) 
govorient WBDPI 27 internal 
C 
System  (presidential(2), 
parliamentary(3)) 
system WBDPI 28 interna
l 
C 
-Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion 
Barrels) 
oilres EIA 29 interna
l 
C 
+wind =Total Resource Area (km^2) at 
50m, Classes 3-7 
wind Data 
Catalogue 30 
interna
l 
C 
+solar= total potential solar energy per 
year MWh/year 
solar Data 
Catalogue 31 
interna
l 
C 
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Table 6 Controls not Included Because of Missing Data 
Controls missing data Abbreviati
on  
Missing Source % 
missing 
+Energy import, net % of energy use eimport 748 WDI 26 
-Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of 
total)  
ffecpt 721 WDI 25 
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) 
eupc 
eupc 670 WDI 24 
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP % per kg 
of oil equivalent 
gdppueu 721 WDI 25 
-Oil rents (% of GDP) oilgdp 665 WDI 23 
+education (the % of gross secondary 
school enrollment)  
seconsgro
ss 
765 WDI 27 
+School enrollment, secondary (% net)  seconsnet 1727 WDI 61 
+Unemployment, total % of total labor 
force 
unem 1309 WDI 46 
Net ODA received (% of gni)  odapgni 831 WDI 29 
Energy Intensity - Total Primary Energy 
Consumption per Dollar of GDP (Btu per 
Year 2005 U.S. Dollars (Purchasing Power 
einten 682 EIA 24 
Target percent of final energy from 
Renewable 
   0 
Share of heavy industry as % of 
GDP(paper products+ nonmetallicindustry 
+ basic metal industry)/gdp for each year  
  dataoec
d  
Restructured electricity product market 
regulation (PMR) in the electricity sector 
  dataoec
d 
 
Renewable energy, Total, % of total energy 
generation 
  dataoec
d  
Renewable Energy Sources Govt R&D in 
Million NC (nominal) 
  IEA 
  
Renewable Energy Sources Total RD&D in 
Million USD (2013 prices and PPP) 
  IEA 
  
International   
solar energy society (unknown year of 
chapter) 
  sustaina
bledeve
lopmen
t.un. 
 
+biomass resources     
+hydro resources     
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About 39 percent out of 196 countries in the world have adopted FIT. Only 13 percent 
(about 25) have adopted RPS. Some of these countries have dropped the policies and the data 
about the years of adoption for some of these countries are unavailable. There are a few countries 
that have adopted both RPS and FIT.  
Figure 1 Total number of countries with FIT and RPS Policies 1990-2013 
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Table 7 shows frequency distribution of FIT and RPS countries and other variables. 
Almost all FIT and RPS countries have membership in multilateral agreements (Kyoto, 
Cartagena, and Montreal Protocols). About 90 percent of FIT and 87 percent of RPS countries 
are recipients of foreign direct investment. In addition, 55 percent of FIT and 40 percent of RPS 
countries had former colonizers with FIT. Around 61 percent of FIT and 73 percent of RPS 
countries have parliamentary governments. 
Table 8 presents the frequency and percent of each variable. There are 28 European 
Union members. High percentages of countries are members of multilateral agreements (Kyoto 
99 percent, Cartagena 83 percent) and are the recipients of foreign direct investment. About 57 
percent and 42 percent are presidential and parliamentary governments. Around 38 percent and 8 
percent of countries have FIT and RPS policies. Governments of the right, center and left are 
respectively 18, 8, and 28 percent of the countries. In addition, about 23 percent of the countries 
Table 7 Frequency Table  
Variables FIT Percent FIT RPS Percent RPS 
EU member 25 36 5 33 
Former colonizer with RPS  18 26 3 20 
Former colonizer with FIT  38 55 6 40 
CDM 19 28 4 27 
Foreign direct investment 62 90 13 87 
Kyoto Protocol  68 99 15 100 
Cartagena Protocol  65 94 11 73 
Government Orientation - right 18 26 6 40 
Center 8 12 3 20 
Left 20 29 4 27 
Other 22 32 2 13 
Presidential 26 38 4 27 
Parliamentary 42 61 11 73 
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have CDM. Around 33 percent and 72 percent have former colonizer with RPS and FIT 
respectively. 
Figure 2 shows the average rate of growth and dispersion of FIT and Non-FIT countries. 
FIT countries have lower rates of growth than Non-FIT countries. This information is only 
Table 8 Frequency Distribution of Variables 
Variables Frequency Percent  
EU membership  28 16 
Former colonizer RPS  60 33 
Former colonizer FIT  129 72 
CDM 42 23 
Foreign direct investment 165 92 
Kyoto Protocol  179 99 
Cartagena Protocol  150 83 
Government Orientation - right 32 18 
Center 15 8 
 Left 51 28 
Other 82 46 
Presidential 103 57 
Parliamentary 75 42 
FIT 69 38 
RPS 15 8 
 
Figure 2 Average Rates of Growth & Dispersion under FIT/ Non-FIT 1990-2011 
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descriptive and only shows correlations. The data cannot inform about the direction of causality 
and association between growth and FIT adoption. Figure 2 also shows that FIT countries were 
hit harder by the 2008 recessions. Their growth rates have declined dramatically. The figure also 
reveals that the FIT countries had lower consistency and higher growth variation than those 
countries without FIT policies.  
Figure 3 and Table 9 show the average rate of growth and dispersion of RPS and non-
RPS countries. RPS countries have lower rates of growth than non-RPS countries. This 
Table 9 RPS/non-RPS Descriptive Statistics 
 RPS Non-RPS 
Variable  Mean Minimum  Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
Growth -0.8 3 5 4 0 6 
Renewable Energy  19 10 27 43 41 45 
CO2 9 7 12 4.8 4.6 5 
 
Figure 3 Average Rates of Growth & Dispersion under RPS/non-RPS 1998-2011 
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information is only descriptive and only shows correlations. The data cannot inform about the 
direction of causality in association between growth and RPS adoption. Figure 3 also shows that 
RPS countries were hit harder in the 2008 recessions. Their growth rates have declined 
dramatically. The figure also reveals that the non-RPS countries had lower consistency and 
higher growth variation than those countries with RPS policies. There has been an increase in 
variation in growth during 2007-2009 and since then it has decreased. Average growth in non-
RPS countries is greater than RPS countries except in 2010. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of FIT adoption based on government orientation and 
system in the year of adoption.  In Figure 4 government orientation represents countries that do 
not fall under right and left categories based on their platform on economic issues or there is no 
information available. The center category represents those countries where the ruling party is 
centrist (example social-liberal context where private enterprises are advocated). The 
categorization is based on Database of Political Institutions of the World Bank.  
Figure 4 Percent of Countries with FIT Based on Orientation/ System of Government 
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FIT seems more popular among parliamentary than presidential system of governments. 
About 55 percent of parliamentary governments and only 27 percent of presidential system of 
government adopted FIT. However, there is not much difference in the distribution of FIT based 
on government orientation in the year of adoption. About 47 percent of right- and left-oriented 
governments adopted FIT. Left-, right- and center-oriented governments adopted 35, 22 and 12 
percent of FIT policies respectively. Parliamentary and presidential governments adopted 59 and 
41 percent of RPS respectively.   
The percent of parliamentary-system governments that adopted RPS is double that of the 
presidential system of governments. About 11 percent of parliamentary and five percent 
presidential governments adopted RPS. There is not much difference between the right- and left-
oriented governments in terms of RPS adoption.  
The percentage of centrist governments which adopted RPS is the highest. About 14, 12 
and 20 percent of RPS policies are adopted by left-, right- and center-oriented governments 
Figure 5 Percent of Countries with RPS Based on System/Government Orientation 
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respectively.  Parliamentary and presidential governments adopted 11 and 6 percent of RPS 
policies respectively.  
RPS adoption is most popular in Asia. Figure 6 shows that the highest percentage of 
countries that adopted RPS are in East Asia and the Pacific followed by South Asia. The 
percentage of countries that adopted RPS in East Asia and Pacific, South Asia and Europe and 
Central Asia are 29, 25 and 13 percent respectively. Around 49 percent of FIT policies are 
adopted in Europe and Central Asia. East Asia/ Pacific and America each has adopted 13 percent 
of all FIT adoptions. Sub-Saharan Africa has adopted 12 percent of FIT policies.  
On the other hand, FIT is most popular in Europe and Central Asia. Figure 6 shows 
percentage of countries in each region that adopted FIT. The percentage of countries that adopted 
FIT in Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and 
Pacific are 69, 50, 30 and 26 percent respectively. East Asia and the Pacific is on the top of the 
list in terms of percentage of RPS policies adoption while America is in the bottom of the list. 
Figure 6 Percent of Countries with FIT/RPS in Each Region 
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East Asia/Pacific, Europe/Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Middle East/North 
Africa have adopted 40, 28, 12, 8,8 and 4 percent respectively.  
Figure 7 shows that the percent of high- and middle-income countries which have 
adopted FIT and RPS are higher than low-income countries. The percent of high income, upper-
middle income, lower-middle income and low income countries that adopted FIT are 43, 45, 33 
and 14 respectively.  In addition, the highest percentage of FIT policies are adopted by high 
income countries. High income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low-income 
countries adopted 38, 33, 22 and 7 percent of FIT policies respectively. Around 76 countries 
adopted FIT policies. Some of these countries have dropped the policies and the data about the 
years of adoption for some of these countries are unavailable.  
The percent of high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income and low-income 
countries that adopted RPS are 15, 13, 13 and 3 respectively. In addition, high-income countries 
have adopted the highest percentage of RPS policies.  While there is around a 10-percent gap 
between upper and lower middle-income countries in the adoption of FIT, it is the same in terms 
of RPS policies. High income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low-income 
Figure 7 Percent of Countries Adopted FIT/RPS by Income Level 
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countries adopted 40, 28, 28 and 4 percent of RPS policies respectively.  
  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter lays out the research design. A mixed statistical method of pooled random-
effects logistic regression and event history will be used to analyze the data and test the 
hypotheses. These two methods will allow for robustness check whether the variables behave 
consistently across specifications within pooled logit models and within event history models 
and across pooled logit models and event history models. To complement the statistical models 
by making it possible to model how actors receive information and update their preferences, 
agent-based model will be developed. This chapter also discussed the sources and 
operationalization of the data. In the next chapter author presents the results of statistical analysis 
of four specifications of event history and four specifications of random-effects pooled logit 
regression. 
Using the findings of previous studies, an agent-based model of diffusion will be built. 
Because an agent-based model provides a micro level analysis of the interactions between the 
crucial actors in the diffusion of policies, it is a useful method for theory and hypothesis 
generation, especially when empirical data about actor preferences are scarce. The next chapter 
will discuss the development, experimentation with and analysis of the agent-based model.   
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AGENT-BASED MODEL 
The previous chapter presented hypotheses, operational measures, and the research 
methodology. In the next chapter, a random effects regression analysis will test the hypothesis 
using large sample data. An event history analysis also will seek to explain the effects on timing 
of diffusion. One advantage of statistical models is that they allow observing correlation of 
regularities. However, they do not permit direct observation of how states change their 
preferences and make decisions. Agent-based models can close this gap by making it possible to 
model how actors receive information and update their preferences. “Agent based models can be 
used to develop models based on agents making decisions with simple strategies that can explain 
the observed behavior in experiments” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,178).  
Conventional theories of collective action claim that actors make decisions based on 
rational utility maximization. However, empirical findings have challenge this assumption. 
These findings show different outcomes in how individuals manage collective action. “The 
findings suggest the importance of communication, trust, and reciprocity, normative 
considerations, interactions among multiple types of actors, and the cognitive challenges 
presented by complex ecological systems” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,194). Agent-
based models use agents with heterogenous attributes and preferences to explain outcomes. This 
justifies the use of agent-based modeling to study collective action and how individuals or agents 
act collectively to manage collective action problems in a sustainable way.  
This chapter's agent-based model of policy diffusion adopts and builds upon Ring’s 
   =  , ,  to represent three parameters of theoretical interest to him: hierarchy, 
neighborhood and identity. He hypothesizes norm adoption is a function of these three factors. 
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Based on theories of policy adoption, policy diffusion is influenced or the result of interaction of 
three sets of actors: external actors, internal actors and "go-betweens" or intermediators. In this 
chapter’s extension of Ring’s model, other nation-states that have already adopted the policy are 
the external actors. An internal actor is represented by nation-states adopting the policy and the 
people in those nation-states. Go-betweens are intergovernmental organizations.  
This chapter presents agent-based model by discussing the simulated environment and 
agents. Then it discusses the rules for interaction for each mechanism. It displays the 
initialization of the model with plots. Finally, it provides the run results and conclusions.  
An agent-based model (ABM) is a computer simulation that represents people as "agents" 
or autonomous objects that execute algorithms written by the modeler. In an ABM, agents 
interact with other agents and with the environment. The interaction rules guide agents’ 
interaction. In this chapter's model of policy diffusion, agents signal each other about a policy 
choice i. At each step of the simulation run, two agents, a receiver and a sender, are activated. 
The sender sends a signal to the receiver agent. When an agent receives a signal, it evaluates the 
benefits and costs of adoption and then updates its policy choice accordingly. An agent that 
sends the signal is the sender and the agent that updates its policy choice is the receiver. The 
study builds the model in NetLogo, a free and widely used integrated development environment 
for agent-based models (Wilensky 1999). 
 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND AGENTS 
The model represents a world with five “regions”. In this respect, the model represents a 
spatially explicit world in which policy diffusion occurs among geographically positioned 
agents. For ease of visualization, the model shades each region a different color.  The model 
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includes 20 nation-states and 20 internal actors, one per patch in each region. Within each region, 
there is one intergovernmental organization; all the nation-states in the region are members of the 
organization, analogous to a regional trading arrangement or governance organization such as the 
Organization of American States.  
The model uses three “breeds” or types of agents: intergovernmental organizations (the NetLogo 
code uses the primitive “IGOs”), internal actors (“i_actors”) and nation states (“nation_states”). 
The nation-states, i_actors and IGOs have star, people and circles shapes to facilitate 
visualization of the simulated social system. The “world” consists of one hundred nation-states 
and one hundred internal actors. There are five intergovernmental organizations. Each actor in 
the model either is committed (i=1) or not committed (i=0) to a policy: although the choice is 
nominal in the model, for purposes of this study the nominal choice represents the mitigation of 
carbon dioxide emissions. If the agent is an IGO or I_actor, the agent is committed to and prefers 
carbon dioxide mitigation. If a nation-state, the nation-state already has the policy. Agents that 
have committed to the policy will have white colors.  
 
Internal Actors initialization 
Below are the variables associated with internal actors. Internal actors are people-shaped 
with pink color except the ones that have adopted the policy, i.e. those with value i=1. The ones 
committed to the mitigation of carbon emissions are colored white.  
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The number of committed internal actors (i=1) is set through a user-interface slider called 
“person=1”. The slider permits the researcher to conduct quasi-experiments that assess the effect 
of the number of internal actors on policy diffusion. These actors are colored white.   
Each internal actor has a reelection value between 0 and 1. The reelection parameter 
shows whether policy makers who had adopted policy i were reelected. If the value is less than 
the value of slider “reelection=1”, reelection gets a value of 1, otherwise 0. The slider permits the 
researcher to conduct quasi-experiments to assess the effect of the prospects for reelection on 
policy diffusion.  
Figure 8 Agent Types  
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Each internal actor has a competitiveness value between 0 and 1. Competitiveness 
represents whether policy i is competitive. If the value is less than the slider 
“competitiveness=1”, the competitiveness value is set at 1, otherwise 0. 
Initialization of IGO actors 
The variables for IGOs agents and their attributes are as follows: The initial number of 
IGOs committed to the policy (i=1) is set through a user-interface slider called “IGO=1”. By 
allowing the initial number of committed IGO agents to vary, the ABM permits quasi-
experimentation to assess the effect of initial adoption on policy diffusion. 
Each IGO has nation-states as members. The nation-states that are located in the same 
simulated region as the IGOs are their members. If more than fifty percent of its members have 
value of i=1, the receiver nation-states gets a value of 1. At each step of the simulation run, two 
agents, a receiver and a sender are activated. One agent, which is the sender, sends a signal to the 
receiver. Based on the signal received, the receiver nation-state makes a decision on whether to 
adopt policy i or keep the status quo. 
 
Initialization of nation-state agents 
The model provides nation-state agents with several properties. The initial number of 
nation-states that have adopted the policy (i=1) is set through sliders “probability-i=1”.  At 
initialization, each nation-state agent draws a random number from a uniform distribution 
bounded by 0 and 1. If the drawn value is less than the probability-i=1 threshold, the nation-state 
agent becomes an initial adopter (i.e. its value of i takes a value of 1). Otherwise the nation-state 
is not an adopter (i=0). This formulation allows the ABM to conduct quasi-experiments to assess 
whether the number of initial-adopter nation-states affects the speed of policy diffusion. 
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Each nation-state has a utility value. This initial utility is set by drawing a number from a 
normal distribution with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. The benefit of the policy π 
to a given country i is the difference between utility of the sender (us) and the utility of receiver 
(ur):  
πi= us – ur 
 
Each state has a benefit of compliance c and cost for non-compliance c' with the policy 
choice i. These values of the compliance and non-compliance variables are drawn from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. This permits the model to calculate 
the costs of non-compliance C as: 
 
C = cr' – cr 
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The model tests whether the distribution of power in the international system affects the 
likelihood and speed of policy diffusion. To do so, at initialization the model distributes power 
among nation-states using three different distributions. The Poisson Distribution represents a 
hegemonic distribution: a single great power and many lesser states. The Normal Distribution 
represents a distribution of power more analogous to a multipolar world: many middle powers 
with a few large and small powers. Finally, the uniform distribution represents a perfectly 
multipolar world: each state has power equal to every other state. This formulation of the ABM 
allows the study to examine policy diffusion in different “worlds”. The researcher chooses the 
power distribution using a chooser in the model’s user interface.  
The ruling-p parameter represents whether the ruling party of a nation-state is a majority 
in the legislature and supports policy i (1) or not (0). For example, leftist parties are more likely 
to support mitigation of carbon emissions than rightist parties. This formulation allows the model 
to simulate domestic politics and their effect on policy adoption. At initialization, the ruling-p 
Figure 9 Competitors 
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parameter draws a random value from a uniform distribution bounded by zero and 1. If the 
random value is less than a threshold value set by the party=1 slider, the nation-state gets a value 
of 1, otherwise it takes the value of 0.  
Each nation state has five competitors. The competitors are selected randomly at 
initialization. If more than fifty percent of their competitors have adopted the policy (that is,  
i=1), the receiver nation-state adopts the policy.  
 
AGENTS’ INITIALIZATION 
All the agents have a dependence value, which is drawn randomly from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. The literature shows that powerful 
countries and multilateral organizations shape policies of countries that are structurally 
dependent on them. The dependence parameter examines the effect of how countries’ 
dependence affects their policy choices.  
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At initialization, the model assigns to each agent a “popularity”. Each agent draws a 
random number from a uniform distribution bounded by zero and 1, and compares the draw to a 
threshold set by a model slider labeled “popularity=1”. If the randomly drawn value is less than 
the slider “popularity=1”, the agent receives a popularity value of 1; otherwise it receives a value 
of 0.  Some policies receive greater public support than others. This parameter examines how 
popularity of a policy among general public affect its adoption.  
 
MODEL EXECUTION: TO ACTIVATE A DYAD 
To enact communication between agents, at run time the ABM will choose a dyad of 
agents, one a sender of its policy choice and the other a receiver. The runtime procedure 
Figure 10 Initialization 
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proceeds as follows. One of the patches will set its color red and one of the agents will set its 
color green, yellow or sky blue. The nation-state in the red color patch will become a receiver 
and one of the other color agents will become a sender. If the color of the patch is sky blue, a 
nation-state will be the sender. If there is an IGO on the patch, it will turn green and the IGO will 
be the sender. If the color of patch is yellow, a domestic actor (i_actor) is the sender of the 
signal.   
 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE RATE AT WHICH DIFFUSION OCCURS  
The agent-based model incorporates algorithms that simulate the four mechanisms of 
policy diffusion: coercion, competition, emulation, and learning. 
  
Variables for the Coercion Mechanism 
Adopting Ring’s (2014) model, the ABM in this study test for three different distributions 
of power. The power distributions (Poisson, Uniform, Normal) represent hypothetical 
assumptions about hierarchy in the global system. In the Poisson distribution, there are many 
Figure 11 Sender Is Nation-state (Sky Blue), IGO (green) & Actor (Yellow) 
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more weak actors than there are strong actors. This distribution indicates a high level of 
inequality in the global system. There are a few powerful actors, some middle level and a large 
number of weak actors. In the uniformly distributed global system, the assumption is that all 
states have equal levels of power. The third assumption is that there are more middle-level actors 
with a few powerful and a few weak actors. This type of distribution is represented by the normal 
distribution. While some distributions might be more realistic than others, this implementation 
allows for testing whether the model’s findings are robust to various assumptions about the 
power distribution in the international system.  
In the ABM, coercion is a top-down approach in which powerful actors affect the policy 
preferences of weaker actors. By contrast, competition, learning and emulation are bottom-up 
approaches. For this reason, one would expect policy diffusion by coercion to occur more 
quickly in a Poisson (hegemonic) world than in the normal or uniform distributions of power. 
 
Hs  > HR   ⇒ ”top-down” 
Hs – HR   ≤  1 ⇒ “bottom up” 
 
International organizations and national governments in a federal system may use 
coercive strategies through grants and aid requirements; pre-emptive laws; sanctions; or military 
force (Graham, et al. 2013). Membership in similar regional or multilateral organizations, 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and military alliances can be used to examine their effect 
on policy outcomes when coercion is involved. To test for the use of carrots and sticks as tools of 
policy change, the study uses “costs” of compliance and non-compliance. “[S]tudies linking 
policy diffusion to soft coercion should show that the policy ideas actively promoted by strong 
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countries are more likely to be put into practice in weaker countries structurally or situationally 
dependent on them” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 791). The dependency variable 
examines the effect of how strong states promote policy ideas in weaker countries that are 
structurally or situationally dependent on them.  
 
 
The model also examines the role of domestic actors in the shaping of nation-states’ 
policy choices: 
The preferences of policy makers may be based on individual opinions and experiences 
or may be induced by the desires of the electorate, interest groups or others. Such 
preferences often affect the range of policy choices that policy makers consider, and 
therefore preferences influence the likelihood of any particular policy spreading from one 
government to the next. (Graham, etal 2013, p.685) 
 
The model also examines the role of domestic actors in the shaping of nation-states’ 
policy choices. In this study, the variable i represents the preferences of policy makers and 
1. Power distribution (Poisson, Uniform, Normal) pick one 
2.  Dependence (random-normal 2.5 1)  
3. dependency = dependence-s – dependence-r 
4. Compliance (random-normal 2.5 1)  
5. non-compliance (random-normal 2.5 1) 
6. cost = non-compliance-r – compliance-r 
7. popularity=1 (slider 0 1) 
8. popularity:  (random-float 0 1) if greater than popularity=1, get value of 1 otherwise 0 
9. popularity-iactor : sender is i-actor with popularity=1 
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intergovernmental organization. The popularity-iactor variable simulates whether a policy is 
more popular than a threshold among internal actors, who may influence the policy makers to 
change the policy.  
  
Variables for the Competition Mechanism 
 
To simulate mechanisms of competition, the ABM uses operational measures derived 
from previous empirical studies of competition and policy diffusion. The literature provides 
various measures of competition, most of which derive from trade relationships among nation-
states. Stadelmann and Castro (2014) use membership in a common economic and regional 
block, trade openness, and countries with similar economic structure as proxies for competition. 
Baccini, Lenzi, and Thurner (2013) define competitors as a state’s main trade partners. Prakash 
and Potoski (2006) use a state’s main export market or partner(s) to identify a nation-state’s 
competitors. Saikawa (2013) suggests that adoption by an importing country puts pressure on the 
exporting country to adopt the policy as well. Adoption by the exporting country gives it a 
competitive advantage. “Simmons and Elkins (2004) found that a country is more likely to 
liberalize its international economic policies following similar reform among its competitors, 
defined as countries with which it shares similar trade relationships” (Gilardi 2016, p.10). 
Policies diffuse from external actors to internal actors when they are competitors or trading 
partners (Berry and Berry 2007). In addition, in the competition mechanism the most important 
relationships among actors are horizontal rather than vertical (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 
2006). External and internal actors who compete are more likely to have similar economic 
structures (Stadelmann and Castro 2014).  Hierarchy examines the similarity of countries' 
economic structure. This study’s ABM defines a nation-state’s competitors as its trade partners. 
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The trade partners are chosen randomly at initialization of the simulation. At run time, the model 
does not explicitly model a trading relationship; rather, by treating actual processes of trade as 
exogenous to the model, the ABM allows the researcher to focus on the fact of an interdependent 
relationship rather than volumes of trade. This allows it to test how the behavior of a country’s 
trade partners affect its policy adoption. 
 
Variables for the Emulation Mechanism 
As Gilardi (2016) argues, intergovernmental organizations facilitate policy diffusion 
through the socialization of its members—that is, through the construction of regulative norms 
that identify “proper” behavior and roles for nation-states. The difference from the coercion 
mechanism is that intergovernmental organizations’ socialization does not influence its members 
through material incentives or sanctions. For example, Stadelmann and Castro (2014) argue that 
the international climate regime and the emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol are not strict enough to force countries into action. In this study’s implementation, joint 
membership in a multilateral organizations will be used as a proxy to examine policy diffusion 
through socialization. In the emulation mechanism, as go-betweens international organization 
can facilitate socialization by establishing information facilities, organizing conferences and 
recommending best practices (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). NGOs, policy professionals, 
and academics among others can influence governments to adopt policies (Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2006). 
 MacGarvie (2005) uses geographic proximity as a proxy for communication barriers 
between two countries, and measures the distance between the capitals of two countries. In this 
study’s ABM, geographic proximity, which reduces communication and cultural barriers, is used 
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to measures similarities among actors or nation-states. Those in closer geographic proximity 
communicate and socialize more often.    
 
Variables for the Learning Mechanism 
Policy makers learn from earlier adopters about the consequences, benefits and costs of 
policy adoption. The policy consequence is the success of the policy elsewhere. Berry and Berry 
(2007) argue that states emulate each other because they learn from each other; they adopt 
policies they perceive as successful elsewhere. One political consequence is reelection to office. 
Policy makers imitate a policy if elsewhere voters reelected those who enacted the policy 
(Gilardi 2010). Assuming it is a democracy, electorates influence policy makers’ preferences 
through elections. In the simulation, every adopter is given a binary variable of reelected/not 
reelected. In the model, “learning” occurs when a receiver checks two variables of a sender: 
whether or not it adopted the policy, and whether or not its reelection value is 1. A receiver is 
more likely to adopt (“learn”) if both of the sender’s variables are equal to 1 
1. neighbors: nation states in the same region  
2. party=1 (slider 0 1)*  
3. ruling-p ( random-float 1) if less than slider “party=1”, gets value of 1 otherwise 0. 
Policy makers’ preferences are based on desire of policy advocates. 
4. p-r: receiver with ruling-p = 1  
5. my-members : igos members are nation states in the same region as the igo 
6. member_i : mean (i) of igo members (my-members) 
7. mem_i : sender igo with more than 50 percent of its members with (i) 
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INTERACTION  
One advantage of agent-based modeling is that the researcher can use quasi-experimental 
techniques to measure interactive effects among model parameters. That is, by explicitly 
manipulating parameter values, the ABM researcher can determine whether parameter 
interactions enhance, mitigate, or have no effect on the systemic behavior of interest. This study 
tests for the following interactions effects. 
 
The Coercion Mechanism 
As in the real world, in the model nation-states exercise coercion through both power 
differentials and asymmetric interdependence.  When the sender is a nation-state that has adopted 
the policy (that is, with i=1), the receiver will also adopt the policy (set its i-value to 1) if two 
conditions are satisfied: the sender has power greater than the power of receiver (hierarchy > 0), 
and dependence of receiver is greater than the dependence of sender (dependency > 0). Actors 
other than states can also use coercive mechanisms. When the sender is an IGO that has adopted 
the policy, the receiver will set its i-value to 1 if the cost of non-compliance is greater than or 
equal to the compliance cost  (cost >= 0). Finally, when the sender is an i-actor with i=1 (i=1 
1. utility (random-normal 2.5 1) 
2. reelection=1 (slider 0  1)*  
3. reelection  (random-float 1) if greater than “reelection=1” slider, reelection gets value 
of 1 (reelection of those who adopted the policy earlier) otherwise 0.  
4. reelection-s: sender is an i-actor with reelection=1 and i=1 
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illustrates that the internal actor’s policy choice is i) and its popularity is greater than the 
threshold popularity=1, the receiver will set is i-value to 1. The popularity=1 is a slider in the 
interface and its value is set before running the model.  
 
The Competition Mechanism 
“Competition” among agents in the model reflects both differences in relative power and 
the policy choices of competing states. When the sender is a nation-state with i=1, hierarchy <= 
1 and fifty percent or more of the receiver’s competitors have i=1, the receiver will set its i-value 
to 1. The competitors have symmetric power. Their power relation is horizontal rather than 
vertical. 
When the sender is an i-actor with i=1 and competitiveness has a value less than the 
threshold (competitiveness = 1), the receiver will adopt the policy (that is, set its i-value to 1). 
Competitiveness represents that this policy i is competitive relative to other policies. For 
example, currently because of low prices of conventional energy prices, the renewables can not 
compete with conventional energy.  
 
The Emulation Mechanism 
When the sender is a nation-state with i=1, hierarchy <= 1 and the receiver and sender are 
in the same region, the receiver will set its i value to 1. The sender and receivers have relatively 
equal power. There is not large power difference between them.  
When the sender is an IGO with i=1 and fifty percent or more of IGO members adopted 
the policy, the receiver will set its i value to 1. The receiver will adopt the policy if fifty percent 
or more of the members of the organization it is member to adopted the policy.  
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When the sender is an i-actor with i=1 and the ruling-p has a value of 1 (less than the 
threshold party=1) the receiver will set its i value to 1. The ruling-p parameter gets a value a 
binary value of 0 or 1. When the ruling party has a majority in the parliament and supports policy 
i, it gets a value of 1. If the ruling party does not have a majority in the parliament it gets a value 
of 0. When ruling party has control of legislature of a nation-state, it can adopt its policy choice 
easier than when ruling party is not a majority. 
 
The Learning Mechanism 
The adopting nation-state is seeking for a solution to its policy problem. It looks at others' 
policy choices actively for a successful policy. When the sender is an adopter nation-state, 
hierarchy <= 1 and the utility of the sender is greater than or equal to the utility of receiver 
Table 10 Interaction Rules 
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(benefit >= 0) the receiver will set its i value to 1. If policy i increases the utility of the receiver, 
the receiver will adopt policy i.  
When the sender is an IGO with i=1, the receiver will set its i value to 1. IGO’s preferred 
policy choice is i, the receiver nation-state learns about the policy i through information provided 
by the IGO.  
Nation-states learn not only about the policy consequences, but also about the political 
consequences of a policy. The policy makers look at how policy adoption affected the reelection 
of policy makers in other nation-states. When they see that policy adoption did not cost them 
their office, they become more confident about the political consequence of the policy adoption. 
When the sender is an i-actor with i=1 and the reelection of sender has a value of 1, the receiver 
will set is i value to 1.  
 
PLOTS  
The results of one simulation run are presented in figures four through eight. For this 
simulation, the model parameters were arbitrarily set at probability-i=1 (0.11); person=1 (40); 
reelection=1 (0.69); competitiveness=1 (0.69); IGO=1 (5); popularity=1 (0.69); party=1 (0.69); 
and power distribution = Poisson. The plot titled “Proportion of States with i=1” shows the 
percent of nation-states with policy i at each time tick. The multiple lines in figure 9 “Regional 
Difference” shows the percent of nation-states in each region with policy i.  Figure 10 “Power 
Difference” illustrates the average power of nation-states with and without policy i. Figure 11 
“Compliance Difference” shows the mean compliance of nation states with policy i and mean 
non-compliance of nation-states without policy i.  
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Figure 12 Non-Convergence the Receiver Nation-state (Red Patch) Not Turning 
White 
 
Figure 13 Convergence: The Receiver Nation-state (Red Patch) Turned White 
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Figure 14 Left to Right Emulation, Learning & Competition 
   
 
 
Figure 15 Coercion: Poisson, Uniform, Normal 
   
 
 
Figure 16 Competition Normal, Uniform, Poisson 
   
 
 
Figure 17 Emulation, Normal, Uniform, Poisson 
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Figure 18 Learning Normal, Uniform, Poisson 
   
Figure 19 Learning Poisson Regional Difference 
 
Figure 20 Learning Poisson Power Difference 
 
Figure 21 Learning Poisson Compliance Difference 
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TYPICAL RUN FOR EACH MECHANISM 
For an initial evaluation of the model, I ran the simulation for each hypothesized 
mechanism of diffusion, allowing the simulations to run until all nation-states had adopted the 
policy (i.e. full diffusion was complete). The following four figures show a typical run for each 
mechanism. The simulations use the same main parameters and the parameters specific to each 
mechanism as specified in the previous section. For the simulation of the competition 
mechanism, the simulated community of states converge on full policy adoption. Competition 
has a typical S-curve. Hence the process is not linear. The early stages of diffusion are slow and 
in the end stages there are a few holdouts who take a while to adopt. The regional differences are 
small. The maximum regional difference of the proportion of nation states with and without the 
policy is 35 percent. There is a 35 percent difference between the region with the highest and that 
with the lowest number of adopters. That difference is in the earlier steps of the run. The 
maximum power difference of nation-states with and without i is close to equal. The highest 
difference is 0.125. The maximum compliance cost difference of adopters and non-adopters is 
0.67. Mostly the compliance cost for adopters and non-adopters is close to equal. This difference 
is in the second quarter of the run time.  
For emulation, there is full diffusion of the policy.  The rate of adoption in the later steps 
of the run time becomes very flat. In the later stages of diffusion, there are a few holdouts that 
take a long time before full diffusion. For the emulation mechanism, full diffusion of the policy 
takes longer than competition and coercion, but it approximates the time to full diffusion for the 
learning mechanism. The maximum power difference is one, which is close to the end of second 
quarter of simulation run time. The maximum difference in compliance costs is 0.79. The 
difference in compliance is calculated subtracting the mean compliance cost of nation-states with 
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i from mean non-compliance cost of nation-states without i. The compliance cost ranges from 1 
to 5. In a simulation run when this difference is the highest, that value is recorded. The maximum 
regional difference of proportion of nation-state with and without i is 0.45, which is in the earlier 
steps of simulation run. It suggests that in the emulation mechanism a policy first diffuses within 
regions before diffusing across regions. 
For the coercion mechanism, there is full diffusion of the policy. The maximum power 
difference is 0.43. This difference is a relatively small value. Maximum power difference is 
calculated subtracting mean power value of countries without i from mean power value of 
countries with i. When this value is the highest in a simulation run, it is recorded. Power value 
ranges from 1 to 5. The proportion of nation states with i in each region is approximately equal 
except in the earlier stage of the process. The maximum regional  difference of states with and 
without i is 0.35, which is in the earlier stages of the run. In the simulation of the coercion 
mechanism, policies diffuse within regions in the earlier stages of the process. The maximum 
difference in compliance and non-compliance costs is 0.40.  
For the learning mechanism, there is full diffusion of the policy. Under this mechanism, 
the simulation takes longer to converge on full policy diffusion than under either coercion and 
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Figure 22 Competition Mechanism. Top to Bottom Run Time 428, 561, 792 
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competition mechanisms. The maximum power difference is approximately equal. The 
maximum regional differences of the proportion of states with i is 0.40, which is in the earlier 
steps of the run. Diffusion through learning occurs within regions before it occurs between 
regions. The maximum compliance difference is also small. It happens at earlier steps of the run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22 Continued 
 
 
91 
 
 
Figure 23 Emulation Mechanism. Top to Bottom Run Time 260, 792, 2594 
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Figure 23 Continued  
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Figure 24 Coercion Mechanism Top to Bottom Run Time 313, 587, 1445 
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Figure 24 Continued 
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Figure 25 Learning Mechanism Top to Bottom Run Time 198, 394, 1086 
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Figure 25 Continued 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED DATA 
To examine the effect of each factor on the diffusion of policies, each diffusion 
mechanism is simulated 100 times. For each run, the experiment measured seven dimensions of 
the emergence of policy diffusion:  
1. the time until full diffusion as measured by the number of steps in the run;  
2. the largest power difference between states within a run;  
3. the largest difference between regions in the proportion of adopters;  
4. the largest difference in compliance and noncompliance costs within a run;  
5. the last step at which the power difference was greater or less than zero;  
6. the last step at which the difference in compliance-noncompliance costs was 
greater than or less than zero; and  
7. the last step at which regional differences are greater or less than zero.  
The maximum power difference is the maximum average power difference between 
adopter and non-adopter nation-states in each simulation run.  The maximum compliance 
difference is the maximum difference of average compliance of adopter and non-adopter nation 
states. The maximum regional difference is the maximum difference among regions in the 
proportion of adopter to total nation-states in the region in each simulation run. “Last tick power” 
is the last step in simulated time at which occurs the maximum average power difference 
between adopter and non-adopter nation-states. “Last tick comply” is the last step in time at 
which occurs the maximum average compliance difference between adopter and non-adopter 
nation states.  “Last tick region” is the last step in time at which occurs the maximum difference 
among regions in the difference in proportion of adopter nation-states.  
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The results of these 400 simulation runs are compiled into a dataset. The unit of 
observation is simulated step in time, for a total n = 19,179. The data is used to run regression 
tests that examine the partial effects of model parameters on the seven measures of policy 
convergence listed above. The parameters of theoretical interest are the initial probability of 
adoption (probability-i=1); the four diffusion mechanisms (learning, emulation, coercion and 
competition); the number of initial internal actors (person=1); the distribution of power among 
nation-states (Poisson, uniform, normal); and the initial number of IGOs committed to the policy 
(IGO=1). The analysis specifies a full regression that includes all model parameters, as well as 
several more parsimonious specifications that include only a subset of the estimators. By 
comparing the full and parsimonious specifications, one can examine the consistency of the 
estimates. Such consistency would suggest that the theoretical findings are insensitive to choices 
of model specification, thus increasing our confidence in the inferences we draw.  Tables 29-35 
present the results of the regression analysis.  
The number of initial adopters; the four diffusion mechanisms; the number of internal 
actors; the number of initial IGOs; and the distribution of power all consistently affect the rate of 
time to full adoption. The variable “probability–i=1” is significant in all five specifications with 
a consistent, negative sign. The negative coefficient implies that this parameter reduces the time 
to policy adoption; as expected, the more initial adopters of the policy, the faster the diffusion of 
the policy will be. The variable “local actor” is statistically significant in three of the 
specifications with a consistent negative sign. As expected, as the number of people committed 
to carbon mitigation increases, the time to full policy diffusion decreases. The number of initial 
IGOs supporting adoption is statistically significant in three of the specifications with consistent 
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negative sign. As expected, as the number of IGOs committed to carbon mitigation increases, the 
time to full adoption decreases.  
Interestingly, the adoption rate is faster in a Poisson distribution of power than in a state 
system characterized by the normal distribution. The adoption rate expedites with a few large 
powers compared to a system with more middle powers and fewer weaker and stronger states. In 
a uniform system, the rate of adoption is lower than a system with normal distribution of power. 
This is an interesting finding: whereas a uniformity of state power may create a “balance” of 
strategic stability, the ABM suggests that in such a world policy diffusion will occur more 
slowly.  
In the simulations that use the learning and competition mechanisms, the rate of adoption 
is faster than in those that use the coercion mechanism. Conversely, adoption takes longer 
through emulation than coercion. These results suggest that learning and competition are more 
effective mechanisms of policy diffusion than is coercion, ceteris paribus.  
Because three parameters—of the number of the initial adopters, the number of internal 
actors, and the number of IGOs—are all measured on a scale of 0 to 1, one can directly compare 
the magnitude of each parameter’s effects. The magnitude of effect of number of initial state 
adopters is the highest on rate of adoption. The IGO parameter has a higher magnitude of effect 
than the person variable. Interestingly, while IGO has a statistically significant effect on the rate 
of adoption in when learning or emulation is the mechanisms of diffusion, it shows no such 
effect on the rate of adoption when competition or coercion is the mechanism. 
Unsurprisingly, the initial distribution of power among nation-states influences the 
maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters. As table 12 illustrates, the initial 
Poisson distribution is statistically significant in four of the regression specifications with a 
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consistently positive sign, indicating a larger emergent power difference on average. The 
uniform distribution of power is significant in all five of the specifications with a consistently 
positive direction of effect. For the maximum power difference dependent variable, the initial 
probability of adoption (probability-i=1) is only significant in the coercion specification. The 
person and IGO parameters are not significant in any of the specifications, suggesting perhaps 
unsurprisingly that these parameter have no effect of the emergent power differences between 
adopters and non-adopters. Interestingly, learning, emulation and competition each have a 
significantly positive effect on the maximum power distribution. The reelection, competitiveness 
and party parameters are statistically significant and have a positive effect on maximum power 
difference. An increase in the number of reelection of policy makers who had adopted the 
policies increases the probability of power difference. An increase in the number of the ruling 
parties that support policy i, increases the power difference. An increase in the popularity of 
policy i has negative effect on maximum power difference. An increase in the popularity of 
policy i among internal actors increases the probability of power differences. An increase in the 
competitiveness of policy i increases the likelihood of power difference.  
As shown in Table 13, for the maximum difference among regions in the proportion of 
adopters, the probability of initial adoption is significant in all five of the specifications with 
consistent positive direction of effect. This is a bit surprising because the probability of initial 
adoption is the same for all regions at the time of initiation. The Poisson, uniform and IGO 
parameters are significant only in one of the specifications. The party parameter is significant in 
the simulations of the emulation mechanism with a negative direction of effect. Only emulation 
is significant with a positive effect. Popularity, reelection, and competitiveness show no 
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meaningful effect on the emergent regional differences in the proportion of states adopting the 
policy.  
Table 14 shows that for the measure of the size of differences in compliance costs, the 
probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is significant in two of the regression specifications: 
the parsimonious specification of only the coercion mechanisms (column 3 i) and the full 
specification. In both specifications, the direction of effect is negative, suggesting the greater 
probability of initial adoption reduces the differences in compliance costs. The IGO variable is 
significant in only one specification, but in a surprising way: in the specification of the coercion 
mechanism, the IGO variable has a positive direction of effect, suggesting that the greater the 
number of IGOs supporting a policy, the greater the emergent differences in compliance costs. 
Learning, emulation, competition and popularity are statistically significant with a negative 
direction of effect, contributing to a reduction in differences in compliance costs. Reelection, 
competitiveness, party, person, Poisson, and uniform show no significant effects in any of the 
specifications.  
Table 16 illustrates that for the dependent variable that measures the last step at which the 
power difference is greater or less than zero, the probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is 
statistically significant in all five specifications with consistent negative direction of effect. This 
suggests that along with the time to full policy diffusion, a larger of number of initial adopters 
also reduces the time at which power differences remain between adopters and non-adopters. The 
Poisson distribution of power is significant only in the parsimonious specification of the 
competition mechanism (Table 16 column 6), with a positive direction of effect. The uniform 
distribution of power is significant only in the competition specification with a negative direction 
of effect. The IGO parameter is significant in three specifications: the full, coercion and 
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emulation specifications, each time with a negative coefficient indicating a reduction in the time 
to the elimination of power differences between adopters and non-adopters. Competitiveness, 
reelection, popularity, learning, emulation and competition are significant with negative 
directions of effect in competition, learning, coercion and in full specification respectively, all 
reducing the time to the elimination of power differences. The person parameter is not significant 
in any of the specifications.  
As shown in Table 17, for the dependent variable that measures the last step at which 
differences in compliance costs were nonzero, the probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is 
statistically significant in all five specifications with a consistently negative direction of effect. 
This illustrates that the larger the number of initial adopters, the quicker the differences in 
compliance costs disappear. The IGO parameter is significant in three specifications: the full, 
learning and emulation specifications with consistently negative directions of effect. This 
suggests that IGOs resolve differences in compliance costs: the larger the number of IGOs 
advocating for a policy, the quicker compliance cost differences converge to zero. The uniform, 
Poisson and person parameters are significant only in the parsimonious competition 
specification, with positive, negative and negative signs respectively. The competitiveness 
(competition specification), party (emulation specification), reelection (learning), popularity 
(coercion), competition and learning (full) parameters are statistically significant with negative 
direction of effect. Emulation is significant with a positive direction of effect in full 
specification.  
For the dependent variable that measures the last step at which regional differences in 
adoption exist, the probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is significant in all the 
specifications with a consistently negative direction of effect. Once again, as shown in table 15 
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the number of initial adopters significantly reduces the time to policy diffusion, measured in this 
case as the time at which regional differences in policy adoption disappear. The uniform and 
IGO parameters are significant in two of the specifications, the full specification and the 
parsimonious emulation specification. The person parameter is significant only in the 
competition specification with a negative direction of effect. The party (emulation specification), 
competitiveness (competition), reelection (learning), popularity (coercion), competition and 
learning (full specification) parameters are statistically significant with negative directions of 
effect. Emulation is significant with a positive direction of effect in full specification. The 
Poisson distribution of power shows no meaningful effect in any of the specifications. 
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Table 11 Time to Full Diffusion 
 
Time to Full Diffusion 
 Full   Coercion   Learning   Competition  Emulation 
Intercept 3251.8 *** 4948.9 *** 2141.4 *** 1795.4 *** 6272.9 *** 
 (37.65)  (77.70)  (29.00)  (21.89)  (75.95)  
probability-
i=1 
-1604.8 *** -1377.2 *** -694.5 *** -775.1 *** -2574.5 *** 
(34.74)  (78.19)  (27.47)  (20.65)  (58.77)  
Learning -1142.6 ***         
 (22.0546)          
Emulation 1042.6 ***         
 (22.2273)          
Competitio
n 
-1294.6 ***         
(22.03)          
popularity=
1 
  -4273.1 ***       
  (61.32)        
reelection.1     -1285.3 ***     
    (27.47)      
competitive
ness.1 
      -923.8 ***   
      (21.18)    
party.1          -2530.8 *** 
         (65.68)  
person=1 -1.4 * -3.2 * -0.2  -0.9 * -1.5  
 (0.71)  (1.42)  (0.50)  (0.38)  (1.52)  
Poisson -78.7 *** 7.0  -42.7 ** -79.8 *** -198.2 **
* 
 (19.09)  (38.30)  (13.47)  (10.12)  (41.03
) 
 
Uniform 86.5 *** 6.1  40.0 ** 75.1 *** 224.9 **
* 
 (19.08)  (38.30)  (13.43)  (10.12)  (41.03
) 
 
igo=1 -55.1 *** -15.2  -20.2 *** -0.03  -185.3 **
* 
 (5.20)  (10.43)  (3.66)  (2.75)  (11.17
) 
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.49         
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05      
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Table 12 Maximum Power Difference 
DV= max-power-difference 
 
Full  Coercion  Learning  Competition  Emulation 
Intercept 1.00 *** 1.22 *** 0.48 *** 0.35 *** 0.38 *** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 probability-
i=1 
-0.02 
 
-0.19 *** 0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.03 
 (0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 Learning -0.49 *** 
        
 
(0.01) 
         Emulation -0.54 *** 
        
 
(0.01) 
         
           Competition -0.59 *** 
        
 
(0.01) 
         popularity=1 
 
-0.41 *** 
      
   
(0.04) 
       
           reelection.1  
   
0.04 
     
     
(0.04) 
     competitiveness.1 
     
0.15 *** 
  
       
(0.04) 
   party.1  
        
0.16 *** 
         
(0.03) 
 
person=1 0.0002 
 
-
0.0004 
 
0.001 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Poisson 0.06 *** 0.06 * 0.05 * 0.12 *** 0.02 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 Uniform 0.21 *** 0.44 *** 0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.14 *** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
           
igo=1 0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-
0.0002 
 
0.003 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 Adjusted R-squared 
0.16 
         Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 
‘*’ 0.05 
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Table 13 Maximum Regional Difference 
DV=max-regional-difference 
 
Full   Coercion   Learning  Competition Emulation  
Intercept 0.43 *** 0.43 *** 0.43 *** 0.41 *** 0.46 *** 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 probability-
i=1 -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.19 *** -0.21 *** 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.004) 
 Learning -0.003 
         
 
(0.002) 
         Emulation 0.004 * 
        
 
(0.002) 
         Competition -0.002 
         
 
(0.002) 
         popularity=1 
 
-0.0003 
       
   
(0.004) 
       reelection.1   
   
-0.01 
     
     
(0.01) 
     competitiveness.1 
     
-0.01 
   
       
(0.01) 
   party.1  
        
-0.05 *** 
         
(0.005) 
 person=1 -0.00005 -0.00020 -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00002 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Poisson 0.003 * 0.002 
 
-
0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.00
3) 
 
(0.00
3) 
 
(0.003) 
 
Uniform 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-
0.002 
 
0.007 * -0.002 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.00
3) 
 
(0.00
3) 
 
(0.003) 
 
igo=1 
0.0000
3 
 
0.0001 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.002 * 
 
(0.0004
) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.00
1) 
 
(0.00
1) 
 
(0.001) 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.25 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
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Table 14 Maximum Compliance Difference 
DV= max-compliance-difference 
 
Full    Coercion    Learning  Competition Emulation 
Intercept 0.83 *** 0.99 *** 0.61 *** 0.67 *** 0.68 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
probability-i=1 -0.09 *** -0.23 *** -0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.10 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
Learning -0.17 *** 
       
 
(0.01) 
        Emulation -0.16 *** 
       
 
(0.01) 
        Competition -0.17 *** 
       
 
(0.01) 
        popularity=1 
 
-0.27 *** 
     
   
(0.03) 
      reelection.1  
   
0.05 
    
     
(0.04) 
    competitiveness.1 
     
-0.06 
  
       
(0.04) 
  party.1  
        
0.01 
         
(0.03) 
person=1 -0.0002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0004 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
Poisson 0.002 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.02 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
Uniform -0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
igo=1 0.001 
 
0.01 * -0.01 
 
0.004 
 
-0.005 
 
0.003 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 
        Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
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Table 15 Last Step Maximum Region 
DV=max-regional-difference 
 
Full   Coercion   Learning   Competition Emulation  
Intercept 0.43 *** 0.43 *** 0.43 *** 0.41 *** 0.46 *** 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
probabili
ty-i=1 
-0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.19 *** -0.21 *** 
(0.003) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.004) 
Learning -0.003 
         
 
(0.002) 
         Emulatio
n 
0.004 * 
        (0.002) 
         Competi
tion 
-0.002 
         (0.002) 
         
popularity=1 
 
-
0.0003 
       
   
(0.004) 
      reelection.1  
   
-0.01 
     
     
(0.01) 
     competitiveness.1 
     
-0.01 
   
       
(0.01) 
   party.1  
        
-0.05 *** 
         
(0.005) 
person=
1 
-0.00005 -0.00020 -0.00003 
 
0.00004 -0.00002 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Poisson 0.003 * 0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Uniform 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
0.007 * -0.002 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
igo=1 
0.0000
3 
 
0.0001 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.002 * 
 
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
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Table 16 Last Step Maximum Power Difference 
DV= lasttick_power 
 
Full   Coercion    Learning    Competition    Emulation  
Intercept 1863.0 *** 3501.4 *** 940.2 *** 614.3 *** 1931.3 *** 
 
(34.62) 
 
(75.81) 
 
(36.71) 
 
(26.17) 
 
(88.49) 
 probability-
i=1 -689.4 *** -1154.2 *** -347.4 *** -340.6 *** -801.0 *** 
 
(31.95) 
 
(76.29) 
 
(34.77) 
 
(24.69) 
 
(68.47) 
 Learning -998.8 *** 
        
 
(20.28) 
         Emulation -356.7 *** 
        
 
(20.44) 
         Competition -1133.0 *** 
        
 
(20.26) 
         popularity=1 
  
-2918.4 *** 
      
   
(59.83) 
       reelection.1  
    
-559.1 *** 
    
     
(34.77) 
     competitivene
ss.1 
      
-237.0 *** 
  
       
(25.32) 
   party.1  
        
-885.3 *** 
         
(76.53) 
 person=1 0.0 
 
-2.5 
 
0.2 
 
-0.2 
 
2.3 
 
 
(0.65) 
 
(1.39) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(1.77) 
 Poisson 6.9 
 
-55.8 
 
-13.5 
 
67.3 *** 29.9 
 
 
(17.56) 
 
(37.37) 
 
(17.05) 
 
(12.09) 
 
(47.80) 
 Uniform -2.8 
 
65.3 
 
-13.2 
 
-25.3 * -37.8 
 
 
(17.54) 
 
(37.37) 
 
(17.00) 
 
(12.09) 
 
(47.80) 
 igo=1 -13.3 ** -24.2 * -3.1 
 
0.9 
 
-27.0 * 
 
(4.78) 
 
(10.17) 
 
(4.64) 
 
(3.29) 
 
(13.01) 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.20 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
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Table 17 Last Step Maximum Compliance Difference 
DV= lasttick_comply 
 Full  Coercion Learning  Competition Emulation 
Intercept 2088.5 *** 3436.6 *** 1108.3 *** 1093.2 *** 3565.0 *** 
 (38.75)  (83.95)  (36.26)  (29.46)  (99.66)  
probability-
i=1 
-1078.8 *** -1232.8 *** -404.5 *** -541.7 *** -1599.0 *** 
(35.76)  (84.48)  (34.34)  (27.79)  (77.11)  
Learning -861.7 ***         
 (22.70)          
Emulation 236.4 ***         
 (22.88)          
Competition -905.1 ***         
 (22.68)          
popularity=1   -2944.4 ***       
   (66.26)        
reelection.1      -618.7 ***     
     (34.34)      
competitiven
ess.1 
      -564.2 ***   
      (28.51)    
party.1          -1784.0 *** 
         (86.19)  
person=1 -0.7  -2.2  0.5  -1.0 * 0.1  
 (0.73)  (1.54)  (0.62)  (0.51)  (2.00)  
Poisson -6.1  37.2  -16.3  -38.9 ** -6.7  
 (19.65)  (41.39)  (16.84)  (13.62)  (53.83)  
Uniform 34.3  -28.6  20.5  49.4 *** 95.9  
 (19.64)  (41.39)  (16.79)  (13.62)  (53.83)  
igo=1 -32.1 *** -6.0  -13.4 ** 1.2  -110.0 *** 
 (5.35)  (11.26)  (4.58)  (3.71)  (14.65)  
Adjusted R-squared 
0.22          
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 
0.01 ‘*’ 0.05          
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the agent-based model, the results of simulation and the regression 
analysis of data generated from the ABM. The analysis examined several measures of policy 
diffusion including the time to full diffusion; the average power of adopters and non-adopters; 
the proportion of adopters in each region; the average difference in compliance cost of adopters 
and non-adopters; the time of the maximum power difference between adopters and non-
adopters; the time of the maximum compliance difference between adopters and non-adopters; 
and the time of the maximum regional difference of proportion of adopters were analyzed.  
The analysis found that the number of initial adopters, commitment of the people and the 
influence of intergovernmental organizations expedite the process of policy diffusion. An 
international system with large number of weak states and small number of super powers 
(Poisson distribution of power) accelerates the time to full adoption. A perfectly multipolar 
international system (uniform distribution of power) slows the time to full diffusion. Learning 
and competition lead to faster diffusion; coercion takes more time to diffuse policy; and 
emulation is consistently the slowest diffusion mechanism.  
Diffusion through coercion tends to increase power differences between adopters and 
non-adopters while learning, emulation and competition tends to decrease it. In the coercion 
mechanism, the weaker states adopt the policies through suasion. However, the more powerful 
ones are less likely to be influenced by the superpowers. Therefore, the power of non-adopters is 
greater. In learning, emulation and competition the more powerful and less powerful ones are 
equally likely to adopt the policy in the early stage of diffusion because the difference between 
power of non-adopters and adopters is lower than in coercion. In coercion there are some 
powerful holdouts up to later stages in the diffusion process. It suggests that the earlier powerful 
112 
 
adopters  indirectly influence the powerful holdouts by first influencing the weaker nation states 
dependent on them. The powerful hold outs eventually converge their policies. For example, 
during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union could first influence the weaker 
states reliant on them. There were some relatively powerful nation states, which were neutral and 
did not side with neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. However, with the fall of the 
Soviet Union more countries liberalized their economies, which eventually led the more 
powerful holdouts to also liberalize their economies. The highest power difference is in the 
initial stages of diffusion process in learning, emulation and competition. The Poisson and 
uniform distributions of power increase the average power difference between adopters and non-
adopters. The number of initial adopters decreases power difference. Likewise, the number of 
initial adopters is negatively associated with regional differences. With an increase in the number 
of initial adopters, there is a decrease in regional difference. There is a higher regional difference 
in emulation than coercion.  
The difference in compliance costs between adopters and non-adopters is lower in 
learning, emulation and competition than in the coercion. The cost is higher for the adopters in 
coercion than in learning, emulation and competition. However, as the number of initial adopters 
increases, the cost decreases for the adopters in coercion and in the full specifications. The 
number of IGOs and the difference in compliance cost of adopters and non-adopters are 
positively associated. With an increase in the number of IGOs, the costs increase for the adopters 
in the coercion specification. The number of initial adopters and the difference in compliance 
costs have a negative association.  
With an increase in the number of initial adopters, powerful and weak nation-states are 
equally likely to adopt the policies. The persistence of maximum power differences is negatively 
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associated with the number of initial adopters. When the number of initial adopters increases, 
maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters decreases. This suggests that if a 
few nation-states adopt a policy, they are the powerful ones and they lead less powerful 
countries. However, when a policy is adopted by a large number of nation-states initially, there 
are both powerful and less powerful nation-states among them. In emulation, learning and 
competition power difference between adopters and non-adopters is small. In coercion the power 
difference between adopters and non-adopters is large. It is negatively associated with learning, 
emulation and competition.  With an increase in the number of IGOs, power difference between 
adopters and non-adopters decrease. In the full regression specification and the coercion 
specification, the persistence of maximum power differences is negatively associated with the 
number of IGOs. In a more equal international system, the difference between the power of 
adopters and non-adopters decreases. The uniform power distribution is negatively associated 
with it in the competition specification. When there are only very few powerful states, the power 
difference between adopters and non-adopters is larger. It is positively associated with the 
Poisson power distribution in the competition specification.  
Table 18 Diffusion of Kyoto Protocol by Region  
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The persistence of maximum differences in compliance costs is negatively associated 
with the initial number of adopters. Interestingly, it is negatively associated with learning and 
competition and positively associated with emulation, suggesting that emulation adds to long-
term differences in compliance costs. In learning and competition the highest cost difference 
between adopters and non-adopters is early in the diffusion process; however, it is in the later 
stage of diffusion process in emulation. Since difference in cost is generated from subtracting 
cost of adopters from cost of non-adopters, whenever the cost closely equal on adopters and non-
adopters the difference is low. In competition and learning the cost is more equal on adopters and 
non-adopters. The persistence of these costs is negatively associated with internal actors’ 
commitment to the policy in the competition model. It also is negatively associated with the 
number of IGOs in the full regression specification as well as the more parsimonious learning 
and emulation specifications. It is positively associated with the uniform distribution of power in 
competition. It is negatively associated with the Poisson distribution of power in the competition 
specification.  
The differences in regional differences decrease in the later stages of diffusion process in 
every mechanism. The persistence of maximum regional differences associates negatively with 
the number of initial adopters. Regional difference decreases when the number of initial adopters 
increases. Countries from every region adopt the policy when there is a large number of initial 
adopters. With a few number of initial adopters, the regional differences increase. The policy 
diffuses within region first before diffusing between regions. As Table 18 illustrates the example 
of membership of Kyoto. The Kyoto Protocol, which has a large number of initial adopters and 
members from each region, has low regional difference in terms of proportion of adopters from 
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each region. The proportional increase in number of adopters in each region is proportional to the 
number of initial adopters from each region.  
The competition and learning mechanisms are negatively associated with regional 
differences while emulation is positively associated. In emulation, the highest regional 
differences occur in the later stages of the diffusion process. However, in learning and 
competition the highest regional differences occur in the earlier stage of the diffusion process. In 
the emulation and full specifications, the highest regional difference is likely to occur in the 
initial stage of diffusion process when the number of IGOs increases. In competition and 
learning policies diffuse between regions, but in emulation the policies diffuse within regions 
before diffusing between regions. Table 19 illustrates the regional variation of FIT diffusion. 
Through the emulation mechanism with a few initial adopters, the policy has initially diffused 
within Europe and Central Asia before diffusing to other regions.   
The number of people committed to the policy is negatively associated with it in the 
competition specification. The uniform power distribution is positively associated with it in the 
full and emulation specifications. The number of IGOs is negatively associated with it in the full 
Table 19 FIT Diffusion Regional Variation  
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and emulation specifications. An increase in the number of IGOs committed to the policy 
decreases regional differences in emulation and full specifications. With an increase in the 
number of IGOs, the cost on adopters is the highest in the initial stages of adoption in emulation, 
full and learning specifications.  
The next chapter will present the results of statistical analysis. The findings show that 
diffusion of renewable energy policies has occurred mainly through emulation and coercion 
mechanisms. The variables EU membership, common language, CDM and FDI are positively 
associated with the policies’ diffusions. 
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STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The previous chapter presented the agent-based model, the results of simulation and the 
regression analysis of data generated from the ABM. The analysis examined several measures of 
policy diffusion including the time to full diffusion; the average power of adopters and non-
adopters; the proportion of adopters in each region; the average difference in compliance cost of 
adopters and non-adopters; the time of the maximum power difference between adopters and 
non-adopters; the time of the maximum compliance difference between adopters and non-
adopters; and the time of the maximum regional difference of proportion of adopters were 
analyzed.  
The analysis found that the number of initial adopters, commitment of the people and the 
influence of intergovernmental organizations expedite the process of policy diffusion. An 
international system with a large number of weak states and a small number of super powers 
(Poisson distribution of power) accelerates the time to full adoption. A perfectly multipolar 
international system (uniform distribution of power) slows the time to full diffusion. Learning 
and competition mechanisms lead to faster diffusion; coercion takes more time to diffuse policy; 
and emulation is consistently the slowest diffusion mechanism. 
This chapter presents the results of statistical tests of the four diffusion theses. To 
examine the robustness of these statistical findings, the research uses several model 
specifications that interrogates the consistency of estimates across different statistical 
assumptions. The variables are tested in eight specifications, four random effect logistic 
regressions and four event history models. In brief, there is a robust finding of support for the 
emulation and suasion mechanisms of policy diffusion, but little support for learning and 
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competition. Estimates that behave consistently increase the confidence when making references. 
In the following two sections, the results of random effect logistic regression models and event 
history models are discussed. First, four models of random effect logistic regression for FIT and 
RPS are presented. Then, four event history models for RPS and FIT are discussed. The findings 
of eight models are then compared to test for consistency of the estimates. 
The independent variables are divided into four categories: suasion, emulation, 
competition, and learning. Each independent variable will be examined under four specifications: 
pooled random-effects logistic regression models that are fully specified; pooled random-effects 
logistic regression that are parsimonious specifications for each mechanism; fully specified event 
history models; and parsimonious event history models for each mechanism. The full models 
include all the independent variables and the controls, and the parsimonious models for each 
mechanism include only the independent variables for the given mechanism and all the controls.  
 
RANDOM EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS  
Table 20 shows the results of random effect logistic regression models for the FIT 
dependent variable, that is, whether (1) or not (0) a state adopts FIT. The full model includes the 
independent variables for all four mechanisms of diffusion and the controls. The suasion model 
only includes the variables for the suasion mechanism and the controls. And for each mechanism 
there is a separate model that includes all the control variables.  
Two of the four variables (EU membership, and FDI) of the suasion model are significant 
in both the full and the parsimonious models and their directions of effects are as hypothesized, 
that is, positively associated with the adoption of FIT. In the competition model only one of the 
three independent variables is significant, but none of them is significant in the full model. 
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Competitors’ adoption of FIT in the competition model is significant with the expected positive 
direction of effect. The direction of effect of a competitor’s FIT is inconsistent across the two 
models. In the emulation model, two of the five independent variables (common language and 
common colonial history) are statistically significant with the expected positive direction of 
effect. However, only one common language is significant in both the emulation and the full 
model with a positive direction of effect. Two of the six independent variables (the difference in 
the share of renewable energy and CO2 share of FIT and Non-FIT countries within each region) 
are significant in both the learning and full models with a negative direction of effect. Control 
variables including time, system, CO2 emissions, solar and wind are statistically significant and 
consistent in five, four, two, two and two models respectively.  
Table 21 shows the results of random effect logistic regression models for RPS. The full 
model includes all the variables and the controls. The suasion model only includes the variables 
for the suasion mechanism and the controls. For each mechanism there is a separate 
parsimonious model that includes all the control variables. 
One of the four independent variables (EU membership) of the suasion model is 
significant in both the full and the suasion models, and the direction of effect is positive as 
hypothesized. CDM is significant only in the full model with a positive direction of effect. None 
of the three independent variables of the competition mechanism is significant in either the full 
model or in the competition model. In the emulation model, three of the four independent 
variables (the percent of common language countries with RPS, the percent of states with a 
common colonial history with RPS) are statistically significant with expected positive direction 
of effect in both the full and emulation models. Neighbors’ adoption of RPS is statistically 
significant with a negative direction of effect in both logit models. Only in the full model, the 
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Cartagena agreement is statistically significant with a negative direction of effect. (The Kyoto 
variable is omitted from the RPS logit models because there is no variation in Kyoto adoption in 
the sample after adoption of RPS. All countries with RPS are members of Kyoto.) 
Two of the six independent variables for learning (the difference in the share of 
renewable energy of RPS and Non-RPS countries within each region, and the difference in the 
GDP growth of RPS and Non-RPS countries in the world) are statistically significant. For both 
variables he direction of effect is positive in the full model. None of the learning variables are 
statistically significant in the parsimonious learning model. In the full model, the difference in 
the GDP growth of RPS and Non-RPS countries in the world is significant and the direction of 
effect is negative. 
Control variables including adoption of wind energy; adoption of solar energy; CO2 
emissions; oil reserves; population size; type of government; and a time variable (to control for  
serial correlation) are statistically significant and consistent in three, five, three, one, two, one 
and four models. The direction of effect for wind and centrist government is negative and the rest 
of them have a positive direction of effect. Wind is significant and positively associated in the 
emulation, suasion and competition models. Solar is significant with a positive direction of effect 
in all the five models. CO2 emission is significant and positively associated in the suasion, 
competition and learning models. The measure of oil reserves is significant with a positive 
direction of effect only in the full model. Population is significant in the full and emulation 
models. The measure of centrist governments is significant with a negative direction of effect 
only in the learning model. Time is significant and positively associated in all four of the models 
except emulation model.  
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Table 10 FIT Models, Random-Effects Logit 
Variable Full Suasion Competition Emulation Learning 
FDI 5.08 2.92* - - - 
EU membership 15.17*** 13.75*** - - - 
CDM 1.63 0.15 - - - 
colonizer_ RPS/FIT -0.76 0.54 - - - 
Neighbors -0.03 -  -  -0.01 -  
Cartagena 0.5 -  -  1.03 -  
Kyoto 5.48 -  -  2.68 -  
Common colonial 
history 10.10* -  -  5.62 -  
Common language 0.42*** -  -  0.37*** -  
Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT -3.34 -  4.65* -  -  
Competitors’ CDM 1.97 -  1.17 -  -  
Competitors’ FDI 0.38 -  0.79 -  -  
Regional 
renewables share -0.10* -  -  -  -0.06* 
Regional CO2 
emission  -0.79** -  -  -  -0.42* 
Regional GDP 
growth -0.25 -  -  -  -0.23 
World CO2 emission 0.59 -  -  -  -0.06 
World GDP growth 0.18 -  -  -  0.28 
World renewables 
share 0.02 - - - -0.01 
wind 0 0.00*** 0 0 0.00*** 
solar 0.00* 0 0 0.00** 0 
CO2emission 0 0.00* 0.00*** 0 0 
GDPG 0 0 0 0 0 
oilreserve 0.01 0 0 0 0 
globaloilprice 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 
GDPPC 0 0 0 0 0 
Population 0 0 0 0 0 
System 1.36 4.57*** 8.34*** 3.01* 8.84*** 
Government type  -  -  -  -  - 
3 -1.34 0.06 -0.55 -0.89 -0.45 
4 0.41 1.18 0.49 0.13 1.38 
_cons 
-
1387.02* 
-
3161.70*** -3571.40*** 
-
1021.18** 
-
3365.87
*** 
_cons 4.88*** 5.30*** 5.84*** 4.81*** 5.59*** 
N 3117 3117 3310 3310 3310 
ll -134.47 -270.4 -284.39 -155.88 -285.85 
time 0.66* 1.55*** 1.76*** 0.49** 1.66*** 
Signif. codes:  * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 21 RPS Models Random-Effects Logit 
Variable Full Suasion Competition Emulation Learning 
FDI 8.38 1.67  -  -  - 
EU membership 46.17** 10.73***  -  -  - 
CDM 23.79** 5.92  -  -  - 
colonizer_ RPS/FIT -6.1 -0.2  -  -  - 
Neighbors -0.96*  -  - -0.66*  - 
Cartagena -19.06*  -  - -0.51  - 
Kyoto (omitted)  -  - (omitted)  - 
Common colonial 
history 
258.93**
*  -  - 128.59***  - 
Common language 1.34***  -  - 1.87***  - 
Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT -6.25  - -7.01  -  - 
Competitors’ CDM -5.77  - 1.64  -  - 
Competitors’ FDI 20.72  - 1.22  -  - 
Regional renewables 
share -0.86*  -  -  - -0.06 
Regional CO2 
emission  -1.5  -  -  - 0.13 
Regional GDP 
growth 1.76  -  -  - 0.5 
World CO2 emission -2.59  -  -  - -0.66 
World GDP growth -7.93*  -  -  - -1.39 
World renewables 
share -1.36  -  -  - 0.01 
wind 0 -0.00* -0.00** -0.00** 0 
solar 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
CO2emission 0 0.00** 0.00* 0 0.01*** 
GDPG 0 0 0 0 0 
oilreserve 0.03* 0 0 0.02 0 
globaloilprice 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
GDPPC 0 0 0 -0.01** 0 
Population 0.01** 0 0 0.01* 0 
System 0.87 2.64 5.6 1.71 5.33 
Government type  -  -  -  -  - 
3 -5.4 -2.62 -2.36 -11.94* -6.83* 
4 -3.02 -2.1 -1.53 -2.48 -2.61 
_cons 
-
8918.34* 
-
3421.56*** -4036.29*** -3039.89* -5042.03*** 
_cons 5.01*** 5.37*** 5.36*** 6.16*** 6.11*** 
N 1888 3117 3310 2522 1956 
ll -17.87 -72.95 -76.75 -27.72 -71.44 
time 4.35* 1.67*** 1.99*** 1.48* 2.48*** 
 legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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EVENT HISTORY MODELS 
Pooled logistic regression models help explain whether diffusion mechanisms explain 
why states adopt FIT and/or RPS. They do not explain, however, when states adopt these 
policies. To help understanding the timing of adoption, and whether diffusion mechanisms 
explain this timing, one can use an event history model (sometimes called a hazard model). 
Table 22 presents the estimates for the event history models. As in the pooled logistic regression 
models, the analysis uses both a full model specification that includes all four diffusion 
mechanisms plus controls; and parsimonious specifications that test each diffusion mechanism 
separately while controlling for rival factors. These specifications allow the analysis to assess the 
consistency of the estimates under different specifications and assumptions; those estimates that 
behave consistently increase the confidences in the inferences one may draw. 
In both the full and suasion FIT event history models, two of the suasion variables (EU 
membership and FDI) are statistically significant with a positive direction of effect. A positive 
direction of effect in event history models speeds up the diffusion process. In both the full and 
emulation FIT event history models, one of the emulation variables (a common language with 
adopters) is statistically significant with a positive direction of effect. None of the competition 
variables is significant. None of the emulation models is significant in either the full or 
parsimonious emulation models. However, the difference in CO2 between regions with FIT and 
non-FIT is significant with a negative direction of effect in the full model of FIT adoption. The 
difference in GDP growth of FIT and non-FIT countries of the world is statistically significant in 
the learning event history model with a positive direction of effect.  
The controls for CO2 emissions, the global price of oil, and system (coded 2 presidential, 
3 parliamentary) are statistically significant in three, four, and three models respectively. CO2 
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emissions is statistically significant in the suasion, competition, and emulation event history 
models of FIT with a positive direction of effect. The global oil price is significant with a 
negative direction of effect (as expected) in all the event history models except the parsimonious 
competition model. FIT diffuses faster in parliamentary system of government than in 
presidential system.  System (coded 2 presidential, 3 parliamentary)  is significant with a positive 
direction of effect in the suasion, competition and learning event history models for FIT 
adoption.  
In the full event history model for RPS adoption, EU membership, CDM, FDI, average 
difference in CO2 emissions within regions of countries with and without RPS, average 
difference in GDP growth within regions of countries with and without RPS, common former 
adopted the policy, common language and Kyoto are statistically significant. As expected the 
direction of effects of EU membership, CDM, FDI, average difference in GDP growth within 
regions of countries with and without RPS, percentage of countries with common former 
colonizer adopted RPS, common language and Kyoto Protocols are positive. However, average 
difference in CO2 emissions within regions of countries with and without RPS has a negative 
direction of effect. Therefore, hypothesis 1, 3, 4, 10, 12, 15, 16 and 18 are accepted.  
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Table 22 FIT Models: Event History (Estimates as Betas) 
 
Variable Full Suasion Competition Emulation Learning 
FDI 13.88*** 14.56*** - - - 
EU membership 0.98** 1.10** -  -  -  
CDM 0.61 0.7 -  -  -  
Colonizer_RPS/FIT -0.44 0.22 -  -  -  
Neighbors -0.01 - - -0.01 -  
Cartagena 0.5 -  -  0.38 -  
Kyoto -1.38 -  -  -1.21 -  
Common colonial 
history 0.44 -  -  -0.27 -  
Common language 0.05*** -  -  0.05*** -  
Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT -0.83 - -0.21 - - 
Competitors’ CDM 0.06 -  0.62 -  -  
Competitors’ FDI 1.78 -  1.14 -  -  
Regional 
renewables share 0.01 -  -  -  0.01 
Regional CO2 
emissions -0.14* -  -  -  -0.08 
Regional GDP 
growth_ 0.08 -  -  -  -0.01 
World CO2 
emission 0.63 -  -  -  0.46 
World GDP growth 0.14 -  -  -  0.25* 
World renewables 
share -0.02  -  -  - -0.02 
wind 0 0 0 0 0 
solar 0 0 0 0 0 
CO2emission 0 0.00*** 0.00*** 0 0.00*** 
GDPG 0 0 0 0 0 
oilreserve 0 0 0 0 0 
globaloilprice -0.05* -0.02* -0.02 -0.03** -0.03* 
GDPPC 0 0 0 0 0 
Population 0 0 0 0 0 
System 0.42 0.90** 0.98** 0.36 1.02** 
Government type 3 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.37 0.1 
Government type 4 0.48 0.16 0.06 0.35 0.19 
_cons 
-
7919.88** 
-
3355.27*** -3259.51*** -3309.68*** 
-
6278.40** 
_cons 6.94*** 6.08*** 6.06*** 6.08*** 6.72*** 
N 2662 2662 2847 2847 2847 
ll 303.11 217.54 215.19 293.71 222.05 
 legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 23 RPS Models: Event History (Estimates as Betas) 
 
Variable Full Suasion Competition Emulation Learning 
FDI 14.11*** 14.17***  -  -  - 
EU membership 9.31* 1.96  -  -  - 
CDM 2.49** 2.60***  -  -  - 
Colonizer_RPS/FIT -1.18 -0.57  -  -  - 
Neighbors -0.05  -  - -0.03  - 
Cartagena -6.56  -  - -2.13**  - 
Kyoto 9.03*  -  - 15.83***  - 
Common colonial 
history 14.97***  -  - 11.09***  - 
Common language 0.12**  -  - 0.07***  - 
Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT -10.77  - -1.49  -  - 
Competitors’ CDM 2.13  - 0.77  -  - 
Competitors’ FDI 4.06  - 0.11  -  - 
Regional renewables 
share -0.07  -    - -0.02 
Regional CO2 
emission 0.42*  -    - 0.02 
Regional GDP 
growth 0.74**  -    - 0.2 
World CO2 emission -0.37  -    - 0.06 
World GDP growth -0.71  -    - -0.14 
World renewables 
share -0.3  -    - 0.06 
wind -0.00* 0 -0.00* 0 0 
solar 0 0 0.00** 0 0 
CO2emission 0 0 0 0.00* 0 
GDPG 0 0 0 0 0 
oilreserve 0.01* 0.00* 0 0 0.00* 
globaloilprice 0.12*** -0.02 0 0.04 0.02 
GDPPC -0.00** 0 0 0 0 
population 0 0 0 0 0 
system 3.65* 0.98 1.32 2.02 1.11 
Government type 0.09  -  -  -  - 
Gov 3   -1.09 -1.43 -0.1 -1.43 
Gov 4   -0.59 -0.58 0.78 -0.56 
_cons -9219.77 
-
3510.93* -4036.51* -690.18 -707.85 
_cons 7.09*** 6.12*** 6.27*** 4.44 4.52 
N 1832 3046 3239 3239 1885 
ll 81.45 43.78 37.04 66.26 39.59 
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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In the RPS event history full specification the controls wind power, oil reserves, the 
global price of oil, GDP per capita and system (presidential coded 2, parliamentary coded 3) are 
statistically significant. While wind power and GDP per capita have a negative direction of effect 
(that is, they slow the process of policy diffusion), oil reserves, the global price of oil and system 
(presidential coded 2, parliamentary coded 3) have positive direction of effect (that is, they speed 
up the process of policy diffusion). In the RPS event history suasion model FDI and CDM are 
statistically significant. As expected both have a positive effect on RPS adoption. In the suasion 
event history specification only the control oil reserve is statistically significant with a positive 
direction of effect.  
In the RPS event history competition model, none of the independent variables is 
significant. Only the controls for wind and solar power are statistically significant with negative 
and positive effects respectively. In the RPS event history emulation model, Cartagena, Kyoto, 
common former colonizer, common language and the control for CO2 emissions are statically 
significant. Kyoto, common former colonizer and common language and CO2 emissions as 
expected are positively associated with RPS adoption in the emulation model. Contrary to 
expectation, Cartagena has a negative effect. In the RPS event history model for the learning 
mechanism, none of the independent variable is statistically significant. Only the control, oil 
reserves, as expected has a statistically significant and positive effect. 
 
HYPOTHESIS EXAMINATION UNDER FOUR SPECIFICATIONS OF FIT MODELS  
Each independent variable is examined in four models (two event history and two 
random effects logistic regression models). There are parsimonious models for each mechanism 
that include the independent variables of a given variable and all the controls. There are full 
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models that include all the variables in the four mechanisms and the controls. This estimation 
approach allows one to compare the effect of a hypothesized variable under different modeling 
assumptions. 
For the models of the suasion mechanism of policy diffusion, wo out of four variables are 
statistically significant and two of them are not statistically significant in any of the FIT models. 
EU membership and FDI in four and three models respectively. CDM and adoption of FIT by a 
former colonizer are not statistically significant in any of the FIT models. Therefore, hypothesis 
two and three are rejected.  
EU membership is statistically significant in all four of FIT models (FIT-full event 
history, FIT-suasion event history, FIT-suasion random-effect logistic regression and FIT-
suasion random-effect logistic regression). EU membership has a consistent positive direction of 
effect as expected in hypothesis one. This consistency in significance and direction of effect 
allows one to accept hypothesis one.  
Table 24 FIT Suasion Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Suasion Full Suasion 
1 EU-
Membership 
4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
2 Colonizer-
FIT/RPS 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
3 CDM 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
4 FDI 3 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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FDI is statistically significant in three of the four FIT models (FIT-full event history, 
FIT-suasion event history and FIT-suasion random-effect logistic regression). FDI has a 
consistent positive direction of effect as expected in hypothesis four. Therefore, hypothesis four 
is accepted in FIT-full event history, FIT-suasion event history and FIT-suasion random-effect 
logistic regression.  
In the FIT emulation models, two out of six variables are statistically significant. 
Adoption by a country with common language is significant in all four of the FIT models. 
Common colonizer is only significant in the full pooled random effects logistic regression 
model; therefore, hypothesis 15 is accepted.  Common colonizer has a positive direction of effect 
as expected in hypothesis 15. Common language is statistically significant and has a consistent 
positive direction of effect in all four of the models. Therefore, hypothesis 16 is accepted.  
Table 25 FIT Emulation Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Emulation Full Emulation 
14 Neighbors 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
15 Common 
colonial 
history 
1 ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ 
16 Common 
language 
4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
17 Cartagena 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
18 Kyoto 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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In Table 26, which compares the estimations across four specifications of the FIT-
emulation models, only competitor’s FIT adoption is statistically significant. Only in one model 
is competitor’s FIT adoption statistically significant and the direction of effect is positive as 
expected in hypothesis 5. Based on the competition random-effects logistic regression model, 
hypothesis 5 is rejected because of omitted variable bias; there is not a lot of confidence in that 
variable. However, it is not consistent and not significant in the full models.  
Three of the variables are statistically significant in at least in one of the learning FIT 
models. Three of the variables, average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without 
FIT within regions, Average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without FIT in 
the world and average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without 
FIT in the world are not statistically significant in any of the models. Therefore, hypotheses 9, 11 
and 12 are rejected. Average difference in renewable energy share within regions of countries 
with and without FIT is statically significant in two of the logit models, but not in any of the 
event history models. The direction of effect is consistent and negative in both logit models. 
However, the hypothesis stated an expectation of a positive direction of effect. According to the 
Table 26 FIT Competition Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Competition Full Competition 
5 Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT 
1 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
6 Competitors’ 
CDM 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
7 Competitors’ 
FDI 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
 
131 
 
logit models’ results, then, hypothesis eight is accepted. Average difference in CO2 emissions 
within regions of countries with and without FIT is statistically significant in three of the models.  
The direction of effect is consistent and negative in all three of the models. Hypothesis 10 
is accepted. Average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without FIT in the world is 
only significant with a positive direction of effect as expected in learning event history model. 
Therefore, hypothesis 13 is rejected because of omitted variable bias; there is not a lot of 
confidence in that variable. However, it is not consistent and not significant in the full models. 
In terms of the strength of the mechanisms that may explain FIT diffusion, there is strong 
support for suasion and to a lesser degree strong support for emulation. For learning and 
competition there is moderate and weak support respectively. Suasion and emulation each have 
one variable that are significant in all four models. The suasion mechanism’s hypothesis 1, EU 
membership, and emulation mechanism’s hypothesis 16, common language, are statistically 
Table 27 FIT Learning Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables   Full Learning Full Learning 
8 Regional 
renewables share 
2 ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔   
9 World renewables 
share 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
10 Regional CO2 
emission 
3 ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
11 World CO2 
emission 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
12 Regional GDP 
growth 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
13 World GDP growth 1 ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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significant with positive direction of effect in all four of the models. Suasion mechanism’s 
hypothesis four, FDI, is statistically significant with consistent positive effect in three of the 
models. Learning mechanism’s hypothesis 10, Average difference in CO2 emissions within 
regions of countries with and without FIT, is statistically significant with negative direction of 
effect in three of the models. 
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Table 28 FIT Models 
  Total  Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Signific
ant 
Full Parsimonious Full Parsimonious 
Suasion       
1 EU-Membership 4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
2 Colonizer-FIT 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
3 CDM 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
4 FDI 3 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ 
Competition       
5 Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT 
1 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
6 Competitors’ 
CDM 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
7 Competitors’ FDI 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Learning       
8 Regional 
renewables share 
2 ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔   
9 World renewables 
share 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
10 Regional CO2 
emission 
3 ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
11 World CO2 
emission 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
12 Regional GDP 
growth 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
13 World GDP 
growth 
1 ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ 
Emulation       
14 Neighbors 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
15 Common colonial 
history 
1 ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ 
16 Common 
language 
4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
17 Cartagena 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
18 Kyoto 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
       
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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There is the strongest support for EU membership and common language in four models. 
There is moderate support for FDI and Average difference in CO2 emissions within regions of 
countries with and without FIT in three models. There is weak support for Average difference in 
renewable energy share within regions of countries with and without FIT in two logit models. 
There is very weak support (one model only) for common colony, competitors’ FIT, average 
difference in GDP growth of countries with and without FIT in the world in full logit, 
parsimonious logit, and parsimonious event history models respectively. In fit models there is no 
support for colonizer-FIT, CDM, neighbors’ FIT, Cartagena, Kyoto, competitors’ CDM, 
competitors’ FDI, average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without FIT within 
regions, Average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without FIT in the world 
and average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without FIT in the 
world. 
 
Table 29 RPS Suasion Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Suasion Full Suasion 
1 EU-
Membership 
3 ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
2 Colonizer-RPS 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
3 CDM 3 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
4 FDI 2 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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HYPOTHESIS EXAMINATION UNDER FOUR SPECIFICATIONS OF RPS MODELS  
Overall there is moderate support for the suasion mechanism in the RPS models. There is 
moderate support (significant in three of the models) for EU membership and CDM. There is 
weak support for FDI, which is statistically significant in only one of the models. There is no 
support for a colonizer’s adoption of RPS.  
Hypothesis 1, EU membership, is statistically significant with the expected direction of 
effect (positive) in the full event history model, random-effects logit full and suasion models. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Hypothesis 3, CDM, is statistically significant with 
expected (positive) direction of effect in three models: the full event history, parsimonious 
suasion, and random-effect logit full models. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is accepted. FDI is 
statistically significant with positive direction of effect in two event history models.  
There is strong support for the emulation mechanism in explaining diffusion of RPS. 
Competitors’ RPS and common language are statistically significant with expected direction of 
effect (positive) in all four models. Therefore, hypothesis 15 and 16 are accepted. Cartagena is 
Table 30 RPS Emulation Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Emulation Full Emulation 
14 Neighbors 1 (-) ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
15 Common 
colonial 
history 
4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
16 Common 
language 
4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
17 Cartagena 2 (-) ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
18 Kyoto 2 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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statistically significant in the event history emulation and logit full models. Hypothesis 17 is 
accepted; however, not with a positive, but instead a negative direction of effect.  
Being signatory to Kyoto Protocols is statistically significant in two event history models 
with positive direction of effect. Therefore, hypothesis 18 is accepted. Hypothesis 14, neirps is 
statistically significant in the logit full and parsimonious models. Hypothesis 14 is accepted; 
however, the direction of effect is negative.  
There is no support for the competition mechanism in explaining the diffusion of RPS. 
None of the competition variables are statistically significant. Therefore, hypotheses five, six and 
seven are rejected.  
There is very weak support for the learning mechanism in explaining RPS diffusion. 
None of the learning variables are significant in both the event history and logit models. 
Hypothesis 10 and 12, average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS 
within regions and average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without RPS within 
Table 31 RPS Competition Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Competition Full Competition 
5 Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
6 Competitors’ 
CDM 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
7 Competitors’ 
FDI 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
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regions are only statistically significant in event history full models. Hypothesis 10 and 12 are 
accepted.  Hypothesis 8, average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and 
without RPS within regions and hypothesis 13, average difference in the GDP growth of 
countries with and without RPS in the world, are statistically significant in the full logit models.  
Hypothesis 8 and 13 are accepted; however, their directions of effects are negative. Hypothesis 
9, average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without RPS in the 
world and 11, average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS in the 
world are rejected.  
Emulation, suasion learning and competition mechanisms are strong, moderate, very 
weak and without support respectively in terms of explaining RPS diffusion. Two variables of 
the suasion mechanism are statistically significant. The suasion mechanism’s hypothesis 15, 
common former colonizer, and hypothesis 16, common language, are statistically significant 
Table 32 FIT Learning Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects 
Logit  
Hypothesis Variables   Full Learning Full Learning 
8 Regional 
renewables share 
1 - ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖   
9 World renewables 
share 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
10 Regional CO2 
emission 
1 ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
11 World CO2 
emission 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
12 Regional GDP 
growth 
1 ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
13 World GDP growth 1 - ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖ 
138 
 
with a positive direction in all four RPS models.  Two variables of the suasion models—
hypothesis 1 about EU membership and hypothesis 3 about CDM—are statistically significant in 
three of the models.  The learning mechanism’s hypothesis 8,10,12 and 13 are significant in one 
of the models. None of the competition mechanism’s variables, hypothesis 5 through 7, is 
statistically significant.  
The strongest support is for hypothesis 15 common former colonizer, and hypothesis 16, 
common language, in four models. There is moderate support for EU membership and CDM, 
which are statistically significant in three models. There is weak support for FDI, which is 
statistically significant, in two logit models. There is very weak support for average difference in 
the renewable energy share of countries with and without RPS within regions, average difference 
in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS within regions, average difference in GDP 
growth of countries with and without RPS within regions, average difference in the GDP growth 
of countries with and without RPS in the world, which are only significant in one of the models, 
full logit, full event history, full event history and full logit models respectively. In the RPS 
models, there is no support for former colonizer, competitor’s CDM, competitor’s FDI, 
competitor’s RPS, average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS in the 
world, average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without RPS in the 
world.  
 
COMPARISON: RESULTS OF FIT AND RPS MODELS 
There are eight models in total for RPS and FIT. In order to check for robustness a 
comparison is made across all eight models. The findings for emulation and suasion are robust in 
both RPS and FIT. The emulation variable of sharing a common language (hypothesis 16) is 
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statistically significant with a positive direction of effect in all eight models. The emulation 
variable of sharing a common colonial history (hypothesis 15) is statistically significant with a 
positive direction of effect in all four RPS models, but there is no consistent finding for it in the 
FIT models. There is a robust finding for EU membership (hypothesis 1) in both RPS and FIT 
models. There is a robust finding for EU membership (hypothesis 1) in both RPS and FIT 
models. EU membership is statistically significant with a positive direction of effect in three and 
four models RPS and FIT respectively. There is robust finding for CDM (hypothesis 3) in RPS 
models but not in FIT models. There is a robust finding for FDI (hypothesis 2) in the FIT 
models, but not in the RPS models. There is no significant finding for the colonizer variable 
(hypothesis 2), which is not significant in any of the models.  
There are robust findings for learning in the FIT models, but not in the RPS models. In 
FIT models, there is a robust finding for the learning variable, the average difference in CO2 
emissions within region of countries that adopted the policy and those that have not, but not in 
RPS models. It is statistically significant in three of the FIT models with a negative direction of 
effect.  There is a robust finding that the competition mechanism is not a predictor of RPS and 
FIT diffusion.  
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The results of eight specifications presented in this chapter show robust findings of 
support for emulation and suasion, but little support for learning and competition. In the 
Table 33 RPS Models 
 
 Total  
Significant 
Event history Random-effects Logit  
Hypothesis Variables  Full Parsimonious Full Parsimonious 
Suasion       
1 EU-Membership 3 ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
2 Colonizer-RPS 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
3 CDM 3 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
4 FDI 2 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ 
Competition       
5 Competitors’ 
RPS/FIT 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
6 Competitors’ 
CDM 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
7 Competitors’ FDI 0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Learning       
8 Regional 
renewables share 
1 - ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖   
9 World renewables 
share 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
10 Regional CO2 
emission 
1 ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
11 World CO2 
emission 
0 ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
12 Regional GDP 
growth 
1 ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
13 World GDP 
growth 
1 - ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ 
Emulation        
14 Neighbors 2 (-) ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
15 Common colonial 
history 
4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
16 Common language 4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
17 Cartagena 2 (-) ✖ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
18 Kyoto 2 ✔ ✔ Omitted Omitted 
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖  
 
141 
 
emulation mechanism, there is a robust finding for common language. In the suasion model there 
is a robust finding of support for EU membership. In addition, there is a robust finding that 
competition is not the driver of RPS and FIT diffusion. The findings for the learning mechanism 
in diffusion of RPS are not robust. However, there is a robust finding for learning variable, 
average difference in CO2 emissions within regions of countries with and without FIT, in the FIT 
learning models.   
 
PROBABILITY PROFILES OF FIT AND RPS MODELS  
Probability profiles are generated to show the magnitude of effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. While the results of regression and event history models 
show the direction of effect and statistically significance of the variables, they do not show the 
magnitude of effect on the dependent variable. Probability profiles allow the calculation of the 
effect of values of a given independent variable on the dependent variable. For example, it 
allows the separate calculation of effect of each value of a dummy variable, EU membership, 
with a value of zero and one on RPS adoption. Therefore, in order to find out which factor has 
the greatest effect on the probability of adoption, probability profiles are calculated for the 
statistically significant variables.  
The probability profiles for the pooled logit full RPS model, pooled logit full FIT model, 
event history full RPS model, and event history full FIT model are presented in the next four 
tables. In the pooled logit full RPS and FIT models, EU membership has the greatest effect. In 
the probability profile of event history full FIT model, FDI has the greatest effect.  
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Pooled logit RPS probability profiles show that EU membership has the highest 
magnitude of effect on RPS adoption. The probability of RPS adoption in the pooled logit full 
RPS model for positive FDI is .029 and the probability of RPS adoption for negative FDI is .03. 
There is one tenth of a percent (0.001) difference between probabilities of RPS adoption in 
countries with positive FDI and negative FDI.  
Table 34 Comparison FIT and RPS Models 
Hypothesis Variables 
RPS Models 
Significant 
FIT Models 
Significant 
 Total 
significant 
Suasion         
1 EU-Membership 3 4 7 
2 Colonizer-RPS/fit 0 0 0 
3 CDM 3 0 3 
4 FDI 2 3 5 
Competition       
 5 Competitors’ rps/fit 0 1 1 
6 Competitors’ CDM 0 0 0 
7 Competitors’ FDI 0 0 0 
Learning       
 8 Regional renewables share  1 - -2 -3 
9 World renewables share 0 0 0 
10 Regional CO2 emission 1 -3 (+1, -3)=4 
11 World CO2 emission 0 0 0 
12 Regional GDP growth 1 0 1 
13 World GDP growth 1 - 1 (-1, +1)=2 
Emulation       
 14 Neighbors  2 (-) 0 -2 
15 Common colonial history 4 1 5 
16 Common language 4 4 8 
17 Cartagena 2 (-) 0 -2 
18 Kyoto 2 0 2 
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The probability of RPS adoption for non-EU member is 0.03 and for EU member it is 
.05. Hence, the probability of RPS adoption is two percent higher for EU members. The 
probability of adoption for non-CDM countries is .03 and for CDM countries it is 0.035. There is 
half a percent increase in the probability of adoption for countries with CDM. The probability of 
adoption for a Cartagena member is 0.03 and 0.035 for non-members. There is half a percent 
decrease in the probability of adoption for Cartagena members. 
Pooled logit probability profiles for full FIT model show that once again EU membership 
has the greatest magnitude of effect on FIT adoption. The probability of FIT adoption for non-
EU member is 0.11 and for EU member it is .28. Hence, the probability of FIT adoption is 17 
percent higher for EU members. The probability of FIT adoption in a pooled logit full FIT model 
Table 35 Pooled Logit Probability Profiles Full RPS Model 
  
Delta-method 
    
 Variables  
Predictive 
Margins Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
FDI 
      1 0.028 0.0025025 11.32 0 0.0234172 0.0332267 
2 0.0298 0.0013549 21.97 0 0.0271092 0.0324204 
EU 
membership 
      1 0.03 0.0066993 4.1 0 0.0143413 0.0406021 
2 0.05 0.0154067 3.26 0.001 0.0199668 0.08036 
CDM 
      1 0.0276 0.0016587 16.62 0 0.0243241 0.0308262 
2 0.0347 0.0046233 7.51 0 0.0256748 0.0437978 
Cartagena 
      1 0.0354879 0.0062065 5.72 0 0.0233233 0.0476524 
2 0.0297563 0.0013585 21.9 0 0.0270937 0.0324188 
N 1861      
Model VCE:  OIM 
     Expression: Pr(rps=1 assuming u_i=0), predict(pu0) 
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for a net positive inflow of FDI is .13 and the probability of FIT adoption for negative FDI is .11. 
Positive FDI has a 2 percent higher probability of FIT adoption than non-FDI countries. The 
probability of adoption for non-CDM countries is .127 and for CDM countries it is 0.132. There 
is half a percent increase in the probability of adoption for countries with CDM.  
The probability profile for the full specification of the event history FIT model predicts 
that half of countries with negative FDI will adopt FIT by 2033, holding other variables constant 
at their mean values. The median adoption time for positive FDI is 2008. The median time of 
adoption for EU members is 2008 and the median time of adoption for non-EU member is 2010. 
The median time of adoption of CDM is 2009 and it is 2010 for non-CDM countries.  
Table 36 Pooled Logit Probability Profiles Full FIT Model 
    Delta-method       
  Margin Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
FDI 
     
1 0.1088369 0.023838 4.57 0 0.0621153 
0.15555
86 
2 0.1281259 0.0043609 
29.3
8 0 0.1195787 
0.13667
32 
EU 
membe
rship 
      
1 0.1051216 0.0034141 
30.7
9 0 0.0984301 
0.11181
3 
2 0.2753785 0.041415 6.65 0 0.1942065 
0.35655
04 
CDM 
      
1 0.1271293 0.0043747 
29.0
6 0 0.1185551 
0.13570
34 
2 0.1324374 0.0067815 
19.5
3 0 0.1191459 
0.14572
88 
N 3117 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr(fit=1 assuming u_i=0), predict(pu0) 
 
145 
 
The probability profiles for the full specification of the pooled logit RPS model, pooled 
logit full FIT model and event history full FIT model were presented in four tables. The variable, 
EU membership, has the greatest effect in the pooled logit full RPS and FIT models. The 
variable, FDI, has the greatest effect in the probability profile of event history full FIT model.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The statistical estimates provide robust support for the emulation and suasion 
mechanisms but not much support for learning and competition mechanisms. In the emulation 
models hypothesis 16, common language, is significant with a consistently positive direction of 
Table 37 Full FIT Model: Event History Probability Profile 
    Delta-method       
  Margin Std. Err.      z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
FDI 
    
1 
2033.01
1 
9.666722   
210.31 0 
2014.06
5 2051.958 
2 
2008.45
9 
1.909871  
1051.62 0 
2004.71
5 2012.202 
EU 
membership 
     
1 
2009.96
2 
2.366367   
849.39 0 
2005.32
4 2014.6 
2 2008.07 
2.013965   
997.07 0 
2004.12
3 2012.018 
CDM 
     
1 
2009.92
4 
2.368373   
848.65 0 
2005.28
2 2014.566 
2 
2008.74
7 
2.129958   
943.09 0 
2004.57
3 2012.922 
N   2662 
Model VCE: Robust 
Expression: Predicted median _t, predict() 
 
146 
 
effect in all eight of the models. In the suasion models, hypothesis 1 about EU membership is 
significant in seven models. There are robust findings that the competition mechanism is not the 
driver of RPS and FIT diffusion. Competition variables, competitor’s CDM and competitor’s 
FDI, are not significant in any of the models. There is no robust finding for learning in diffusion 
of RPS. However, there is a robust finding for Average difference in CO2 emissions within 
regions of countries with and without FIT, which is statistically significant in three FIT models 
with a negative direction of effect. In addition, the factors EU membership and FDI have the 
highest magnitude of effect.  
The next chapter discusses the theoretical findings and conclusions of the study. There 
are robust findings of support for emulation and suasion mechanisms, but there is little support 
for learning. The statistical findings show that diffusion of RPS and FIT are not through 
competition mechanism.   
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CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL FINDINGS  
The diffusion of RPS and FIT are more likely to have occurred through emulation and 
suasion than through learning or competition. There are robust statistical findings for emulation 
and suasion, but there is little support for competition in the diffusion of RPS and FIT policies. 
This is consistent with empirical data since currently renewable energy sources cannot compete 
with conventional sources of energy. Currently, the prices of conventional sources of energy is 
lower than renewable sources of energy. Using renewables do not give competitive advantage to 
either producers or consumers. There is also a robust finding of support for learning in the 
diffusion of FIT, but not in RPS diffusion. Countries are seeking a solution that mitigates carbon 
emissions, diversifies their energy needs, and improves their energy security.  
The following eighteen hypotheses are tested using event history and random-effects 
logistic regression specifications. The findings show robust support for hypothesis 1, 3, 15 and 
16 in the RPS models. There is robust support for hypothesis 1, 4 and 16 in FIT models. 
Therefore, these hypotheses are accepted and the remainder of them are rejected.  
 
Coercion Hypotheses 
H1a Countries that are members of the European Union are more likely to adopt renewable 
energy policies than non-EU states. (Accepted for both FIT and RPS) 
H2a Countries for which their former colonizers adopted RPS/FIT are more likely to adopt 
them. (Rejected) 
H3a Countries with CDM projects are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than countries without 
them. (Accepted for RPS) 
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H4a Countries with high levels of FDI are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS than countries with 
lower levels of FDI. (Accepted for FIT).  
 
Competition Hypotheses 
 
H5a Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their main export partner(s) (competitor) 
adopted them. (Rejected)  
H6a Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their competitors with CDM have adopted 
these policies.  (Rejected) 
H7a Countries are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT if their competitors with positive FDI,  
foreign direct investment net inflows as a percentage of GDP, (new investment inflows less 
disinvestment divided by GDP) adopted them. (Rejected)  
 
Learning Hypotheses  
H8a In comparing countries, those in regions with a high share of renewable energy are more 
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with a low share of renewable energy. 
(Rejected) 
H9a In comparing countries of the world, the average share of renewable energy is higher in 
countries with FIT/RPS than countries without them. (Rejected) 
H10a In comparing countries, those in regions with lower average carbon emissions are more 
likely to adopt FIT/RPS that those in regions with high average carbon emissions. 
(Rejected) 
H11a In comparing countries of the world, the average carbon emissions are lower in countries 
with FIT/RPS than countries without them. (Rejected)  
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H12a In comparing countries, those in regions with higher average economic growth are more 
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with lower average economic growth. 
(Rejected)  
H13a In comparing countries of the world, the average economic growth is higher in countries 
with FIT/RPS than countries without them. (Rejected)  
 
Emulation Hypotheses 
H14a States with a higher percentage of neighbors with renewable energy policies are more 
likely to adopt renewable energy policy than states with a lower percentage of neighbors 
with renewable energy policies. (Rejected)  
H15a States that share a common colonizer with countries that have a higher percentage of 
FIT/RPS adoption are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than states which share a common 
colonizer with countries that have a lower percentage of RPS/FIT adoption. (Accepted 
for RPS) 
H16a States that share a common language with countries that have a higher percentage of 
FIT/RPS adoption are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than states which share a common 
language with countries that have a lower percentage of RPS/FIT adoption. (Accepted for 
both RPS and FIT). 
H17a Countries that are signatories to the Cartagena multilateral environmental agreement are 
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies than states which are non-signatories. 
(Rejected)  
H18a Countries that are signatories to the Kyoto multilateral environmental agreement are 
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies than non-signatories. (Rejected) 
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Countries that are members of European Union and receive foreign direct investment are 
more likely to adopt FIT. The statistical analysis shows that the probability of FIT adoption is 17 
percent higher among EU members than non-members. Countries with positive FDI,  Foreign 
direct investment net inflows (% of GDP) (new investment inflows less disinvestment divided by GDP) 
have a two percent higher probability of RPS adoption than those without FDI. In addition, FDI 
and EU membership increase the rate of adoption. Holding other variables at their means, the 
median time of adoption for EU members is 2008 and it is 2010 for non-EU members. The 
median time of adoption for FDI countries is 2008 and it is 2033 for non-FDI countries. The 
indicators of suasion (EU membership and FDI) are statistically significant in all four of the 
event history models and three of the random effects logistic regression models. These findings 
suggest that EU membership and FDI increase the incentives for the countries to adopt FIT.  
FIT is more likely to diffuse to countries that share a common language, a significant 
indication of emulation diffusion. As the percentage of policy adopters with common language 
increases, there is an increase in the adoption of FIT. The percentage of countries with common 
language is statistically significant with a consistent positive direction of effect in all the 
statistical models of FIT.  
For RPS diffusion, the strongest support is for the emulation mechanism, followed by 
suasion. There is not much support for competition and learning. For FIT, there is a robust 
finding for common language. For RPS, in addition to common language, there is a robust 
finding for common colonial experience as measures of emulation in all four of the statistical 
models.  
CDM and EU membership increase the probability of RPS diffusion. The probability of 
RPS adoption is two percent higher for EU members than for non-members. There is half a 
percent increase in the probability of RPS adoption for countries with CDM than for countries 
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without it. As measures of suasion, there are robust and consistent positive findings for EU 
membership and CDM for RPS diffusion. Each of them is statistically significant in three of the 
four statistical models. EU membership increases the probability of diffusion of FIT and RPS. In 
addition, FDI increases the probability and diffusion of FIT. There is no robust finding for FDI in 
RPS diffusion. CDM, for which there is no robust finding in FIT, is a strong predictor of RPS 
diffusion.  
 Agent-based models complement these findings and show that full diffusion through 
coercion and emulation take longer than competition and learning. In addition, the initial number 
of adopters; people’s commitment to the mitigation of carbon emissions; the number of 
intergovernmental organizations committed to mitigation; and the Poisson distribution of power 
in the international system expedite full diffusion. When there are one or two super powers in the 
international system, the policies diffuse faster than in a multipolar system. This is an interesting 
finding: whereas a uniformity of state power may create a “balance” of strategic stability, the 
ABM suggests that in such a world policy diffusion will occur more slowly. Initially adoption of 
RPS and FIT only started with a single country, and their diffusion through emulation and 
suasion explains the slow rate of diffusion of these policies.  
The maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters is higher in a 
Poisson distribution, an international system with one or two super powers than a normal system 
with many middle powers. Non-adopters have higher power in the Poisson than in the normal 
distribution of power. In a multipolar world, powerful and less powerful countries are equally 
likely to adopt, but in a single power world the less powerful ones are more likely to adopt. In 
addition, the maximum power difference is higher in a uniform system than a normal system. 
Weaker states are more likely to adopt in a uniform world than a multi-polar world.  The number 
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of initial adopters decreases the time to maximum power difference. When there are more initial 
adopters, the maximum power difference occurs in the earlier times of diffusion process. In other 
words, there are less powerful ones that adopt the policies in the earlier phase of diffusion 
process. The maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters is lower in the 
learning, emulation and competition mechanisms than in suasion. Powerful and less powerful 
ones are equally likely to adopt. Since in suasion more powerful countries shape the policies of 
weaker states dependent on them, the power difference between adopters and non-adopters is 
higher. In suasion less powerful states are more likely to adopt. In learning, emulation and 
competition, the maximum power difference occurs in the initial phase of diffusion. In coercion 
there are more powerful non-adopters in the later stage of diffusion process than in emulation, 
learning and competition.  
The maximum regional difference in proportion of adopters and non-adopters occurs only 
in diffusion through emulation not in other mechanisms. As the number of initial adopters 
increase, there is a decrease in the maximum regional difference. However, this difference is 
more likely to occur in the initial phase of diffusion. In the competition and learning 
mechanisms, the maximum regional difference occurs in the earlier phase of diffusion. In 
emulation, the regional difference occurs in the later phase of diffusion.  
Maximum compliance cost differences of adopters and non-adopters is lower in 
competition, learning and emulation than in suasion. There is more equal cost on adopters and 
non-adopters in learning, emulation and competition. In coercion, the cost is greater on adopters 
than on non-adopters. In the learning and competition mechanisms, the maximum cost difference 
is in the earlier phase of diffusion. In emulation, the maximum cost difference is in the later 
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phase of diffusion. With higher number of initial adopters, the maximum compliance cost 
difference occurs in the earlier phase of diffusion.  
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study moves beyond the state centric approach and, in the agent-based model, 
examines individuals working as activists and the intergovernmental organizations. One of the 
study's contributions is that it includes different level of analysis and interactions across them in 
diffusion process. Contrary to the literature, this study makes clear distinctions between 
indicators of the four mechanisms. In the literature, the focus is more on whether diffusion has 
occurred through these mechanisms while indicators overlap across mechanisms. In addition, the 
use of agent-based modeling allow for understanding the rate of diffusion through each 
mechanism. The findings show that full diffusion through emulation and coercion take longer 
than competition and learning. In addition the agent-based model can be adopted to understand 
other examples of diffusion such as economic liberalization, metric system, fashion, sports and 
etc.  
There are several suggestions for future research. Future research can look at the reversal 
of adoption. There are countries that have initially adopted the policies, but have dropped later. 
This can bring new insights on how it can affect the whole process of diffusion.  
Another area of future research is to develop measures of learning variables that better 
capture the effect of policy adoptions on the share of renewables, economic growth and 
mitigation of carbon emissions. The difference in share of renewables before and after policy 
adoption would precisely show how much a country’s renewable share grows after adoption of 
the policies. A regional or world difference could also be calculated considering the difference of 
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before and after adoption. In addition, measuring carbon emissions by dividing it by GDP before 
and after adoption would show the effect of the policy adoption on mitigation of carbon 
emissions. Regional and world differences in mean GDP growth before and after adoption would 
measure the effect of policy adoptions on economic growth. 
In addition, instead of using European Union as a control, future research can use 
taxation rate to understand the role of collectivist and individualistic societies as a determinant of 
policy diffusion. Do actors that emulate are more likely to learn? Using percentage of renewable 
energy share as a dependent variable would allow to understand the link between emulation and 
learning in a statistical model combing the learning and emulation variables. It is expected that in 
policy diffusion through emulation the share of renewable energy will be low and in policy 
diffusion through learning the share of renewables will be higher.  
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APPENDICES  
A. DATA SOURCES 
Variables 
 
r Data Source 
Energy import, net % of energy use 1 Word Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 1 WDI 
GDP per capita (Current $US)  WDI 
Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total) 1 WDI 
GDP growth (annual %) 1 WDI 
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP % per kg of oil equivalent) 1 WDI 
Net ODA received (% of central government expense)  1 WDI 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) 1 WDI 
Population 1 WDI, Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)  
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)  1 WDI, MacGarvie (2005) 
FDI dummy created using WDI FDI % of GDP data  WDI 
Education (the % of gross secondary school enrollment) 
secongross   
1 WDI, Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
School enrollment, secondary (% net)  1 WDI 
Unemployment, total % of total labor force 1 WDI, Jenner, Chan, Frankenberger, 
Gabel 2012 
Oil rents (% of GDP) 1 WDI 
Government Orientation 1 World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions 
http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ4
0  
Pump price for gasoline ($US per liter) 1 WDI 
Crude Oil in Dollars per Barrel, Products in Dollars per 
Gallon, WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma 
 
 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_s
pt_s1_d.htm 
system2012 
execrlc2012 
1 DPI2012:  
http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ4
0 
+EU member 1 EU, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/index_en.htm 
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) Target final energy percent from Renewable 1 Renewables 2014 Global Status Report 
OECD Stats, rndata 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSe
tCode=PATS_IPC# 
 
 
Kyoto Protocol from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
1 IEAD, Neumayer (2002) 
http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query
=static&file=download_full_dataset.ht
m 
Citation: Data from Ronald B. 
Mitchell. 2002-2015. International 
Environmental Agreements Database 
Project (Version 2014.3). 
http://iea.uoregon.edu/ 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 1 IEAD 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer 
1 IEAD 
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Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels) 1 EIA  
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6&
cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2014&
unit=BB 
Energy Intensity - Total Primary Energy Consumption per 
Dollar of GDP (Btu per Year 2005 U.S. Dollars (Purchasing 
Power Parities) 
1 EIA 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
iedindex3.cfm?tid=92&pid=47&aid=2
&cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2011
&unit=BTUPUSDM 
 
Total Renewable Electricity net generation  (Billion Kilowatt 
Hours) 
eia http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=6&pid=29&aid=1
2 
Total Renewable Electricity Net Consumption (Billion 
Kilowatt Hours) 
eia  
+Global Oil Price 
 
eia  
Colonizer effect cepii CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales (French: 
Institute for Research on the 
International Economy) 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/cepii/cepi
i.asp 
       
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/dist
_cepii.dta 
+Common colony cepii CEPII,  Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
Common language cepii CEPII, MacGarvie (2005) 
 Cdm cdm Percentage of projects by Host Party of 
all registered projects 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/
CDMinsights/index.html 
Membership (Central European Free Trade Agreement) cefta http://www.cefta.int/ 
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
% of neighboring states with RPS or FIT 
 
 The world factbook, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publication
s/the-world-factbook/fields/2096.html 
Jenner, etal (2012), chandler 2009 
Renewable Energy Sources Govt R&D in Million NC  
(nominal) 
1 IEA 
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/t
ableView.aspx 
Renewable Energy Sources Total RD&D in Million USD 
(2013 prices and PPP) 
1 IEA 
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/t
ableView.aspx 
Share of  heavy industry as percentage of GDP(paper 
products+ nonmetallicindustry + basic metal industry)/gdp 
for each year (Smith_Urpelainen 2013) 
 OECDstatshttp://stats.oecd.org/index.a
spx?queryid=90# 
Renewable energy, Total, % of total energy generation 1 OECD (2014), Renewable energy 
(indicator). doi: 10.1787/aac7c3f1-en 
(Accessed on 08 December 2014) 
http://data.oecd.org/energy/renewable-
energy.htm 
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Restructured electricity product market regulation (PMR) in 
the electricity sector 
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/48/ 
42480328.xls 
PMR is used by Smith_Urpelainen 
2013  
Jenner, Chan, Frankenberger & Gabel 
(2012) 
Erdogdu (2013) for explanation of the 
variable 
+biomass resources  Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
+hydro resources  Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
+solar resources  Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset?q=win
d+resources+by+class+and+country&s
ort=score+desc%2C+name+asc&publi
sher=National+Renewable+Energy+La
boratory&ext_location=&ext_bbox=&
ext_prev_extent=-
106.80084228515625%2C42.0370543
01883806%2C-
106.15264892578125%2C42.4437279
3752476 
+wind resources  Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014) 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset?q=win
d+resources+by+class+and+country&s
ort=score+desc%2C+name+asc&publi
sher=National+Renewable+Energy+La
boratory&ext_location=&ext_bbox=&
ext_prev_extent=-
106.80084228515625%2C42.0370543
01883806%2C-
106.15264892578125%2C42.4437279
3752476 
Export/import partners  http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfi
le/Country/AFG/Year/2010/Summary 
Export/import partners (accessed 29 oct 15)  https://www.cia.gov/library/publication
s/the-world-factbook/fields/2050.html 
Growth of electricity consumption  Pfeiffer, Mulder 2013 
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B. DIFFUSION VARIABLES 
Literature Review 
Dependent V IVs Sources Diffusion M Test 
RPS adoption 
 
US states 
+ economic growth 
/ local environment conditions 
/ preferences effects, ?political 
ideology, ?private interests, American 
solar energy association, No oil price 
Lyon & Yin, 
2010 
Control 
 
 
 
Proportional 
odds model 
(Kiefer, 1988) 
RPS adoption 
in state 
requirement 
US states 
-higher level of renewable energy 
development 
+ regulated electricity market/ cost 
based pricing 
Lyon & Yin, 
2010 
Control  
policy 
adoption 
(RPS, FIT) 
EU 
+International solar energy 
association 
/ratio of neighbor with policy and the 
total number of states (nbor) 
/EU membership (representing EU 
Directive 2001/77/EC on generation 
of electricity from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E). It has been the first 
binding directive that obliges state 
legislators to support RES-E 
+solar potential 
+unemployment rate 
-electricity market concentration 
Electricity price per kwh for private 
consumers 
No oil price 
Jenner, Chan, 
Frankenberger 
& Gabel, 
2012 
international solar 
energy association= 
emulation 
nbor=learning bc 
chandler (2009) 
introduces it as 
learning effect 
between US neighbor 
states 
EU 
membership=Coercion  
bc binding 
Proportional 
hazard model 
FIT adoption 
developing 
and emerging 
economies 
-domestic energy production 
/air quality (so2), +biomass resources, 
+hydro resources, +GDP per capita, 
+population, /education, +EU 
member, +Common colony, oil price 
Stadelmann & 
Castro (2014) 
EU=Learning/coercion 
Common Colony= 
emulation/learning 
Colonizers= coercion  
Logit model, 
using maximum 
likelihood 
techniques 
energy & 
environmental 
policy 
Turkey 
-economic concern 
- geopolitical concern 
+environmental concern 
Ustun, 2012 geopolitical concern= 
competition bc turkey 
as transit state and 
having long term 
energy contract with 
foreign countries 
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Dependent V IVs Sources Diffusion M Test 
financial 
incentives 
through tax 
reduction, 
grants, 
concessional 
loans 
-domestic energy production 
+solar resources 
+GDP per capita +population 
 /education, +democracy, +EU 
+Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA), +former 
colonizer % adopted the policy 
Stadelmann & 
Castro (2014) 
EU=Learning/coercion 
Common Colony= 
emulation/learning 
 
re Target 
adoption 
+wind resources, -hydrological 
resources +population, /education, 
+EU member, +Lag CDM 
Stadelmann & 
Castro (2014) 
EU member=learning, 
coercion 
 
Framework 
policies 
(strategies, 
plans, generic 
law) 
+population 
+Common colony 
+Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) funding 
+Lag CDM 
Stadelmann & 
Castro (2014) 
Common Colony= 
emulation/learning 
GEF funding= 
coercion (financial 
incentive diffusion) 
 
Technology 
knowledge 
diffusion 
+common language  
geographic distance as proxy for 
language barrier 
FDI 
Import of citing country from cited 
country 
telephone call traffic between two 
country 
MacGarvie 
(2005) 
Common language = 
emulation/ learning 
geographic distance as 
proxy for language 
barrier= emulation/ 
learning 
FDI = competition 
Import of citing 
country from cited 
country= competition 
telephone call traffic 
between two country= 
emulation/learning 
regression 
RPS adoption 
US states 
+ Renewable energy interest groups 
contribution to state level policy 
makers 
-conventional energy interest groups 
donations to state level policy makers 
No oil price 
Jenner etal., 
2013Database 
of state 
incentives for 
renewables 
and efficiency 
(DSIRE) 
control Proportional 
hazard model 
and probit (for 
the increase in 
share of 
renewables  
Renewable 
energy 
programs and 
policies 
US states 
+*air pollutant per capita 
-*carbon intensive economies (carbon 
dioxide tons per thousand of real 2000 
chained dollars of Gross State 
Product) 
-coal and natural gas production 
+GSP per capita 
+*number of liberal citizens (0 
conservative -100 liberal) 
+wind capacity 
+solar generation capacity 
+% of neighboring states adopted 
Matisoff, 
2008 
neighboring states 
with RPS= 
emulation/learning, 
competition 
Cross-sectional 
analysis to test 
for internal 
determinants of 
policy adoption 
and event 
history analysis 
for diffusion, 
probit 
maximum 
likelihood 
regression 
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RPS model  
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C. DIFFUSION MECHANISMS 
A
ct
or
s 
Diffusion Processes 
Coercion/Suasion Competition 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
Stadelmann & Castro 2014=Colonizer 
Aklin, etal 2014=environmental ministries  
Simmons, et al. 2006= policies promoted by strong 
countries to be put into practice in weak countries 
structurally or situationally dependent on them 
Schelling 1960= Unilateral policy leadership 
 
Stadelmann & Castro 2014=External and internal 
actors more likely have similar economic structure, 
they compete with each other 
Simmons, etal. 2006= most important relationships are 
horizontal 
G
o-
be
tw
ee
ns
 
Stadelmann & Castro 2014=EU member 
Stadelmann & Castro (2014)= Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 
Stadelmann & Castro 2014, Clean development 
mechanisms through international orgs 
Saikawa 2013=International development assistance 
(ODA) 
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy governments or 
international organizations in federal system and 
international organization may use coercive 
strategies through grants and aid requirements, pre-
emptive laws, sanctions or military force 
 
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy governments or 
international organizations in federal system and 
international organization “may help restructure 
competitive environments, such as with the European 
Union facilitating the reduction of trade barriers or the 
US Constitution limiting interstate regulation of 
commerce by the states” (693) 
In
te
rn
al
 
 
Simmons, etal. 2006= Weaker countries are 
structurally or situationally dependent on strong 
countries that diffuse  the policies 
Tucker, etal 2012= geographic proximity 
Berry & Berry 2007= Internal actor compete with 
external actor when trading partner or3rd party in FDI 
Dobbin, etal. 2007 
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A
ct
or
s 
Diffusion Processes 
Learning Emulation 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
External actor increase the knowledge about 
policy effectivness. Their policy adoption 
does not have externality effect on the 
internal actors or potential adopters. External 
actors are not actively promoting and shaping 
policy change in potential adopters 
Matisoff, 08= % of neighboring states with RPS 
Walker 1969= interaction between potential and diffusing 
countries officials 
Berry & Berry 2007=Similar cultural and historical 
connections, common norms drive diffusion 
Finnemore, etal. 1998=common norms emerge from increased 
interaction between external and internal actors 
Graham, etal. 2013=Countries with soft power can appeal to 
others  
G
o-
be
tw
ee
ns
 
Stadelmann & Castro 2014=EU learning 
effect on European countries in transition 
Capacity building projects under 
development and environmental finance 
initiatives of international climate policy for 
developing countries 
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy 
governments or international organizations in 
federal system and international organization 
can facilitate learning 
Jenner, etal (2012)= Intersolar energy association 
Koppl & Steininger 2012=Renewable energy regime  
Simmons, etal. 2006= NGOs, policy profesionals, academics 
influence government to adopt policies 
Graham, etal 2013=Socialization aims to change preferences 
of actors, without expecting immediate policy change, but 
rather would lead to long term policy change 
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy governments or 
international organizations in federal system and international 
organization can facilitate socialization by establishing 
information centers, conferences recommending best practices 
In
te
rn
al
 
Internal actor active, external actor passive.  
Graham, etal. 2013=Policy makers seeking 
effective public policies, learn from others 
about the success political viability 
Stadelmann & Castro (2014)=Common colonial history 
Policy makers imitate a policy if else where people reelected 
those who enacted the policy (Gilardi 2010)  
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D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
variable vars n mean sd min max 
time 1 3395 2000.48 6.3 1990.0 2011.0 
region* 2 3395 3.63 2.1 1.0 7.0 
fit 3 3395 0.15 0.4 0.0 1.0 
rps 4 3395 0.03 0.2 0.0 1.0 
ccode* 5 3395 78.63 45.5 1.0 157.0 
wrps_co2 6 3395 4.57 0.7 3.9 12.3 
wrps_gdpg 7 3395 3.86 1.8 -0.5 6.5 
wfit_co2 8 3395 4.56 1.2 3.7 15.4 
wfit_gdpg 9 3395 3.86 1.9 -3.0 6.8 
regrps_co2 10 3395 4.63 3.6 0.3 18.8 
regrps_gdpg 11 3395 3.83 2.9 -6.7 12.0 
regfit_co2 12 3395 4.62 3.6 0.2 20.2 
regfit_gdpg 13 3395 3.83 3.0 -7.1 12.0 
wind 14 3395 77544.77 388272.9 0.0 3225342.0 
solar 15 3395 2041006815.49 4553811811.0 793.7 27373606560.0 
fdi 16 3185 0.94 0.2 1.0 2.0 
co2em 17 3318 4.61 6.6 0.0 68.5 
gdpg 18 3251 3.83 7.4 -64.0 150.0 
gdppc 19 3277 8549.78 13946.5 64.8 113738.7 
popul 20 3392 37450145.91 134742084.0 96286.0 1344130000.0 
eumem 21 3395 0.11 0.3 0.0 1.0 
cdm 22 3395 0.07 0.3 0.0 1.0 
neifit 23 3395 14.96 26.3 0.0 100.0 
neirps 24 3395 1.64 8.6 0.0 100.0 
sys 25 3351 1.43 0.5 1.0 2.0 
system* 26 3395 3.45 0.7 1.0 4.0 
gov 27 1963 2.14 0.9 1.0 3.0 
govorient* 28 3395 3.27 1.3 1.0 5.0 
oilres 29 3185 7.06 29.3 0.0 266.8 
goilpr 30 3395 40.11 26.4 14.4 99.7 
kyoto 31 3395 0.75 0.4 0.0 1.0 
montreal 32 3395 0.85 0.4 0.0 1.0 
cartagena 33 3395 0.29 0.5 0.0 1.0 
colonizer_rps 34 3395 0.13 0.3 0.0 1.0 
colonizer_fit 35 3395 0.27 0.4 0.0 1.0 
colonizercode* 36 3395 8.86 4.5 1.0 16.0 
comcrps 37 3395 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.5 
comcfit 38 3395 0.08 0.2 0.0 1.0 
coml_rps 39 3395 1.87 9.7 0.0 100.0 
coml_fit 40 3395 13.72 26.6 0.0 100.0 
comprps 41 3395 0.10 0.2 0.0 1.0 
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compfit 42 3395 0.42 0.3 0.0 1.0 
comcdm 43 3395 0.08 0.2 0.0 1.0 
income* 44 3395 1.69 0.8 1.0 3.0 
comfdi 45 3395 0.91 0.1 0.0 1.0 
income.group* 46 3395 3.44 1.3 1.0 5.0 
cname.y* 47 3395 78.86 45.6 1.0 157.0 
renew_gen* 48 3395 898.33 779.3 1.0 2402.0 
elec_gen* 49 3395 1398.92 934.2 1.0 3056.0 
elshare* 50 3395 148.41 174.4 1.0 474.0 
wrps_elshare 51 3395 35.41 2.8 10.3 38.6 
wfit_elshare 52 3395 35.42 3.9 7.9 49.8 
rps_elshare 53 3395 35.25 15.0 1.0 57.9 
fit_elshare 54 3395 35.25 15.6 0.0 88.0 
regrps_elshare.nrps 55 1999 -15.09 15.0 -38.5 21.5 
reg_rps_co2.nrps 56 1999 3.98 4.6 -10.9 14.0 
reg_rps_gdpg.nrps 57 1999 -1.65 1.7 -5.4 5.3 
regelshare_fit.nf 58 3395 -6.73 18.4 -52.8 46.4 
regfit_co2.nonfit 59 3395 3.21 4.2 -8.0 15.0 
regfit_gdpg.nonfit 60 3395 -0.64 2.7 -8.2 8.0 
wfit_co2_nonfit 61 3395 4.32 2.4 1.8 11.6 
wfit_gdpg_nonfit 62 3395 -0.95 1.4 -5.0 1.6 
wfit_elshare_nonfit 63 3395 -8.13 9.3 -31.2 15.0 
wrps_co2_nonrps 64 1999 4.26 1.8 2.0 7.8 
wrps_gdpg_nonrps 65 1999 -1.59 1.1 -3.2 0.4 
wrps_elshare_nonrps 66 1999 -16.37 3.8 -24.5 -9.3 
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E. CORRELATIONS 
  co
lo
ni
ze
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co
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ni
ze
r_
fit
 
co
m
on
co
lo
ny
_r
ps
 
co
m
co
lo
ny
fit
 
co
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l_
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co
m
l_
FI
T 
cd
m
 
ne
ig
hb
or
_f
it 
ne
ig
hb
o 
rp
s 
eu
m
em
 
C
o2
em
 
fd
iip
c 
colonizer_rps 1             
colonizer_fit -.067** 1           
comncolnyrps .125** .252** 1          
comcolonyfit .138** .242** .083** 1         
coml_RPS .078** 0.028 .318** -0.017 1        
coml_FIT 0.022 .087** 0.037 .480** .191** 1       
cdm .114** .272** .176** .211** .048* .152** 1      
neighborfit 0.007 0.018 .074** .287** .184** .405** .116** 1     
neighborps .167** 0.004 0.028 .200** 0.031 .155** .052* .246** 1    
eumem -.060** 
-
.123** 0.031 .143
** .182** .460** -.079** .446
** .162** 1   
Co2em .069** -.190** 
-
0.016 .061
** .050* .115** -.063** .173
** 0.03 .252** 1  
fdiipc .067** .047* 0.014 .140** 0.003 .122** 0.012 .068** .055** .096** .074** 1 
gdpg .055** .063** 0.013 .074** -0.023 
-
0.011 .065
** -0.014 0.014 
-
.064** 0.036 .107
** 
gdppcapita .081** -.127** 
-
0.011 .079
** .235** .407** -.056** .451
** .157** .495** .585** .154** 
popul .091** -0.035 0.003 0.004 .045
* -0.006 .168
** -0.01 0.029 -.053** 
-
.071** 
-
.052** 
Kyoto .223** .291** .139** .259** .116** .254** .159** .263** .106** .107** 0.027 .111** 
cartagena .255** .300** .249** .398** .223** .391** .286** .307** .188** .183** -0.037 .119
** 
oilres 0.013 -.052** -0.02 0.009 
-
0.024 
-
.065** 
-
0.026 
-
0.008 
-
0.036 
-
.067** .200
** -0.028 
Renewbles consumpn 0.005 -0.011 
-
0.019 -0.03 .127
** .097** .098** .262** -0.015 0.025 .135
** -.042* 
goilpr .355** .360** .299** .485** .210** .356** .375** .375** .222** .106** -0.002 .132
** 
system .097** -.237** -.039
* .065** .111** .183** -.104** .330
** .078** .348** .206** .048* 
govorient -.052** .083
** .110** -0.022 0.023 .083
** .043* .142** 0.039 .174** 0.014 0.019 
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E. CORRELATIONS Continued 
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colonizer_rps          
colonizer_fit          
comncolnyrps          
comcolonyfit          
coml_RPS          
coml_FIT          
cdm          
neighborfit          
neighborps          
eumem          
Co2em          
fdiipc          
gdpg 1         
gdppcapita -.043* 1        
popul .047* -.063** 1       
Kyoto .141** .136** .042* 1      
cartagena .071** .157** .054** .377** 1     
oilres .044* .063** 0.031 -.041* -.052** 1    
Renewbles consumpn -.042* .272** .286** .061** 0.021 .150** 1   
goilpr .102** .205** 0.026 .415** .740** 0.008 .038* 1  
system -.075** .437
** .091** 0.035 0.013 -.084** .143
** -0.011 1 
govorient -.077** .148
** .070** 0.014 -.044* -.102** .194
** -0.028 .226
** 
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F. OPERATIONALIZATION 
 
Independent variables operationalization      
 Abbreviation  Sources # Actor Hypothe
sis 
RPS dummy fit Renewables 
2014 Global 
Status Report 
1,2 Internal DV 
+EU membership (non=1,2) eumem EU 3 Go-betw H1a 
+former colonizer RPS (1,2) without 
colonizers 0 
colonizer_rps CEPII, created 
4 
external H2a 
+former colonizer FIT (1,2),  colonizer_fit CEPII, created 5 external H2a 
+CDM, dummy (non=1,cdm=2) cdm UNFCCC 6 Go-betw H3a 
+Foreign direct investment, (positive fdi =2, 
negative fdi=1) 
fdi WDI 
7 
external H4a 
+ %Main export partners 
(competitor)_RPS/FIT 
comfit CIA Factbook 8 external H5a 
+ %Main export partners 
(competitor)_RPS/FIT 
comrps CIA Factbook 9   
%Competitor CDM compcdm create 10 external H6a 
+%Competitor FDI compfdi  11 external H7a 
+  Difference in mean renewable electricity 
share of FIT and nonFIT countries in each 
region, Total Renewable Electricity Net 
Generation (Billion Kilowatthours)/Total 
Electricity Net Generation (Billion 
Kilowatthours)*100 
 
regelshare_fit.n
f 
EIA 
12 
External H8a 
+Difference in mean  renewable electricity 
share of RPS & nonRPS countries in each 
region 
regrps_elshare.
nrps 
EIA 
12 
External H8a 
+  Difference in mean renewable electricity 
share of FIT and nonFIT countries in world,  
 
wfit_elshare_no
nfit 
EIA 
12 
External H9a 
+Difference in mean  renewable electricity 
share of RPS & nonRPS countries in world 
wrps_elshare_n
onrps 
EIA 
12 
External H9a 
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric 
tons per capita) of fit & nonfit countries in 
each region 
regfit_co2.nonfi
t 
Created-WDI 
13 
External H10a 
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric 
tons per capita) of RPS & nonRPS countries in 
each region 
reg_rps_co2.nrp
s 
Created-WDI 
13 
External H10a 
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric 
tons per capita) of fit & nonfit countries in 
world 
wfit_co2_nonfit Created-WDI 
13 
External H11a 
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric 
tons per capita) of RPS & nonRPS countries in 
world 
wrps_co2_nonr
ps 
Created-WDI 
13 
External H11a 
Difference in mean GDP growth (annual %) 
share of RPS & nonRPS countries in each 
region 
reg_rps_gdpg.n
rps 
Created-WDI 
14 
External H12a 
+  Difference in GDP growth (annual %) of 
FIT and nonFIT countries of each region 
 
regfit_gdpg.non
fit 
Created-WDI 
14 
External H12a 
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+  Difference in GDP growth (annual %) of 
FIT and nonFIT countries in world 
 
wfit_gdpg_nonf
it 
Created-WDI 
14 
External H13a 
+  Difference in GDP growth (annual %) of 
RPS and non-RPS countries in world 
 
wfit_gdpg_nonf
it 
Created-WDI 
14 
External H13a 
+% of neighboring states with RPS 
 
Nei_rps created 15 External H14a 
+% of neighboring states with FIT 
 
nei_fit created 16 External H14a 
+Common colony, % of countries with the 
same colonizer having RPS, countries that 
were not part of a colony coded 0,  
commoncolony
_rps 
CEPII, created 0 External H12a % of c untries with the same colonizer 
h ving FIT, countries without a colony coded 
0 
Co oncolo 
ny_fit 17 
5
+ % of countries with the same colonizer 
having RPS, countries without a colony coded 
0 
commoncolony
_fit 
CEPII, created 
18 
 H15a 
+ % countries with common language RPS coml_RPS CEPII, created 19 External H16a 
+ % countries with common language FIT coml_FIT CEPII, created 20 External H16a 
+Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, dummy cartagena IEAD 22 Go-betw H17a 
+Kyoto Protocol from the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change,dummy 
kyoto IEAD 
21 
Go-Betw H18a 
+The Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer.  dummy 
montreal IEAD 23 Go-betw H19a 
+CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) Co2em WDI 13 External C(control 
+Global oil price goilpr EIA 24 Go-betw C 
+GDP per capita (Current US$) gdppc WDI 25 internal C 
+Population popul WDI 26 internal C 
Government Orientation, -right, center, +left govorient WBDPI 27 internal C 
System  (presidential, parliamentary) 
 
system WBDPI 28 internal C 
-Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels) 
 
oilres EIA 29 internal C 
+wind =Total Resource Area (km^2) at 50m, 
Classes 3-7 
wind Data Catalogue 30 internal  
+solar= total potential solar energy per year 
MWh/year 
solar Data Catalogue 
31 
internal  
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G. ABM CODE 
 
Setup 
 
 There are three types of actors: igos, nation_states and i_actors. At the setup they 
are initialized. In addition, competitors are identified for each country. Each country has five 
competitors. The countries also become members of international organizations. The six 
measures that will be reported at the end of each run are setup.  
In the hypothetical world there are 100 countries. One country is located in each cell. The 
world is divided into 5 regions. Each country is member of the international organization in their 
region. There are 100 people. There is one person in each country.  
 
 
 
;Setup and Initialization of Patches  
 
to setup 
  clear-all  
  clear-all-plots 
  
  create-igos 5 [ set color yellow ] 
 
  ask patches [initialize-patches] 
  ask nation_states [initialize-nation_states] 
  ask igos [initialize-igos] 
  ask i_actors [initialize-i_actors] 
  ask turtles [initialize-turtles] 
  setup-competitors 
  setup-members 
 
    ;; added code for purposes of measurement in behaviorspace 
 
set max-power-difference power-differ  
  set max-compliance-difference compliance-difference 
  set max-regional-difference regional-proportion 
  set lasttick_power 0 
  set lasttick_comply 0 
  set lasttick_region 0 
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  reset-ticks 
end 
 
 
to initialize-patches 
sprout-i_actors 1 ; populate the world with 100 agents with one on each cell 
  sprout-nation_states 1 
   
  if pycor < 2 [ 
                set region 0 
                set pcolor 56 ; A shade of green 
                
                ] 
if pycor >= 2  [ 
               set region 1 
               set pcolor 8 ; A shade of grey 
                
              ] 
if pycor >= 4  [ 
               set region 2 
               set pcolor 35 ; A shade of brown 
              ] 
if pycor >= 6  [ 
               set region 3 
               set pcolor 118 ; A shade of violet 
              ] 
if pycor >= 8  [ 
               set region 4 
               set pcolor 127 ; A shade of magenta 
              ] 
 
end 
;“Go" and “Activate Dyad" Commands 
 
;Initialization of Agents 
to initialize-i_actors 
set size .4 
set color pink 
set shape "person" 
 
set i random 2   
set i 0  
ask n-of person=1 i_actors [set i 1]  
if i = 1 [set color white] 
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set reelection random-float 1 
ifelse reelection  < reelection=1 [set reelection 1] [set reelection 0] 
set competitiveness random-float 1 
ifelse competitiveness  < competitiveness=1 [set competitiveness 1] [set competitiveness 0] 
 
 
end 
to initialize-igos 
ask igos [move-to one-of patches with [not any? igos in-radius 2] ]  
 
ask igos [set member nation_states-on neighbors] 
 
ask igo 1 [set membership  1]  
ask igo 2 [set membership  2]  
ask igo 3 [set membership  3]  
ask igo 4 [set membership  4]  
ask igo 0 [set membership 0]  
ask igo 4 [move-to patch 3 9 ]  
ask igo 3 [move-to patch 5 6 ]  
ask igo 2 [move-to patch 3 4 ]  
ask igo 1 [move-to patch 5 3 ]  
ask igo 0 [move-to patch 4 1 ]  
 
 
set shape "circle" 
      set color cyan 
      set size .4 
   
 
set i random 2   
set i 0  
ask n-of igo=1 igos [set i 1]  
if i = 1 [set color white] 
 
end 
 
to initialize-nation_states 
 
  ;; NEED TO INITIALIZE ALL THREE TYPES OF ACTORS 
   
set color black 
set shape "star" 
set size .9  
 
ask nation_states [ if pycor < 2 [ 
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                set membership 0 
                ]] 
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 2 [ 
                 
                set membership 1 
                ]] 
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 4 [ 
                 
                set membership 2 
                ]] 
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 6 [ 
                 
                set membership 3 
                ]] 
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 8 [ 
                 
                set membership 4 
                ]]                
 
 
set utility-star random-normal 2.5 1 
 
 if             utility-star < 1 [set utility 1] 
if utility-star >= 1 and utility-star < 2 [set utility 2] 
if utility-star >= 2 and utility-star < 3 [set utility 3] 
if utility-star >= 3 and utility-star < 4 [set utility 4] 
if utility-star >= 4             [set utility 5] 
 
 
set non-compliance-star random-normal 2.5 1 
 
 if             non-compliance-star < 1 [set non-compliance 1] 
if non-compliance-star >= 1 and non-compliance-star < 2 [set non-compliance 2] 
if non-compliance-star >= 2 and non-compliance-star < 3 [set non-compliance 3] 
if non-compliance-star >= 3 and non-compliance-star < 4 [set non-compliance 4] 
if non-compliance-star >= 4             [set non-compliance 5] 
 
set compliance-star random-normal 2.5 1 
 
 if             compliance-star < 1 [set compliance 1] 
if compliance-star >= 1 and compliance-star < 2 [set compliance 2] 
if compliance-star >= 2 and compliance-star < 3 [set compliance 3] 
if compliance-star >= 3 and compliance-star < 4 [set compliance 4] 
if compliance-star >= 4             [set compliance 5] 
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if Power-Distribution = "Poisson" [ 
set power random-poisson 1 + 1 
if power > 5 [set power 5] 
] 
 
if Power-Distribution =  "Normal" [ 
set power-star random-normal 2.5 1 
if             power-star < 1 [set power 1] 
if power-star >= 1 and power-star < 2 [set power 2] 
if power-star >= 2 and power-star < 3 [set power 3] 
if power-star >= 3 and power-star < 4 [set power 4] 
if power-star >= 4             [set power 5] 
 
] 
if Power-Distribution = "Uniform" [ 
set power random 5 + 1 
if power > 5 [set power 5] 
] 
 
 
set i random-float 1 
ifelse i < probability-i=1 [set i 1] [set i 0] 
 
if i = 1 [set color white] 
 
set ruling-p random-float 1 
ifelse ruling-p < party=1 [set ruling-p 1] [set ruling-p 0] 
 
 
ifelse show-power? [set label power ] [set label ""] 
set label-color black 
 
 
end 
 
to initialize-turtles  
 set dependence random-normal 2.5 1  
 
set popularity random-float 1 
ifelse popularity < popularity=1 [set popularity 1] [set popularity 0] 
 
 
end  
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to setup-competitors 
  ask nation_states 
  [ 
    set my-competitors n-of 5 nation_states with [ self != myself ] 
  ] 
end 
 
to setup-members 
  ask igo 0 
  [ 
    set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 56] 
     
  ] 
 
  ask igo 1 
  [ 
    set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 8] 
     
  ] 
   ask igo 2 
  [ 
    set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 35] 
     
  ]  
    
 ask igo 3 
  [ 
    set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 118] 
     
  ]  
  ask igo 4 
  [ 
    set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 127] 
     
  ]  
      
end 
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To go 
 
In the go procedure randomly two agents will be activated at each time tick. One of them 
is the receiver nation state and the other is a sender, which can be another nation state, an igo or a 
person. These two agents interact. Based on the interaction rules, the nation states decides to 
adopt a new policy or keep the status quo. There are separate rules for each mechanism. One of 
the four mechanisms is selected in the interface.   
 
 
to go 
 activate-dyad  
 interact 
 ask nation_states [if i = 1 [set color white]] 
 if not any? nation_states with [color = black] [stop] 
 calculate-proportion-i 
 calculate-proportion-region-i 
 calculate-power 
 calculate-compliance 
 Ask nation_states [set compet_i mean [ i ] of my-competitors] 
  Ask igos [set member_i mean [ i ] of my-members] 
   measure-system 
tick 
end 
 
to activate-dyad 
ask patches [ 
  if region = 0 [set pcolor 56] ; Reset the previous sender and receiver 
  if region = 1 [set pcolor 9] ; to their original color of their region 
   if region = 2 [set pcolor 35] ; Reset the previous sender and receiver 
  if region = 3[set pcolor 118] ; to their original color of their region 
  if region = 4 [set pcolor 127] ; to their original color of their region 
   ] 
ask one-of patches [set pcolor red] ; select a random receiver 
ask one-of turtles [ifelse any? igos-on patch-here [set pcolor green] [set pcolor random-color]] ; 
select a random sender 
 
ask nation_states [ 
  set r? false ; reset the previous receiver 
  if pcolor = red [set r? true ]] 
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ask nation_states [ 
set s? false ;reset the previous sender 
if pcolor = sky [set s? true]  ; set indicator for sender and receiver  
  ] 
ask igos [ 
  
 set s? false ;reset the previous sender 
  if pcolor = red and breed = nation_states [set r? true] 
   if pcolor = green [set s? true]  ; set indicator for sender and receiver  
  ] 
  
ask i_actors [ 
  
  set s? false ;reset the previous sender 
if pcolor = yellow [set s? true]  ; set indicator for sender and receiver  
  ] 
 
set i-s count turtles with [ i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators 
set i-n count nation_states with [i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators 
set i-ig count igos with [i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators 
set i-iactor count i_actors with [i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators 
 
 
set p-r count nation_states with [ ruling-p = 1 and r? = true ]  
 
set commitment-r count nation_states with [ commitment = 1 and r? = true ]  
 
set popularity-iactor count i_actors with [popularity = 1 and s? = true]  ; update the indicators 
 
set reelection-s count i_actors with [reelection = 1 and s? = true and i = 1] 
 
set competitiveness-s count i_actors with [competitiveness = 1 and s? = true] 
 
set mem_i count igos with [s? = true and member_i >= 0.5]  
 
end 
 
to measure-compliance 
  set max-compliance-difference compliance-difference  
end  
 
to measure-system 
        set max-power-difference power-differ 
        set lasttick_power end-powerdiff 
         
        set max-regional-difference regional-proportion 
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        set lasttick_region end-regiondiff 
         
        set max-compliance-difference compliance-difference 
        set lasttick_comply end-complydiff 
end 
 
;Interaction Rules 
to interact 
   
if Mechanism = "Coercion" [ 
 
if i-n = 1 
and hierarchy > 0 
and dependency > 0 
[ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
 
] 
  
if i-ig = 1 
and cost >= 0  
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
 
] 
if i-iactor = 1 
and popularity-iactor = 1  
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
  
] 
] 
if Mechanism = "Competition" [ 
if i-n = 1 
and hierarchy <= abs 1 
 
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true and compet_i >= 0.5 ] [set i 1] 
] 
 
 
if i-iactor = 1 
and competitiveness-s = 1  
 
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
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] 
] 
 
if Mechanism = "Emulation" [ 
if i-n = 1 
and hierarchy <= abs 1 
and neighbor = true 
 
[ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
] 
if i-ig = 1 
and mem_i = 1 
 
 
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true  ] [set i 1] 
 ] 
 
 
if i-iactor = 1 
and p-r = 1  
 
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
  
] 
] 
if Mechanism = "Learning" [ 
if i-n = 1 
and hierarchy <= abs 1 
and benefit >= 0  
 
[ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
] 
if i-ig = 1 
 
 [ 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
 ] 
if i-iactor = 1 
and reelection-s = 1 
 
 [ 
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ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1] 
  
] 
] 
 
end 
 
 
;Reporters and Output 
 
 
to-report regional-proportion 
   
The code to update the largest regional difference within a run 
   
   
  let difference-set [ ] 
   
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionA-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionB-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionC-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionD-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionE-i difference-set 
   
  let maxproportion max difference-set 
  let minproportion min difference-set 
   
  let maxdifference maxproportion - minproportion 
   
  ifelse (maxdifference > max-regional-difference) 
     [ 
       report maxdifference 
     ] 
     [ 
       report max-regional-difference 
     ] 
   
end   
 
to-report end-regiondiff 
   
  let thistime lasttick_region 
 
   
  let difference-set [ ] 
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  set difference-set lput proportion-regionA-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionB-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionC-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionD-i difference-set 
  set difference-set lput proportion-regionE-i difference-set 
 
  let maxproportion max difference-set 
  let minproportion min difference-set 
   
  let maxdifference maxproportion - minproportion 
   
  if (maxdifference >= max-regional-difference) 
    [ 
      set thistime ticks 
    ] 
     
  report thistime 
 
end 
   
 
to-report compliance-difference 
  let this-difference  compliance-with-i - non-compliance-without-i 
  if (this-difference > max-compliance-difference) 
  [set max-compliance-difference this-difference 
  ] 
  report max-compliance-difference 
end  
 
to-report end-complydiff 
   
  let thistime lasttick_comply 
   
  let this-difference  compliance-with-i - non-compliance-without-i 
  if (this-difference >= max-compliance-difference ) 
  [ 
    set thistime ticks 
  ] 
   
  report thistime 
   
end 
 
 
to-report power-differ 
        let this-difference power-without-i - power-with-i 
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        if (this-difference > max-power-difference) 
                [ 
                        set max-power-difference this-difference 
                ] 
        report max-power-difference 
end 
 
to-report end-powerdiff 
   
  let thistime lasttick_power 
   
          let this-difference power-without-i - power-with-i 
          if (this-difference >= max-power-difference ) 
          [ 
            set thistime ticks 
          ] 
           
    report thistime 
end 
 
 
;max-power-difference 
;max-regional-difference 
;max-compliance-difference 
;lasttick_power 
;lasttick_comply 
;lasttick_region 
 
 to-report igo-membership  
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set membership-r membership] 
 ask igos with [s? = true] [set membership-s membership] 
 report membership-r - membership-s 
end 
 
to-report cost  
 ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set compliance-r compliance] 
 ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set non-compliance-r non-compliance] 
 report non-compliance-r - compliance-r  
end 
 
to-report benefit 
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set utility-s utility] 
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set utility-r utility] 
report utility-s -  utility-r  
end 
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to-report dependency   
ask turtles with [s? = true] [set dependence-s dependence] 
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set dependence-r dependence] 
report dependence-s -  dependence-r  
end 
 
to-report hierarchy  
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set power-s power] 
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set power-r power] 
report power-s -  power-r  
end 
 
to-report neighbor 
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set neighborhood-s region] 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set neighborhood-r region] 
ifelse neighborhood-s = neighborhood-r [set same-region? True] [set same-region? false] 
report same-region? 
end 
 
to-report trade  
 
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set tp-s tp] 
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set tp-r tp] 
ifelse tp-s = tp-r  [set trade? true] [set trade?  false]  
report trade? 
end 
 
to-report random-color 
  report one-of [sky yellow] 
end  
 
 
 
to calculate-proportion-i 
set-current-plot "Proportion of States with i=1" 
let number_i count nation_states with [i = 1] 
let number_nation_states count nation_states 
let proportion-i number_i  / number_nation_states 
plot proportion-i 
end 
 
to calculate-proportion-region-i 
set-current-plot "Regional Difference" 
 
set-current-plot-pen "RegionA" 
let number_regionA_i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 0] 
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let number_regionA_nation_states count nation_states with [region = 0] 
set proportion-regionA-i number_regionA_i  / number_regionA_nation_states 
plot proportion-regionA-i 
 
set-current-plot-pen "RegionB" 
let number-regionB-i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 1] 
let number-regionB-nation_states count nation_states with [region = 1] 
set proportion-regionB-i number-regionB-i  / number-regionB-nation_states 
plot proportion-regionB-i 
 
set-current-plot-pen "RegionC" 
let number_regionC_i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 2] 
let number_regionC_nation_states count nation_states with [region = 2] 
set proportion-regionC-i number_regionC_i  / number_regionC_nation_states 
plot proportion-regionC-i 
 
set-current-plot-pen "RegionD" 
let number-regionD-i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 3] 
let number-regionD-nation_states count nation_states with [region = 3] 
set proportion-regionD-i number-regionD-i  / number-regionD-nation_states 
plot proportion-regionD-i 
 
set-current-plot-pen "RegionE" 
let number-regionE-i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 4] 
let number-regionE-nation_states count nation_states with [region = 4] 
set proportion-regionE-i number-regionE-i  / number-regionE-nation_states 
plot proportion-regionE-i 
 
end 
 
to calculate-power 
set-current-plot "Power Difference" 
set-current-plot-pen "Mean-i=0" 
set power-without-i mean [power] of nation_states with [i = 0] 
plot power-without-i 
set-current-plot-pen "Mean-i=1" 
set power-with-i mean [power] of nation_states with [i = 1] 
plot power-with-i 
 
end  
 
to calculate-compliance 
set-current-plot "Compliance Difference" 
set-current-plot-pen "compliance-i=1" 
set compliance-with-i mean [compliance] of nation_states with [i = 1] 
plot compliance-with-i 
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set-current-plot-pen "non-compliance-i=0" 
set non-compliance-without-i mean [non-compliance] of nation_states with [i = 0] 
plot non-compliance-without-i 
 
end 
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